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LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: THE MICHIGAN PROPOSALS
Jerold H. Israel*
IN March 1971, the Michigan Bar Commissioners appointed a
twenty-five-member committee with a directive "to promulgate
a recommended revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure codi-
fying existing statutory and case law provisions which, in the judg-
ment of the Committee, should be retained and adding thereto such
provisions as the Committee, in its judgment, deems warranted;
and to incorporate such recommendations into proposed legislation
for submission to the Legislature."' The committee membership in-
cluded judges, prosecutors, legislators, criminal defense lawyers, law
school professors, and representatives of Michigan police and cor-
rections agencies.2 Judge Horace Gilmore served as Chairman, and
I served as Reporter.
After twenty day-long meetings over a two-year period, the Com-
mittee temporarily concluded its work with proposed statutes on
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan, B.B.A. 1956, Western" Reserve Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1959, Yale University.-Ed.
1. Letter from Charles Joiner, President of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author,
March 30, 1973. The Committee was supported by a grant from the Michigan Office of
Criminal Justice Programs under the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
The Committee did not reexamine the appropriate division of authority between
court rule and legislation, but simply followed the current legal structure. The Com-
mittee presented its recommendations in the form of proposed legislation because the
current provisions on search and seizure are contained in the Michigan Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. In some jurisdictions many of the subjects treated in the proposed
statute (e.g., the subjects of sections 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9) are governed by court rule.
2. Members who were legislators did not actively participate in the committee meet-
ings because the proposals would eventually be submitted to their legislative commit-
tees. Other committee members included: private attorneys Ivan E. Barris, Harry L.
Pliskow, James Renfrew, Myzell Sowell (Chief Defender of the Detroit Legal Aid and
Defender's Association), Sheldon Toll, and Joseph Wilcox; prosecuting attorneys William
L. Cahalan (Wayne County) and James K. Miller (Kent County); James Shonkwiler
(Executive Director, Prosecuting Attorneys Association); Judges Thomas G. Kavanagh
(Supreme Court), Timothy Quinn (Court of Appeals), Horace Gilmore (Wayne County
Circuit), Donald Reisig, (Ingham County Circuit), Joseph Sullivan (Wayne County Cir-
cuit), Geraldine Ford (Recorder's Court), Donald Leonard (Recorder's Court), and
Daniel Walsh (initially District Court, Gaylord, and now Court of Appeals); Marcell
Greenia, Director of Legal Services, Supreme Court; Department of Corrections officials
Gus Harrison (former Director), Perry Johnson (Director), and Roy Nelson (Deputy
Director); police officials John Brown (Colonel, Michigan State Police), Kenneth
Preadmore (Sheriff, Ingham County), and John Nichols (former Detroit Police Com-
missioner); and Professors B.J. George (Wayne State University) and Jerold Israel
(University of Michigan). Myzell Sowell often was represented at meetings by George
Crockett, III; William Cahalan was represented by James Garber and Richard
Padzieski; Perry Johnson was represented by Edward Turner, and John Nichols was
represented by William Morris and Richard McKnight.
[ 222 ]
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Search and Seizure, Arrest, Disposition of Arrested Persons, Appear-
ance Tickets, Summons, Grand Jury Operations, and Proseciltion
Investigatory Depositions. What follows is a modified version of the
Reporter's Commentary on the proposed statute dealing with "Search
and Seizure." (The statute appears in an appendix to this article.)
I have attempted to restate the major arguments advanced by Com-
mittee members in support of the statute, and where'the Committee
was sharply divided on a particular policy issue, to restate the posi-
tions advanced by the dissenters.
Various factors contributed to the selection of search and seizure
as the initial topic for Committee consideration. First, although the
Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure provisions on search war-
rants8 were revised as recently as 1966, developments since then ne-
cessitated reconsideration of at least some portions of that revision.
The drafters of the 1966 provisions obviously had not anticipated
Supreme Court decisions that expanded the area in which warrants
are constitutionally required for a valid search. Furthermore, a sig-
nificant increase in the use of warrants, particularly in connection
with household searches, had produced a corresponding increase in
administrative burdens that previously were viewed as too insignifi-
cant to merit legislative consideration. 4
Second, the 1966 revision dealt only with search warrants; there
had been no reexamination of the legislative treatment of warrant-
less searches since the complete code revision of 1927. In the mean-
time, both the practice and precedents relating to warrantless searches
had dramatically changed.
A third factor was the availability of legislative materials that
could serve as helpful models in drafting. In particular, the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure5
extensively considers all aspects of search and seizure. Recently
adopted state procedural codes also include substantial provisions
on several aspects of search and seizure.6
Finally, the Committee recognized that time limitations would
3. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.651-.659 (1968).
4. Although statewide statistics were unavailable, the Detroit experience appeared
fairly typical. The number of search warrants obtained annually in Detroit wag esti-
mated by the Wayne County Prosecutor's office to have jumped from less than 100 in
1968 to over 1800 in 1972. Most of the increase has been attributed to Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), particularly as it relates to household searches.
5. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Official Draft No. 1, 1972).
[hereinafter ALl CODE].
6. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § i08-1 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2501 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. CRiur. P. LAw § 690 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15A, arts. 9-10,
§§ 15A-221 to -231 (effective July 1, 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.10 (1971).
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mich. L. Rev.  223 1974-1975
Michigan Law Review
not permit reexamination of all aspects of pretrial procedure before
its initial report was due. Search and seizure was particularly appro-
priate for initial consideration because the provisions relating to
that area are largely self-contained. A significant revision of search
and seizure law could be adopted without substantial alteration of
provisions dealing with other components of criminal procedure.
The Committee concentrated primarily on possible legislative
guidelines relating to five aspects of the law governing search and
seizure: (1) the degree of probability of finding seizable items re-
quired to justify various forms of invasion of privacy that might be
characterized as "searches"; (2) justifications for engaging in a search
without first obtaining a search warrant, and the permissible scope
of warrantless searches; (3) procedural requirements for obtaining
a search warrant; (4) execution of searches and seizures both
with and without warrants, including retention and disposition of
seized matter; and (5) application of the exclusionary rule to bar
use of evidence obtained through searches and seizures in violation
of statutory standards. After examining each of these areas, the
Committee decided to propose legislation only on the third and
fourth topics, and on a limited aspect of the first topic.
In reaching this decision, the Committee appeared to be guided
by certain basic premises as to the appropriate role of legislation
in the area of search and seizure. The Committee generally assumed
that those aspects of search and seizure law that are largely governed
by constitutional limitations should be left to the courts. The pri-
mary role of legislation should be in areas, such as execution and
administration, in which the courts generally have found no sig-
nificant constitutional requirements or only general requirements
that grant the states considerable leeway in fashioning guidelines.
Committee members frequently contended that proposed legislation
that merely repeats judicially developed constitutional standards
carries a burden of special justification. Such legislation adds noth-
ing to the present substance of the law, and might well prove per-
nicious if subsequent judicial decisions alter constitutional stan-
dards. If later decisions grant the police less leeway in conducting
searches, the existence of the broader legislative standard might cast
doubt even on activities that comply with the new decisions. At
times courts have seemed to be as concerned with the constitution-
ality of - the legislative authorization under which police acted as
with the police activity itself.7 If subsequent decisions expand police
7. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Whitaker,
[Vol. 73:221224.
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authority, the legislature may find that it has imposed more restric-
tive limits than it otherwise would have thought desirable. When"
codifying a judicially developed constitutional limitation, the legis-
lature is unlikely to examine the subject in such detail as to be
certain that any future judicial dilution of that limitation would
necessarily be unacceptable as a matter of public policy.
Notwithstanding this general concern, the Committee recognized
that there are instances in which legislation can appropriately ad-
dress topics governed largely by constitutional limitations. Where
current judicial guidelines authorize searches deemed undesirable
as a matter of public policy, more restrictive legislative guidelines
ordinarily are required. Similarly, where a particular practice is
viewed as desirable but its constitutionality has been questioned,
legislative approval may help in gaining ultimate judicial approval.8
The Committee also appreciated the administrative benefits pro-
vided by a code so comprehensive as to include all of the basic
guidelines (constitutional and nonconstitutional) applicable to a
particular subject. Most members viewed such a task as more appro-
priate for a treatise or a Model Standards project, but they were
willing to support it to a limited extent. A legislative restatement of
current constitutional standards would be acceptable if it could pro-
vide specific guidelines sufficient to lend substantial assistance to
magistrates and prosecutors without requiring a detailed examina-
tion of judicial opinions. It was generally agreed, however, that this
criterion would not be met by simply adding a "shopping list" of fac-
tors that might be considered on a case-by-case basis in applying a
general constitutional standard. Such enumerations frequently are
based on a series of appellate decisions that illustrate the applicability
of particular factors in a far better fashion than a legislative listing
that strips those factors from the context in whichf they were devel-
oped.9 Indeed, a legislative listing of potentially relevant factors is
343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), revd., 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.. 953
and sub nom. Perrerra v. United States, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). But see Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973).
8. See, e.g., text at notes 75-76 infra. Cf. Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination
of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MiCH."
L. REv. 15, 33-34 n.70 (1974). In a few areas there may be reason to believe that legis-
lative authorization might even gain judicial acceptance of practices previously held
invalid. See note 306 infra.
9. The Committee recognized that such listings may be more appropriate in police
regulations, where specific examples can be provided to illustrate the weight a certain
factor should receive in a particular case. See, e.g., PRojFxr ON LAW ENFORcENTr
PoLicy AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULEs: SToP AND F IuK (1973) [hereinafter PLE MoDEL;
RuLs]. See also Quinn, The Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth.
Decemaber 1974]
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often misleading, even as a restatement of constitutional standards,
because it fails to reveal that certain elements often tend to be far
more important than others.
I. PROBABILITY REQUIREMENTS
The Committee considered various proposals relating to the
degree of probability needed for different forms of searches, in-
cluding the extensive provisions in the ALl Code. The Committee
concluded that, aside from the area of court orders directing par-
ticipation in nontestimonial identification procedures, adoption of
legislation attempting to define probability requirements would be
inappropriate at this time.
A. Probable Cause for a "Full Search"
The nature of the "probable cause" needed to justify a "full-
fledged" search has been the subject of considerable discussion in
Michigan and federal decisions. Those decisions have not established
a specific required quantum of probability, such as the "more-prob-
able-than-not" standard that concerned the Reporters for the ALI
Code.10 Instead, most simply have emphasized that probable cause
consists of more than "mere suspicion" (that is, more than an as-
sumption of probability not supported by objective facts)."1 Several
decisions, attempting to provide a more precise definition, have de-
scribed probable cause as a probability sufficiently "substantial"'
2 or
"reasonable" to justify a search in the judgment of a "prudent and
careful person, having due regard for the rights of others."' 3 What
Amendment Rights, 52 J. URBAN L. 25 (1974), proposing a rulemaking procedure that
would require a case-by-case development of fourth amendment standards. A listing
of r~levant factors may also be appropriate in a provision governing an area such as
bail, in which there are likely to be few appellate decisions illustrating the appropriate
applications of the factors. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1970).
10. See ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 133-36.
11. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); People v. Walker,
385 Mich. 565, 575, 189 N.W.2d 234, 239 (1971).
12. See People v. laconis, 29 Mich. App. 443, 454, 185 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1971), affd,
sub nom. People v. Bercheny, 387 Mich. 431, 196 N.W.2d 767 (1972).
13. People v. Miller, 245 Mich. 115, 118, 222 N.W. 151, 152 (1928). See also People v.
Goss, 246 Mich. 524, 224 N.W. 364 (1929); People v. Smith, 43 Mich. App. 400, 407, 204
N.W.2d 308, 312 (1972).
The term "reasonable cause" rather than "probable cause" is used in the proposed
draft, but the same degree of probability applies to both terms under Michigan deci-
sions and statutes. See People v. Siemieniec, 368 Mich. 405, 407, 118 N.W.2d 430, 432
(1962); People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 499-500, 113 N.W.2d 808, 811, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 930 (1962); People v. LaTeur, 39 Mich. App. 700, 703, 198 N.W.2d 727, 729
(1972); M ca. Comp'. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.433, 780.651 (1968), 925.455(2) (Supp. 1974-1975).
See also ALl CODE, supra note 5, at 163-64. The Committee selected the phrase "reason-
[Vol. 73:221
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constitutes a sufficiently substantial or reasonable degree of proba-
bility may vary with such factors as the nature and purpose of the
search and the use of the warrant.1 4 A legislative definition that
merely restates such generalities would add little to the current body
of law; 15 yet a more exact definition could not be provided without
examining specific fact situations. 6 Even then, legislation could do
little more than provide a "shopping list" of potentially relevant
factors-a function the Committee generally viewed as inappropriate
for legislation.
17
B. Other Probability Requirements
The key issue facing the Committee in considering probability
requirements was whether it should propose legislation authorizing
limited searches based upon a standard less stringent than probable
cause. Possible subjects of legislation were the regulatory inspection,
the frisk incident to a temporary stop, and the obtaining of identi-
fication evidence (e.g., hair or blood samples) upon court order. The
Committee decided not to treat the first two subjects, but section
22 of the proposed statute provides for issuance of identification
orders on a "group probable cause" basis.
1. Inspections
The Committee concluded that the guidelines governing inspec-
tion searches should vary according to the nature of the inspection
involved. The same standards need not apply to the inspection of
households to determine whether there has been compliance with
building code standards and the inspection of a weapons dealer's
able cause" because it is the phrase most frequently used in the current provisions.
Cf. id. § SS 210.1.
14. See, e.g., People v. White, 54 Mich. App. 842, 220 N.W.2d 789 (1974); People v.
Kremko, 52 Mich. App. 565, 218 N.W.2d 112 (1974). See also text at notes 126, 190, 200
infra.
15. See, e.g., ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 210.1(7) (" 'Reasonable cause to believe'
means a basis for belief in the existence of facts which, in view of the circumstances
under and purposes for which the standard is applied, is substantial, objective, and
sufficient to satisfy applicable constitutional requirements.'); MicH. Comp,. LAwS ANN.
§ 300.12 (1967) (governing conservation officers) ("For the purposes of this act, 'probable
cause' or 'probable cause to believe' shall be considered to be present on the part of a
peace officer where there are facts which would induce any fair-minded man of average
intelligence and judgment to believe that a law or statute has been violated or was
being violated contrary to any of the aforesaid statutes or laws.").
16. See, e.g., People v. Parisi, 46 Mich. App. 822, 208 N.W.2d 70 (1973) (distinctive
odors as basis for probable cause); People v. Hall, 40 Mich. App. 329, 198 N.W.2d 762
(1972) ("furtive gesture" or "evasive action" as basis for probable cause). See generally
Cook, Probable Cause To Arrest, 24 VANm. L. Ruv. 317 (1971).
17. See text at note 9 supra.
December 1974)
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place of business to determine whether he is operating beyond his
licensed authority.18 Greater flexibility should be permitted where,
as in the case of the weapons dealer, violations are easily concealed
and noncontinuous in nature, and the enterprise is "pervasively reg-
ulated" because of its unique and potentially dangerous nature.19
The numerous Michigan provisions that govern regulatory inspec-
tions vary considerably in describing the required grounds for in-
specting a particular premises. For example, the provision that gov-
erns inspections for possible housing law violations20 requires that
inspections be justified on a geographical area, complaint, or recur-
rent-violation- basis. Other provisions apparently give the inspector
authority to conduct random inspections at his discretion.21 The
Controlled Substances Act of 197122 requires that inspections be jus-
tified by "probable cause," which is said to exist "upon showing
a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this act or
rules hereunder, sufficient to justify administrative inspection ...
in the circumstances specified in the application for the warrant."23
The Committee concluded that any general guideline capable of
application to most (if not all) regulatory inspections would be of
limited value. The required probability standard would have to be
so broad that it would add very little to the general judicial stan.
dards that already exist.24
18. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), with United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
19. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972) (inspection of weapons
dealer's locked storeroom pursuant to Federal Gun Control Act). In lBiswell the Court
upheld a warrantless inspection during business hours achieved without forcible entry.
The Court held that, notwithstanding the absence of a warrant, the inspection consti-
tuted "reasonable official conduct under the Fourth Amendment." 406 U.S. at 316.
In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court had held that a warrant was constitu-
tionally required for an inspection of a commercial warehouse for possible building
code violations. In both See and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1972), the
Court applied a "balancing" test in determining the applicable requirements of the
fourth amendment. Biswell applied the same test, but found that the special factors
of that case-particularly the limited expectation of privacy in such a "pervasively
regulated business," the "essential" need for "unannounced, even frequent inspections"
to deter regulatory violations, and the "large interests ... at stake" in preventing such
violations-justified dispensing with the warrant requirement. 406 U.S. at 316. See
generally Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment:
A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1011 (1973). Presumably the same balancing analysis also would justify granting the
weapons inspector far more leeway in selecting a particular dealer for inspection than
would be granted the building inspector in selecting a particular household. Cf. id.
at 1022.
20. Mrcii. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.526 (Supp. 1974-1975).
21. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 289.265 (inspection of enterprises selling
meat), 330.62 (1967) (mental hospital or residential facility).
22. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 335.301-.367 (Supp. 1974-1975).
23. Mic. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 335.352(2) (Supp. 1974-1975).
24. See, e.g., ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § SS 250 (inspection must be in accordance
[Vol. 73:221
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Similar difficulties would be presented in drafting a standard
governing the need for warrants in inspection searches. A few Mich-
igan provisions require issuance of a warrant, but most do not.25
While some current statutes may be constitutionally defective in
failing to require warrants, certain warrantless inspections dearly
are constitutional. 6 The ALI Code would establish a general policy
requiring officials to seek consent for all inspections; if consent is
denied, they must obtain an administrative or judicial warrant (un-
less an emergency exists).2 The Committee concluded that such a
policy failed to give proper weight to the wide variations among
different types of inspections in terms of the available personnel of
the agency involved, the number of inspections, the scope of the
inspections, and the need for immediate access to ensure that the
inspection is effective. To test the ALI policy properly, each area
of regulation would have to bd examined separately by a group with
some expertise as to agency operations. Inspection provisions are
not designed or utilized primarily for criminal investigation, 28
considerable weight must be given to their regulatory function apart
from the use of possible criminal sanctions. The Committee con-
cluded that an evaluation of that sort was beyond both its expertise
and the task assigned to it by the Commissioners.
2. Frisks
The Committee also decided against proposing legislation gov-
erning police authority to "frisk" suspects who have not been ar-
rested. There was considerable doubt as to the need for specific
legislation on this topic. In Terry v. Ohio29 and Adams v. Williams0
with "reasonable legislative or administrative standards'). Cf. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 335.352 (Supp. 1974-1975), quoted in text at note 23 supra. Any proposed siandard
would also have to distinguish between "regulatory inspections" and those so-called
"inspections" that are designed to uncover evidence of nonregulatory offenses. See, e.g.,
People v. Dajnowicz, 43 Mich. App. 465, 204 N.W.2d 281 (1973) ("inspection" for
suspected arson).
25. Compare MiCr. Comp,. LAws ANN. § 125.527 (Supp. 1974-1975) with MICH. Comp.
LAwS ANN. § 289.265 (1967).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); MICH. CoMp. LAwS ANN.
§ 289.36 (1967) (creameries inspection). Cf. Department of Natural Resources v. Seaman,
53 Mich. App. 192, 218 N.W.2d 813 (1974).
27. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 250.
28. In most regulatory areas violations discovered through inspections would con-
stitute misdemeanors. In several areas, however, prosecution may not be brought if
the condition resulting in the violation is promptly eliminated. See, e.g., MICH. Cornt.
LAws ANN. § 289.44 (1967). In other areas the violation probably would not constitute a
crime in any event. See, e.g., MICH. Coap,. LAWs ANN. § 287.15a (1967). In at least one
area, the current Code prohibits use of evidence obtained through an inspection in a
criminal prosecution. See MICH. Com'p. LAws ANN. § 286.461 (Supp. 1974-1975).
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
December 1974]
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the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of a protective
"frisk" (a limited search of a suspect for the purpose of discovering
weapons). In both cases the Court upheld protective frisks where
the officer had a reasonable belief (a belief based upon rational in-
ferences, but not amounting to probable cause) that the suspect was
"armed and dangerous."3 1 Michigan decisions have established that
Michigan peace officers have inherentauthority to frisk within the
guidelines suggested by Terry and Adams.32
There would be little value in adopting legislation that merely
restates the reasonable-belief standard of Terry and Adams. Yet, as
with other probability requirements, to provide a substantially more
specific standard, legislation would have to specify potentially rele-
vant factors and define how they relate to different fact situations. 3
Any legislative guideline also would have to specify the proper scope
of the frisk. Here again it would be difficult to add to the guidelines
provided in the Terry and Adams decisions. Although those cases
leave open several issues relating to the permissible scope of the
frisk, those issues are not of the type that can be resolved satisfac-
torily by a general statement of prohibition or authorization as is
typically found in legislation.84
31: 392 U.S. at 30.
32. See, e.g., People v. Jeffries, 39 Mich. App. 506, 197 N.W.2d 903 (1972); People v.
Piggee, 27 Mich. App. 367 (1970). The decisions have not expressed any concern about
the lack of legislation specifically authorizing frisks. They apparently have assumed that
the protective frisk is an essential aspect of the police officer's investigative authority
and therefore the power to frisk is inherent in the creation of his office. Cf. LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Micu.
L. REV. 39, 42-45 (1968); note 83 infra.
33. See text at notes 8-16 supra. See also PLE MO.EL RuLuS, supra note 9. Model
Rule 501 states the general probability standard commonly found in stop and frisk
legislation: "Mhe officer reasonable [sic] suspects that the person is carrying a concealed
weapon or dangerous instrument." Cf. N.Y. Ciau. P. LAW § 140.50(2) (McKinney 1971);
ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 110.2(4). However, Model Rule 502 goes on to list "some
of the factors which-alone or in combination-may be sufficient to create 'reasonable
suspicion' for a frisk." These include: whether the person's "clothes bulge in a manner
suggesting the presence of any object capable of inflicting injury"; whether the person
made "a furtive movement, as if to hide a weapon"; whether the person is suspected
of involvement in a violent crime; whether the person has a record for weapons of-
fenses; and whether the officer has detained a number of persons and lacks assistance.
While such a listing may be appropriate for police regulations, the Committee did not
view it as an appropriate format for legislation. See text at notes 8-9 supra. Also, police
regulations often are drafted to include a limited number of factual examples that
illustrate appropriate application of the listed factors. See note 9 supra.
34. One open issue relates to the extension of the frisk beyond the body of the
person to include examination of a parcel (e.g., a purse or shopping bag) in the posses-
sion of a suspect reasonably believed to be armed. See United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d
699, 704 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971). Arguably, examination of the parcel is unnecessary
because it simply can be removed from the suspect's reach. Yet there may be situations
in which the suspect first attempts to reach into the parcel, and the officer must respond
[Vol. 73:221
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Legislation would be desirable if one were convinced that the
Terry and Adams standard granted excessive authority to the police.
Those Committee members most concerned about the extensive use
of frisks, however, largely agreed that the difficulty does not lie in
the officer's authority to frisk for self-protection, but in his expan-
sive authority to detain suspects. They believed that the best avenue
of attack was to restrict the officer's "investigative stop" authority
and thereby limit the situations in which there might be a need
for a frisk.5 For reasons noted below, the Committee refused to
propose such legislation.
3. Investigative Stops
Both state and federal decisions have upheld police authority
to make investigative stops. While in Terry the Supreme Court re-
fused to pass upon the constitutionality of the investigative stop
apart from the seizure necessarily incident to a permissible frisk,
the Court in Adams clearly indicated that an investigative stop is
constitutionally acceptable apart from the frisk. The Court noted
that a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtain-
ing more information, may be most reasonable," 36 even though the
officer "lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable
by feeling or opening it to ensure that it does not contain a weapon. Cf. LaFave, supra
note 32, at 90. Even when the parcel is initially removed, it will be returned to the
suspect if he is not arrested, and the officer may "reasonably suspect the possibility of
harm if he returns such object unexamined." PLE MODEL RuLEs, supra note 9, Rule
605. Under this view the "frisk" cannot always be limited to the body of the person,
but neither should it automatically extend to parcels without regard to the elements
of the particular case. See id., Rules 601, 605.
Similar difficulties are presented in dealing with other aspects of the scope of the
frisk-for example, may the officer directly reach into a certain portion of the suspect's
clothing without "patting down" the outer clothing? ALl CODE, supra note 5, § 110.2(4)
limits the frisk to a patting-down. But Adams elearly indicates that under the circum-
stances of that case, in which the officer was told that the weapon was in a-particular
location, it was permissible to "test" immediately the informant's reliability by reaching
directly into the area in which the gun was supposedly hidden. There may be other
situations in which it would also be appropriate, from the viewpoint of both the
officer's safety and the suspect's privacy, to reach into a pocket or a similar area rather
than to make a general pat-down.
35. See also ALl CODE, supra note 5, at 103-28. One major proposal designed to
prevent misuse of frisking authority could have been instituted apart from the regula-
tion of "stop" authority-requiring that evidence obtained from a frisk, other than a
dangerous instrument, be excluded. LaFave, supra note 32, at 91-92, suggests that the
Supreme Court's disposition of Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion
case to Terry, reflected the Court's desire to leave open this issue. See also People v.
Dogans, 26 Mich. App. 411, 422 (1970). The Committee generally viewed the application
of the exclusionary rule as a matter most appropriately left to judicial determination,
see Part V infra, and saw no reason to create an exception in this area.
36. 407 US. at 146.
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cause to arrest .... ,,87 The Court clearly was referring to coercive
detention-the use of police authority to restrain a person-and not
merely to an initiation of conversation where the person is free to
leave. The Adams opinion cited with approval lower court cases8s
involving coercive detention, and at one point spoke of the peace
officer's authority to make a "forcible stop."'m Several Michigan de-
cisions, relying on Terry and Adams, have held that an officer can
make an investigatory stop on less than probable cause, and that
such action is consistent with legislation requiring probable cause
to make an "arrest.
'40
The Committee considered various legislative proposals that
would define stop authority more fully than have judicial decisions,
but concluded that adoption of legislation governing stops was in-
appropriate at this time. Initially the members agreed that the prob-
ability standard for a stop would not be a proper subject for legis-
lative regulation. While the Supreme Court's opinions are not en-
tirely clear, they strongly suggest that the officer needs approximately
the same degree of probability for a stop as for a frisk: The officer
must have a reasonable belief based upon rational inferences, al-
though amounting to less than probable cause, that the suspect has
engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.41 This level
of probability is commonly referred to as a "reasonable suspicion
standard."42 As with any standard that tests an actor's conduct against
the judgment of a "reasonably prudent person" (including the stan-
dard of probable cause itself), there remains a good deal of uncer-
tainty in application. As with the standard for a frisk, however, a
legislative definition is unlikely to provide more guidance than the
statements of the courts.
It has been suggested, however, that legislation could be useful
with respect to other aspects of the authority to stop. Thus, the ALI
37. 407 U.S. at 145.
38. The Court cited Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1971), and United
States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1970), as illustrations of reasonable stops
made by officers. 407 U.S. at 146.
89. 407 U.S. at 146.
40. See, e.g., People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1978); People v.
Hutton, 50 Mich. App. 351, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); People v. Paris!, 46 Mich. App. 822,
208 N.W.2d 70 (1978); People v. Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498 (1972).
See also note 82 supra.
41. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-47 (1972) (describing the level of
probability needed for stops in terms similar to those used in Terry for frisks);
J. IsRAEL &c W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 175-76 (1971) (discussing
the significance of various passages in Terry).
42. See, e.g., People v. Hutton, 50 Mich, App. 351, 361, 218 N.W.2d 320, 824 (1978);
ALl CODE, supra note 5, at 122.
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Code considers, inter alia: (1) whether the investigatory stop should
be limited to investigations of the commission or potential commis-
sion of only serious crimes; (2) whether the length of the stop should
be limited to a specific period (e.g., twenty minutes); (3) whether
detention should be permitted only in public places; (4) whether the
officer should have authority to remove the suspect from the initial
point of the stop; (5) whether suspects should be warned of their
rights upon being stopped, and given the Miranda warnings43 if
questioned; (6) what degree of force may be used in making a stop;
(7) whether the authority should extend to stopping individual auto-
mobiles and to the imposition of general roadblocks under some cir-
cumstances; and (8) whether the authority should extend to detaining
uncooperative material witnesses at the scene of the crime.4 Michi-
gan decisions provide partial answers to some of these questions,45 but
many remain unanswered except by reference to very general dicta.
The Committee recognized the need for further guidelines in
this area, but concluded that this was an inappropriate time to
adopt a legislative standard. Judicial decisions relating to investi-
gative detention have taken a very cautious approach; rulings are
largely limited to the facts of the particular case. Many Committee
members believed that the paucity of relevant empirical data re-
quired that the Committee take a similarly cautious approach. They
argued that insufficient information exists relating to the variety of
situations requiring an investigative stop to determine, for example,
the maximum permissible length of a stop or the need for investi-
gative stops in connection with less serious crimes.
46
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 3-14, 99-128.
45. See, e.g., People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1973) (automobile
stops); People v. Hutton, 50 Mich. App. 351, 213 N.W.2d 320 (1973) (Miranda warnings);
People v. Parisi, 46 Mich. App. 322, 208 N.W.2d 70 (1973) (stop in connection with a
suspected ordinance violation); People v. Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498
(1972) (removal of the suspect from the initial point of contact).
46. At least some of the members concerned about the lack of data appeared to
share the viewpoint expressed by Professor Conard in Macrojustice: A Systematic
Approach to Conflict Resolution, 5 GA. L. REv. 415, 426-27 (1971):
It is sad, I think, that [some) defenders of the Constitution have so little faith
in its validity that they think it will be impaired by scientific investigation. For
my own part, I believe that constitutional liberties can survive the probe of science.
At the same time, I suspect our conceptions of them will be altered by scientific
investigation-as have our conceptions of the earth, the heavens, and human mind.
.. Every human value is bought at the price of some other human value, and
we are destined to squander our patrimony of liberties like spendthrift heirs unless
we find out what we are giving for what we are getting. For instance, with regard
to search and seizures, if the police could not frisk suspects, there would be more
dead policemen, and probably more dead citizens of other professions. At the other
end of the spectrum, if policemen could also search the clothing of a selection of
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The most comprehensive studies of investigative stops relate to
police activity before Terry, when stops may have been made more
indiscriminately on the theory that the fourth amendment did not
limit the authority to detain temporarily a pedestrian. 47 Earlier
studies also may not reflect the more rapid and systematic flow of
information that has become available to patrol officers.48 More-
over, even if the available studies were considerably more current,
they still would not reflect the full impact of certain recent develop-
ments. For example, in People v. Whalen49 the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the Terry and Adams opinions permitted investi-
gatory stops of moving vehicles on less than probable cause. In the
past, police stops of "suspicious drivers" usually have been justified
on the basis of alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Code rather
than on investigative stop authority. (If the police follow the driver
over a short distance, they ordinarily will find that he has committed
at least a technical violation of the traffic laws. 0) It is too early to
determine whether police will come to rely frequently upon the
investigatory stop authority recognized in Whalen or will continue
to rely upon traffic violations in stopping suspicious drivers. Com-
mittee members concerned about the unavailability of current data
were fairly confident that information relating to various aspects of
investigatory stops would become available as police adopt depart-
citizens, they could probably reduce gambling and drug traffic. If they could search
cruising cars in the wee hours, they would probably reduce the number of burgla-
ries. All of these are trade-offs; some are better than others. To know the terms of
the trade, we ought to have some idea whether frisking, clothing searches, and
automobile searches would be productive once in ten times, once in one hundred
times, or once in one thousand times.
47. See, e.g., PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-86 (1967), and the studies cited therein;
A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); 2 A. RIlss, STUDIES OF CRIME AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (1966).
48. Consider, for example, the development and use of the Law Enforcement
Information Network (LEIN), described in MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FIRST COMPREHENSIVE LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PLAN FOR MICHIGAN, app. A (1969). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY CO rISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE, Standard 24.1 (1973) (hereinafter
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION).
49. 390 Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1973).
50. See, e.g., People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269 (1963); People v.
Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960); People v. Hutton, 50 Mich. App. 351,
213 N.W.2d 320 (1973); People v. Beauregard, 21 Mich. App. 224, 175 N.W.2d 301 (1970).
Of course, a traffic stop may be challenged on the ground that it was used merely as a
pretext to afford the officers an opportunity to examine the car and question the
occupants, see People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269, 272 (1963), but such
a challenge is difficult to sustain where the traffic stop was made by a regular patrol
officer and there was no irregular treatment of the driver. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 292 (4th ed. 1974) (collecting cases).
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mental guidelines regulating the use of stop authority,51 and as ju-
dicial decisions gradually explore the scope of that authority.
2
Some Committee members argued that, even if we had reliable,
current information, most of the issues treated in the ALI Code
still could not be resolved by rigid standards if the Committee ad-
hered to the "balancing" approach of Terry. The Court in Terry
stressed that the reasonableness of a frisk under the fourth amend-
ment was to be determined by balancing "the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion" against "the nature and
quality of the intrusion." 53 To apply this test to investigatory stops,
the Committee members contended, a case-by-case analysis is essen-
tial. The infringement of liberty imposed by the particular stop
must be weighed against the strength of the evidence possessed by
the officer and the purpose of his action. In evaluating the infringe-
ment of liberty, a court must consider various factors, including:
(1) the length of detention; (2) the degree of coercion used in mak-
ing the stop (e.g., whether the officer asked the person to "hold
on for a second," or approached with gun removed and ordered the
suspect to "halt"); and (3) whether the person was required to ac-
company the officer to another place (e.g., to "check out" an expla-
nation). In evaluating the basis for the stop, the seriousness of the
possible crime should be an important, although not the sole fac-
tor. 4 A requirement that the offense be a felony would bar stops
for some fairly significant misdemeanors even though the officer
possesses reasonable grounds that barely fall short of probable cause.
Indeed, limiting stops to suspected felons would be inconsistent with
the Court's recognition in Terry of the authority to stop on the
51. Stop and frisk guidelines adopted in cities outside Michigan are cited in PLE
MODEL Rur.Es, supra note 9, at 24-25; Quinn, supra note 9, at 26 n.9. NATIONAL
ADvIsoRY COMMISSION, supra note 48, recommends adoption of such guidelines and
collection of data through a "reportable incident file." See Standards 1.3, 24.2. See also
MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRAFT CRIMINAL JusncE GoAis AND STAN-
DARDS FOR THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Standards 111.1.2.2, 111.1.6.1 (1974).
52. One question of particular interest to the Committee was whether limits formu-
lated in light of those situations requiring the most extensive stops tended to become
the standard guideline for all stops. For example, where a police agency adopts a
guideline like ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 110.2(1), permitting stops for "such period as
is reasonably necessary ... but in no case more than 20 minutes," do the police tend
to extend most of their stops to the 20-minute maximum? Some Committee members
expressed concern that this would occur unless the permissible grounds for extending
the stop were stated in much more specific terms. These members objected, for example,
to a standard that authorized extension of a stop where "reasonably necessary to ...
verify... identification" without also indicating what constituted adequate verification.
See id. § 1l0.2(1)(a)(ii).
53. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 24 (1968).
54. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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basis of suspicious street activity. When the stop is based on such
activity, the officer may have the investigation of crimes of varying
seriousness in mind. Thus, where a suspect is obviously keeping a
house under surveillance, the officer may be concerned that the
suspect intends to engage in activities ranging from theft of a bi-
cycle to kidnapping.m
In sum, these Committee members acknowledged the relevance
of the various elements noted in the ALI Code, but felt that those
elements must be balanced against each other in each case. Thus,
where the officer relies solely upon the observation of suspicious
activity, as in Terry, only a brief stop might be appropriate. Where,
on the other hand, the officer knows that an armed robbery has just
been committed in the vicinity, and the stopped individual meets
a general description of the criminal, the stop may be considerably
longer, and some movement from the scene and even an initial
show of a weapon may be appropriate.5 0 Similarly, even though the
crime is comparatively insignificant (e.g., defacing a public sign),
when the officer finds several persons at the scene and it is clear
that one of them has committed the offense and the others are
witnesses, a brief period of detention may be reasonable to permit
the officer to obtain each person's name and to determine if there
is evidence at the scene pointing to the guilt of any one person. 7
Some members of the Committee, although agreeing that the
balancing approach of Terry is inconsistent with specific legislative
guidelines, nevertheless suggested that legislative limitations were
necessary because the balancing approach grants the police exces-
sive discretion. They appreciated the lack of data on current use
of stop authority, but argued that the very potential for misuse was
sufficient justification for adopting at least some legislative safe-
guards. These members were particularly concerned that investiga-
tive stops not be misused against persons whom the police have
generally viewed as suspicious-for example, long-haired youths, un-
conventionally attired persons, and blacks found in "white areas."
In response to these concerns the Committee examined various ALI
Code proposals designed to prevent such abuse: (1) that stops be
allowed only in the investigation of crimes involving "danger of
forcible injury to persons or of appropriation or damage to prop-
55. See, e.g., People v. Hutton, 50 Mich. App. 351, 213 N.W.2d 320 (1973); People v.
Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498 (1972).
56. Cf. People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1973).
57. Cf. People v. Parisi, 46 Mich. App. 322, 208 N.W.2d 70 (1973) (upholding auto-
mobile stop for suspected curfew violation).
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erty,"58 thereby excluding stops in connection with many misde-
meanors and narcotics offenses; (2) that stops based upon suspicious
behavior be limited to situations in which it appears that the person
has just committed or is about to commit a crime; 59 (3) that the stop
be limited to a maximum of twenty minutes; (4) that the stop be
limited to detaining the person near the place where the stop is
made; (5) that roadblock stops of vehicles be limited to stops of all
or most vehicles; (6) that the person stopped be warned of his right
to remain silent and be told that he will be released within twenty
minutes unless arrested; (7) that no suspect be questioned once he
indicates that he does not wish to be questioned or that he desires
to consult with counsel; and (8) that a police record be made of all
stopsY0
The Committee also considered three other proposals designed
to prevent abuse of stop authority. Some Committee members sug-
gested that the potential for abuse was so great that the authority
to stop on less than probable cause should be eliminated entirely.
Others would have required that the stopped individual be given
a "citizen's inquiry card" noting the time and date of the stop, the
officer involved, and the reason for and location of the stop.6' Fi-
nally, some members would have limited the authority to stop to
cases in which the officer (i) has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed, (ii) has received a description of the offender
(although not necessarily one that is sufficiently specific or reliable
to support a probable cause arrest), and (iii) stops a person who
generally fits that description. The purpose of this last proposal was
to eliminate stops based upon "suspicious street behavior," as was
involved in Terry, on the ground that such authority is most sus-
ceptible to abuse. A stop in the situation presented by Adams was
viewed as less subject to abuse because the officer's discretion is
limited by the prerequisite of a report from a third person specify-
ing the offense involved and providing a description of the offender.
The Committee as a whole concluded that it was not prepared
to support any of these proposals as a means of preventing abuse
of stop authority. Some members felt that here again there was
insufficient information available to provide a basis for legislation.
58. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 110.2(1)(a)(i), (b)(i).
59. See id. § 110.2(l)(a). A note following this section states that the provision is
designed to require that the stop "take place in the res gestae of the crime-that is
in the vicinity of and roughly contemporaneously with the crime." Id. at 11.
60. See id. § 110.2.
61. See, e.g., New Orleans Police Department, General Order #32-P, § A(8) (April 7,
1967).
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While pre-Terry studies established some abuse, almost no informa-
tion was available on the impact of subsequent police training on
the use of stop authority in accord with Terry. The recent adoption
of internal police guidelines governing stop and frisk authority was
cited as evidence of potentially fruitful efforts to prevent abuse. 2
Other Committee members stressed the lack of any basis for deter-
mining what kinds of restraints would prove effective in preventing
abuse. 3 The commentary to the ALI Code notes that the proposals
advanced there are made without "any objective empirical evidence"
as to the types of limits that are likely to prevent abuse." The Code
attempts to strike "a balance between filling the need [for stop and
frisk authority] and minimizing the costs and dangers," but the
commentary acknowledges that the balance is struck "to a large
extent on analytic and intuitive grounds."0 5 The Committee con-
cluded that, given the incomplete data, greater flexibility is needed
than the ALI Code would permit, and that experimentation should
be left to internal police guidelines, supplemented by judicial au-
thority to bar any pattern of patent abuse. 0
4. Nontestimonial Identification Orders
Although the problems presented by legislative authorization of
nontestimonial identification orders are similar in many respects to
those presented in the stop and frisk area, the Committee found
that additional considerations supported limited legislative authori-
zation of such orders. Proposed section 22 permits the court to order
a suspect to participate in specified evidence-gathering procedures
(e.g., fingerprinting) that are nontestimonial in nature and therefore
not contrary to the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. 7
The court may issue the order on the basis of a factual showing that
would not meet the traditional probable cause standard for the is-
62. See regulations cited note 51 supra. On the capacity of police agency rulemaking
to deal effectively with police abuse, see Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rtv. 785, 812-15 (1970); Quinn,
supra note 9.
63. See, e.g., the discussion in note 52 supra on the impact of imposing a "time
limit" on stops. Similarly, some members were concerned that requiring recordkeeping
by methods such as distribution of citizen's inquiry cards might be misused to develop
lists of "suspicious persons" or "persons frequently stopped for suspicious activities."
64. ALI CoDE, supra note 5, at 116.
65. Id. at 117.
66, See Williams v. Alioto, excerpted in 15 Caim. L. REP. 2187 (N.D. Cal. April 25,
1974); ABA STANDARDS, THE URBAN POLicE FUNCriON § 4A(b) (Approved Draft, 1973).
67. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting exem-
plars); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (speech samples for voice
identification); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (blood samples).
[Vol. 73:221
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mich. L. Rev.  238 1974-1975
Search and Seizure Legislation
suance of a warrant either to arrest the suspect or to undertake a
full search of his person. Provisions similar to section 22 have been
adopted in Arizona,"" North Carolina, 9 and Idaho,70 and have been
proposed by the American Law Institute,71 the.National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,72 and the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
7 3
The Committee could find little empirical data relating to the
need for nontestimonial identification orders. Past case histories illus-
trate certain situations in which suspect participation in a nontesti-
monial evidence procedure ordinarily would lead directly to the
identification of the offender,74 but no reliable estimate could be
obtained as to how frequently such situations arise. Neither could
it be determined whether nontestimonial evidence orders could be
used effectively in various situations in which such evidence would
be less significant in identifying the offender.75 In light of this lack
of data, the Committee concluded that it should proceed cautiously.
This area, however, could not appropriately be left to judicial de-
velopment. Michigan courts probably would be unwilling to order
suspect participation in nontestimonial identification procedures in
the absence of legislative authorization. In this area, unlike the stop
and frisk area, there is no established precedent of the Supreme
Court or the Michigan appellate courts recognizing the validity of
the nontestimonial identification order.76 Neither is there an estab-
68. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1424 (Supp. 1973).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-271 to -272 (effective July 1, 1975).
70. IDAHo CODE § 19--625 (Supp. 1974). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-37 (Supp.
1973) (limited to lineups); COLO. R. CmRI. P. 41(b) (fingerprints).
71. ALI CODE, supra note 5, art. 160 (rent. Draft No. 6, 1974).
72. UNiFoRM RuLrs OF CIUMINAI PRocEDuRE, Rules 434, 435 (Proposed Final Draft,
1974) [hereinafter UNiFORM RULES].
73. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts,
Rule 41.1 (Prelim. Draft), 52 F.R.D. 409, 462-67 (1971).
74. Initially police must have discovered nontestimonial evidence that will assist in
establishing the offender's identity. Even then, nontestimonial evidence obtained from
suspects is not fairly certain to lead to the identification of the offender unless the
participating suspects include all of the persons who reasonably could have committed
the offense. Situations do arise, however, in which such a complete group of suspects
can be identified. Thus, access to the scene of the crime may have been so restricted
or the characteristics of the offender so unique that there is a very strong likelihood
that the offender is one of a limited group of persons, all of whom can be identified.
75. Consider, for example, a case in which the modus operandi of the crime generally
points to several persons in the community who have committed similar crimes in the
past.
76. While United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), upheld the constitutionality
of grand jury subpoenas directing individuals to furnish voice exemplars, the grand
jury setting may be distinguished from the section 22 proceeding. Davis v. Mississippi,
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lished judicial practice at the lower court level. In the absence of
legislation, the police officer's natural inclination might be to attempt
to obtain the evidence through manipulation of other procedures
rather than to present such an "unusual" request to the lower courts.
Thus, police might simply arrest the suspect on the basis of doubtful
"probable" cause, or arrest for some misdemeanor unrelated to the
offense in question and then direct the suspect to participate in a
nontestimonial evidence procedure while in custody 77 Legislation
hopefully would encourage police to utilize court orders and, per-
haps, avoid unnecessary arrests.
The Committee was also influenced by arguments that legislation
on nontestimonial identification orders need not consider as many
different factual situations as need be considered in formulating stop
and frisk legislation. It was possible to concentrate upon the few key
situations in which the need for such orders is most clearly estab-
lishedv7 and therefore to formulate a standard of probability more
precise than the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry. Section
22(e) requires a showing of probable cause to believe that the offense
was committed by "one of a grouping of not more than several per-
sons" and that the particular suspect "falls within that group." Thus,
there must be probable cause as to the total group of suspects. As to
the individual suspect, probable cause is lacking only because the
number of equally likely suspects is too large to present a substantial
likelihood that any particular person in the group is the guilty
person.
Additionally, since section 22 grants the court discretion to con-
trol the conditions under which nontestimonial evidence is obtained,
there was less concern that legislative authorization would be mis-
used, even if the legislation did not anticipate the need for certain
safeguards. On the other hand, the limited area of need for nontes-
timonial identification orders indicates that, if future experience
should show the Committee's proposal is overly restrictive, the ad-
verse consequences will not be nearly as great as the consequences
394 U.S. 721 (1968), contains dictum that suggests a fingerprint order would be upheld,
but the opinion does not directly treat that issue. With respect to other jurisdictions,
see Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). See also United States v. Greene,
429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. See AL CoDE, supra note 5, § 170.6, at 245-46 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974);
UNitoEm RULES, supra note 72, Commentary to Rule 436(a). The grand jury subpoena
does not provide an administratively adequate alternative to section 22, particularly
in a state such as Michigan, where the availability of grand juries is limited. See
note 76 supra.
78. See note 74 supra.
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that might flow from the imposition of an unnecessary limitation
upon stop and frisk authority.79
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Notwithstanding the increased use of search warrants, the vast
majority of all searches still are made without warrants.80 Never-
theless, the guidelines governing warrantless searches remain ambig-
uious. It was primarily with reference to warrantless searches that
Justice Frankfurter noted that "[t]he course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures ... has not-to put it mildly-run smooth." 8'1
While many subsequent Supreme Court opinions have discussed
warrantless searches at length, those opinions, taken as a group, still
seem to fall short of the goal envisaged by Justice Frankfurter-
"that the law on searches and seizures by which prosecutors and
trial judges are to be guided should be as clear and unconfusing as
the nature of the subject matter permits."8' 2 Despite the apparent
need for more precise guidelines, the Committee concluded that the
desired clarification could not appropriately be provided by legis-
lation.
Traditionally, legislation has played a comparatively minor role
in the development of the law governing warrantless searches. The
Michigan Code contains only one major provision dealing with the
issue of when a search can be made without a warrant, and that
provision has not been relied upon by the Michigan courts.83 Other
79. See note 34 supra.
80. See Y. KAmiSAR, W. LAFA E & J. ISRAEL, supra note 50, at 266. See also note 4
supra.
81. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring opinion).
82. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (concurring opinion). The
Committee's goal also was to provide some degree of guidance for peace officers. It
recognized that legislation could not provide the specificity needed in police regulations.
See, e.g., PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RuLFs FOR
Lw ENFORCEMENT-WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES (1973) [hereinafter
PLE WARRANTLES s SEARCHES]; TEXAS CRimrNAL JusnicE CouusEL, MODEL RuL.Es FOR LAW
ENFORC-mEMr OFFICERS (1974). See also Quinn, supra note 9, at 81-35. Indeed, working
rules for police officers may often require more specific guidelines than are provided
even in most police regulations (e.g., in defining the scope of an inventory search at a
jail, working rules probably should refer to the examination of particular items, such
as wallets and cigarette packages). Nevertheless, a fairly specific legislative code, while
not sufficient in itself, could provide considerable assistance to police in developing
appropriate regulations and working rules.
83. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 764.25 (1968) provides: "Any person making an arrest
shall take from the person arrested, all offensive weapons or incriminating articles
which he may have about his person and must deliver them to the sheriff of the
county, chief of the police of the city or to the magistrate before whom he is taken."
Although this provision applies to peace officers, People v. Henderson, 25 Mich. App.
28, 180 N.W.2d 903 (1970), appellate decisions dealing with searches incident to an
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state codes follow the same pattern; even the most recent revisions
tend to treat only one type of warrantless search, the search incident
to an arrest.84 The Committee, however, did not view itself as bound
by the traditional role of legislation in this area." It considered at
length the provisions of the ALI Code that describe the permissible
grounds for a warrantless search,80 but decided against urging adop-
tion of either those or similar provisions.
Any legislative guidelines for warrantless searches would, of
course, have to be consistent with the decisions of the Supreme
Court. Currently prevailing decisions have stressed that, "as a gen-
eral rule," the Constitution requires that a search be authorized by
a warrant; a warrantless search, though supported by probable cause,
will be acceptable "only in exigent circumstances."8' 7 Several deci-
sions suggest that exigent circumstances exist only when "urgent
necessity"88 justifies the failure to obtain a warrant, that is, when
it is not "practicable" to obtain a warrant because the delay is very
likely to result in the loss or destruction of the evidence sought or
may subject the officers to possible danger.89 Yet other decisions sug-
gest that this "strict practicability" standard is not always control-
ling; other factors may justify a warrantless search where the delay
in obtaining a warrant presents difficulties, but readily could be han-
dled without a loss of evidence. The two primary illustrations of
such "departures" from a "strict practicability" approach are Cham-
bers v. Maroney9" and United States v. Edwards.9 1
arrest have rarely discussed or cited the provision. The opinions have proceeded on
the assumption that the officer has authority to search incident to the arrest to the
extent permissible under the federal and state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Moore,
891 Mich. 426, 216 N.W.2d 770 (1974); People v. Bohm, 49 Mich. App. 244, 212 N.A.2d
61 (1978); People v. Simmons, 49 Mich. App. 80, 211 N.W.2d 247 (1973). Cf. note 32
supra.
84. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. S8, § 108-1 (1973); LA. ConE CRiur. P. art. 225 (1967);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.10 (1971).
85. In contrast to the position taken with respect to warrantless searches, codes of
criminal procedure commonly contain provisions describing the grounds for warrantless
arrests. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 764.15 (1968). The Committee concluded
that, if feasible, it would be appropriate to describe the permissible grounds for
warrantless searches with at least the same specificity that the current code provides
in describing grounds for warrantless arrests or for the issuance of a search warrant.
86. See ALI CODE, supra note 5, §§ SS 230-60. See also note 104 infra.
87. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
88. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 660 n.l (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-63 (1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
90. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
91. 415 US. 800 (1974).
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In Chambers, the Court upheld a warrantless search of an auto-
mobile conducted after its occupants had been removed from the
vehicle, arrested, and taken to the police station. The majority sus-
tained the search under the "moving vehicle" exception to the war-
rant requirement,92 presumably because the driver (if released) or
his agent could demand return of the car before the police could
obtain a warrant. The majority rejected the contention that, "be-
cause of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the im-
mobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant
is obtained . . ... 93 It noted that "[fjor constitutional purposes,"
there is "no difference between ... seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and... carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant."" In Edwards, the Court
relied upon a somewhat different analysis in upholding the war-
rantless seizure and subsequent scientific examination of clothes
taken from the defendant ten hours after his arrest. The Court
noted that the search incident to an arrest had long been recognized
as an exception to the warrant requirement, and that the delay in
undertaking the search did not require issuance of a warrant where
the defendant had remained in jail and was still subject to normal
custodial restraints, including possible removal of possessions. 95
92. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), the Court noted that the
fourth amendment must be construed "as recognizing a necessary difference between
a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." In Carroll, the driver of the vehicle had not been placed
under arrest, and there was considerable doubt prior to Chambers as to whether
Carroll justified a warrantless search of a car after the arrest of the driver. Compare
Chambers with Ramon v. Cupp, 423 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1970), and Heffley v. Hocker,
420 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1969).
Subsequent to Chambers the Supreme Court upheld two other post-arrest searches
of automobiles. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (upholding warrantless
seizure and impoundment of arrested person's automobile, found in parking lot, and
subsequent scientific examination of paint chips found on exterior of car); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (upholding warrantless "custodial search" of automo-
bile for weapon reasonably believed to be located there; car had been towed to service
station after driver's arrest and hospitalization). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), discussed in note 96 infra.
93. 399 U.S. at 51.
94. 399 U.S. at 52.
95. Although Edwards and Chambers relied upon different "exigent circumstances,"
the two decisions are similar in several respects. In both cases the majority stressed
that, since a warrantless search could have been made at the time of the arrest, the
delay in conducting the search should not necessarily require the acquisition of a
warrant. See 415 U.S. at 807; 399 U.S. at 52. In both cases the majority relied upon a
debatable application of a well-established exception to the warrant requirement,
rather than upon creation of a totally new exception. Also, both cases recognized that
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Although Chambers and Edwards illustrate that the existence
of reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant does not necessarily
invalidate a warrantless search, they do not go so far as to suggest
that warrants will never be required for any search of an automobile
or of a person held in custody. 6 Moreover, considerable doubt exists
whether factors similar to those noted in Chambers and Edwards
would justify warrantless searches of other areas protected by the
fourth amendmentyr Accordingly, the Committee concluded that
any legislation authorizing warrantless searches would have to be
largely consistent with a strict practicability approach if its consti-
tutionality was to be assured. The Committee was unwilling to pro-
pose such legislation, however, for several reasons.
Some Committee members simply opposed the strict practica-
bility approach. Though acknowledging the desirability of obtaining
a warrant, they did not believe that a search should be invalidated,
"[t]he prevailing rule under the Fourth Amendment [is] that searches ... may not be
made without a warrant." 415 U.S. at 802; 399 U.S. at 51. Edwards, however, also cited
with approval language to the effect that the "test" under the fourth amendment is
"not whether it [is] reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search
itself [is] reasonable.'" 415 U.S. at 806-07, quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967), quoting United States v. Rosenberg, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
Arguably, both Edwards and Chambers also presented the issue of weighing the
restraint imposed by immobilizing the defendant's property against the "preference
for a magistrates judgment." If Edwards had been released on bail before a warrant
could be obtained, the police presumably would have had to "immobilize" the clothes
if they desired to prevent Edwards from taking and destroying them. Finally, in both
Edwards and Chambers Justice White wrote the majority opinion. On the other hand,
Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart, who dissented in Edwards, joined
the majority in Chambers.
96. The Court specifically noted in Chambers that "[n]either [Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see note 92 supra] nor other cases in this Court require or
suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable
cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords."
399 U.S. at 50. Subsequently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the
plurality opinion held invalid a warrantless search of an automobile where, inter alia,
"the police had known for some time [prior to the search] of the probable role of the
... car in the crime," and "[t]here was no way in which [the defendant] could con-
ceivably have gained access to the automobile after the police arrived on his property."
403 U.S. at 460. Chambers was distinguished as a case that "held only that, where the
police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also seize it and
search it later at the police station." 403 U.S. at 463.
Michigan cases have also required warrant authorization of a vehicle search under
certain circumstances. See People v. White, 392 Mich. 404, 221 N.W.2d 357 (1974);
People v. Weaver, 35 Mich. App. 504, 192 N.W.2d 572 (1971).
With respect to the possible need for a warrant to conduct an intensive search of
the body of the person, see text at notes 198-201 infra.
97. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); United States v. Van Leeuwen,
397 U.S. 279 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). These cases arguably
differ considerably from Chambers in their view of the desirability, from a constitu-
tional perspective, of immobilizing property so that a search warrant may be sought.
See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the
"Quagmire", 8 Car. L. BLL. 9, 27 (1972); note 101 infra.
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and evidence excluded, simply because the officer had the oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. They would judge
the "reasonableness" of a search by considering not only the failure
to obtain a warrant, but also the strength of the probable cause
possessed by the officer and the extent of the search. Thus, it was
suggested, where a locked suitcase, reasonably believed to contain
contraband, is found in the possession of an arrested person, it might
be reasonable for the officer to open the suitcase immediately, al-
though it no longer is within the arrested person's immediate con-
trol and easily could be retained by the officer for the period
necessary to obtain a warrant.98 Along the same lines, it was argued
that when an officer has arrested a person in a motel room for the
attempted sale of narcotics, and there is probable cause to believe
that more narcotics are located in the room, the officer should not
be barred from proceeding without a warrant to examine certain
portions of the room, such as the toilet flush tank, that are not open
to plain view but also are not traditional storage areas for private
possessions.9 While some courts would view such searches as un-
constitutional under current precedent, others might uphold the
searches under a narrow reading of that precedent. If the Committee,
however, drafted a warrantless search provision based upon a strict
practicability approach, the searches in both illustrations would be
invalid. 00
Other Committee members favored a strict practicability ap-
proach but felt that that approach could be imposed by legislation
only after machinery was established that would permit prompt ac-
quisition of search warrants. They believed that the state could not
reasonably bear the risk of losing evidence due to the lengthy period
that might be needed to obtain a warrant. Moreover, if the police
were allowed to protect against that risk by "securing" the place to
be searched while a warrant was obtained, innocent individuals con-
ceivably could be denied access to the place for several hours.' 0 '
98. Compare United States v. Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
985 (1970), with Faubion v. United States, 424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970).
99. Cf. United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1064 (1971); People v. Simmons, 49 Mich. App. 80, 211 N.W.2d 247 (1973); State v.
Erwin, 473 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1971).
100. See, e.g., ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § SS 230.5, which permits a warrantless
search of premises incident to an arrest only if (1) "the arrested individual is in or on
[the] premises," and (2) the officer has reason to believe that the premises contain
evidence connected with the offense that is "likely to be removed or destroyed before a
search warrant can be obtained and served ...." See also id. § SS 230.3.
101. See Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969-Is It a Means or an End?, 29 MD. L.
REv. 307, 317 (1969):
Does the police officer have any power to maintain the status quo while he, or a
colleague of his, is taking the time necessary to ... obtai[n] the search warrant if
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These members hoped that the various Committee proposals de-
signed to promote prompt acquisition of warrants would be effec-
tive,10 2 but were unwilling to impose a strict practicability standard
until those provisions had been proved in practice.
Still other Committee members favored adoption of a strict
practicability standard only if it were buttressed by detailed guide-
lines as to those "exigent circumstances" that would justify warrant-
less searches. They argued that there would be little value in merely
repeating the strict practicability standard stated in Supreme Court
opinions.1 0 3 As those opinions indicate, however, a key to the appli-
cation of the strict practicability standard lies in defining the per-
missible scope of those warrantless searches that are automatically
accepted under that standard (e.g., the search incident to arrest).
Legislation could make a substantial contribution only if it pro-
vided specific standards defining the permissible scope of such
searches. o4
it is issued, and then brin[g] it to the place where the arrest was made. It seems
inevitable that a minimum of several hours will be required for this process, at
the very best. Unless there is some kind of a power to prevent removal of material
from the premises, or destruction of material during this time, the search warrant
will almost inevitably be fruitless... . May they guard the premises, and prevent
egress and entry, and action within the premises, while the search warrant is being
obtained? We do not know. There may well be room here, though, for a balance
in determining the applicability of the fourth amendment.
See also Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evi-
dence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1971); note 97 supra. PLE WARRANI.EsS SEARCHES, supra
note 82, provides in Rule 303[c]:
If an officer reasonably believes that other persons on the premises at the time of
the arrest-or who later arrive at the premises and have a right to enter-might
conceal, remove or destroy seizable items, he shall explain that a search warrant
is being obtained. He shall also ask such persons to leave the premises [for up to
two hours] or to permit an officer to remain within the premises [for up to two
hours] while the warrant is obtained. If neither request is complied with, or if
diligent police efforts fail to procure a warrant within two hours, the officer may
then search for the seizable items [for not longer than twenty minutes]. [Emphasis
original.]
102. See text at notes 141-63 infra on the required availability of magistrates and
the authorization of telephonic search warrant applications.
103. See notes 88-89 supra.
104. See, eg., ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § SS 230.5. The ALI Code contains provisions
on the following warrantless searches: searches incident to an arrest, searches by
consent, vehicle searches, searches of open lands, emergency searches, and border
searches. Section SS 230.5, governing searches of premises incident to an arrest, illus-
trates one of the more detailed provisions. That section provides:
(1) Permissible Circumstances. If at the time of the arrest (a) the arrested
individual is in or on premises all or part of which he is apparently entitled to
occupy, and (b) in view of the circumstances the officer has reason to believe that
such premises or part thereof contains things which are (i) subject to seizure under
Section 210.3, (ii) connected with the offense for which the arrest is made, and (iii)
likely to be removed or destroyed before a search warrant can be obtained and
served, the arresting officer may search such premises or part thereof for such
things, and seize any things subject to seizure under Section SS 210.3 and discovered
in the course of the search.
[Vol. 73:221
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These members contended, for example, that little would be
gained by merely codifying the ruling in Chimel v. CaliforniaW5
that an arrested person and the area within his control may be
searched contemporaneously with the arrest to effectuate the arrest
with safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.1° Meaningful
legislation should go beyond Chimel by defining the area "within
the immediate control" of the arrested person. In particular, must
the area be determined in light of the capacity of the particular
person at the time of the search (e.g., taking into consideration the
fact that he was handcuffed, or the number of officers present), or
is it to be measured by a general assessment of the "lunging capacity"
of most persons?10 7 Similarly, once the person is in custody, what
standards should be employed to limit the misuse of various "ex-
cuses" for entering other parts of the premises and thereby expand-
ing the area of the search? May the officer on the basis of "mere
suspicion" examine the entire house to determine if any other of-
fenders or persons who might destroy evidence are present?10 8 Also,
if the officer comes upon persons who might destroy evidence -hidden
in the house, but who are not subject to arrest, may he direct them
to leave while he obtains a warrant?109 Similar questions would have
to be answered in defining the scope of jail-inventory searches and
(2) Time of Search. Search of premises pursuant to Subsection (1) shall only
be made contemporaneously with the arrest, and search of building interiors shall
only be made consequent upon an entry into the building made in order to effect
an arrest therein. In determining the necessity for and scope of the search to be
undertaken, the officer shall take into account, among other things, the nature of
the offense for which the arrest is made, the behavior of the individual arrested
and others on the premises, the size and other characteristics of the things to be
searched for, and whether or not any such things are observed while making the
arrest.
105. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
106. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2501 (Supp. 1973). Cf. ALI CODE, supra note 5,
§ SS 230.3(l): "An officer making an arrest on a charge other than as described in
Section SS 230.2 [excluding minor offenses] and the authorized officials at the police
station or other police building to which the arrested individual is brought, may
conduct a search of the arrested individual's garments and personal effects ready to
hand, the surface of his body, and the area within his immediate control."
107. See Bailey v. United States, 279 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scott v. State, 7 Md.
App. 505, 508-09, 256 A.2d 884, 387-89 (1969); Note, Warrantless Searches in Light of
Chimel: A Return to the Original Understanding, 11 ARiz. L. REv. 457, 480 (1969).
108. See People v. Schrantz, 50 Mich. App. 227, 213 N.W.2d 257 (1973); PLE
WARRANTLESS SEARcHEs, supra note 82, Rule 303(a): "If an officer has probable cause to
believe that seizable items are on the premises where an arrest has just been made,
he may make a prompt general inspection to determine whether there are persons
present who are likely to remove or destroy the items while a search warrant is being
obtained. Under no circumstances should this inspection include a search for seizable
items." (Footnote omitted.)
109. See Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973);
note 101 supra. Cf. People v. Carter, 387 Mich. 897, 411-12, 197 N.W.2d 57, 63-64 (1972).
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warrantless -searches of automobiles.110 The result, it was suggested,
would be a series of provisions considerably more extensive than
even the current statutes regulating police authority to arrest."11
Several Committee members, although in favor of a strict practica-
bility approach, agreed that such a departure from the format of
the current code would best be initiated in an area in which there
was more substantial agreement as to basic principles.
112
In light of the determination not to propose specific guidelines
on warrantless searches, the Committee's inclusion of sections 16, 17,
and 18 requires some explanation. These provisions refer to three
types of constitutionally acceptable warrantless searches-the search
incident to an arrest, the inventory search for custodial purposes,
and the warrantless search justified by other "exigent circumstances."
While these three "exceptions" to the warrant requirement are given
formal recognition in sections 16 through 18, no effort is made to
provide guidelines for their application.'13 Indeed, the listing of
110. A complete provision on searches incident to an arrest also requires consider-
ation of the appropriate use of arrest authority. For example, should a search be
permitted incident to an "arrest" where the officer stops a person on the basis of
probable cause but determines that the individual is one who can appropriately be
released upon issuance of a citation, rather than taken to the station? Several cases,
e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 216 N.W.2d 770 (1974), suggest that traditional
authority to conduct a full search incident to an arrest may be limited to "custodial
arrests" (arrests in which the person is taken to the station). See also Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973); People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959). That
position, however, may significantly undermine the legislative trend toward encouraging
the use of citations in lieu of arrests. See ABA STANDARDS, PRE-TRIAL RELEASE § 2.3
(Approved Draft, 1968). Jurisdictions encouraging expanded use of citations generally
have granted officers broad discretion (on nontraffic offenses) in determining whether
to take the person into custody or issue a citation. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2408
(Supp. 1973); Micm. Comp. LAws ANN. § 764.9c (Supp. 1974-1975); UNIFORM RULs, supra
note 72, Rules 211, 221. Compare MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 257.727-.728 (Supp.
1974-1975). If officers are not permitted to search a detained person before they have
decided whether to take him to the station, they may simply ignore the possibility of
release on citation. See ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 38. While Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), provides authority to frisk, officers may feel that the Terry requirement of
"suspicious circumstances" does not offer sufficient protection. See Brief for Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
Arguably, where persons are stopped for a crime other than a possible traffic offense,
they expect to be taken to the station and, if armed or carrying contraband, they will
act accordingly; the police therefore should be given full search authority while the
officer is deciding whether to make a "full custody arrest" or release on citation. Cf.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973). But cf. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 230.3.
111. See MicH. CoMr. LAws ANN. §§ 764.1-.28 (1968).
112. It was also suggested that if the provisions designed to facilitate prompt
acquisition of search warrants proved effective, the courts might apply the strict
practicability approach more rigidly and thereby provide a better basis for answering
some of the questions noted above. See also Nakell, Proposed Revisions of North
Carolina's Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C. L. REv. 277, 311 (1973).
113. The one exception is section 16[4], which governs searches incident to an arrest
(Vol. 73:221
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these exceptions is not intended to be exclusive, although "exigent
circumstances" is a sufficiently broad phrase to encompass all con-
stitutionally acceptable justifications for warrantless searches except
for consent. 14 The description of these exceptions serves only as an
introduction to the subsequent provisions in sections 16 through 18
governing the execution of warrantless searches. The manner of
executing searches is a traditional area of legislative coverage, al-
though here too provisions governing searches with warrants have
tended to be more extensive than provisions governing searches
without warrants. For reasons discussed in part IV, the Committee
viewed the execution of searches as an area in which it could make
a major contribution within the framework of current constitutional
guidelines. The three types of warrantless searches are treated sepa-
rately only because they present somewhat different problems in
determining appropriate execution. The initial description of each
type is phrased so that it should neither limit nor expand the au-
thority to conduct the particular search as developed in judicial de-
cisions.
III. FACILITATING THE USE OF SEARCH WARRANTS
Although the Committee decided against proposing legislation
that would require search warrants whenever practicable, it decided
that the current code should be revised so as to encourage police
use of search warrants. Greater use of search warrants was favored
both by those members who supported a strict practicability require-
ment, but who felt it could not appropriately be imposed by legis-
lation at this time, and by those who opposed a strict practicability
requirement. While the latter group resisted automatic invalidation
of a search solely because an officer failed to obtain a warrant, they
favored adoption of measures designed to encourage the use of war-
rants as a matter of good police practice.115
by a private person. The Committee concluded that, in light of the limited enforcement
responsibilities and lesser expertise of the private person, both the search and the
seizure incidental thereto could appropriately be restricted to obtaining weapons and
evidence of the offense for which the arrest was made. Compare United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. A special provision was not included on search by consent because the stan-
dards for search execution set forth in sections 16-18 may depend upon the scope of
the consent in the particular case. See, e.g., People v. Chism, 890 Mich. 104, 211 N.W.2d
193 (1973); People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 118 N.W.2d 406 (1962). However, the
sections relating to receipts and disposition of property apply to all seized property,
including that obtained during a search by consent. Cf. ALI CoDE, supra note 5,
§ SS 280.2.
115. See MicnGAN COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JusTncE, supra note 51, at 111.1.6.1,
recommending that "[s]earches ... be conducted through the use of a warrant when-
ever possible."
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Support for encouraging the use of search warrants was based
on several grounds. Most importantly, the warrant application pro-
cess provides significant protection against unconstitutional searches.
The Supreme Court has frequently stressed the importance of re-
quiring "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
... be interposed between the citizen and the police."' 16 This em-
phasis upon the "interposition" of the "neutral magistrate" has been
criticized by various commentators as based more upon "myth than
fact." 17 In practice, it has been argued, warrants are frequently
issued "by a minor magistrate who has little means or inclination
to look behind the police application." 118 While that description
may be accurate as applied to other jurisdictions, there is no basis
for assuming that it reflects current Michigan practice. Search war-
rants ordinarily have been issued by judges of a district court, mu-
nicipal court, or Recorder's Court. These judges are all lawyers, and
sit on courts having substantial jurisdiction in criminal cases. They
can hardly be characterized as "minor magistrates." The experience
of Committee members indicates that the judges recognize that a
successful search is likely to be challenged by a motion to suppress,
and that they accordingly exercise considerable care in issuing a
warrant. Studies indicating that arrest warrants have been issued in
a perfunctory manner do not support a similar conclusion with
respect to search warrants. 119 Most arrest warrants in Michigan are
not issued before a suspect is arrested, but are issued as a prelimi-
nary step to presenting an arrested person before the magistrate for
his initial appearance. The function of the warrant determination
at this point is quite different from that of a search warrant determi-
nation,1 20 and the studies have acknowledged that most magistrates,
116. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
117. See LaFave, supra note 97, at 27, and articles cited therein.
118. ALI CoDE, supra note 5, Commentary to § SS 230.4, at 187.
119. Most of the commentators questioning the significance attached to the magis-
trate's participation in the search warrant process have relied upon studies relating to
the issuance of arrest warrants. See, for example, the frequently cited article by Miller &
Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices,
1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (describing Recorder's Court practice as observed during
1956-1957).
120. Where the arrest already has been made, the task before the court is not
preventing a fourth amendment violation, but determining whether a violation has
occurred. Since the prosecutor, in approving the warrant application, has already
reviewed the evidence and concluded that it is sufficient to support a prosecution, the
magistrate may assume that probable cause most likely exists. Moreover, at least in
felony cases, the decision on the arrest warrant application is not the only point at
which a probable cause determination will be made. The same issue will be raised
again at the preliminary hearing. In the meantime the individual may be immediately
relieved of the initial consequence of his arrest by release on bail. While the Committee
[Vol. 73:221
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even before Supreme Court decisions required more substantial war-
rant applications, 121 took considerably greater care in reviewing
search warrant applications.
22
The review of a magistrate is not the only safeguard presented
by the warrant application process. Although it is not legally re-
quired, applications for warrants are often reviewed by a member
of the prosecutor's staff or a senior police official before being pre-
sented to a magistrate. As in the case of arrest warrants, this review
can be a very effective screening device. Also, the warrant process,
combined with the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule, ar-
guably encourages more careful screening by the executing officer
himself, apart from the role played by the magistrate and prosecu-
tor. The officer who obtains a warrant recognizes that, on any sub-
sequent suppression motion, probable cause must be established
on the basis of the information he has included in his application.
Unlike the warrantless search situation, there is no opportunity for
proposal on arrest requires a more extensive review of the warrant application, it is
understandable why a practice of perfunctory examination may have developed in the
past. See People v. Burrill, 391 Mich. 124, 214 N.W.2d 823 (1974).
121. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
122. Consider, for example, two of the reports based upon the ABA Foundation
Studies of 1956-1957, which included Michigan as one of the three states studied. In
L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DErxarION OF CRIUM 119-20 (1967), the
authors, although concluding that the judiciary "does not always take seriously its
commitment to make a 'neutral and detached' decision," also acknowledge:
Generally magistrates give more attention to requests for search warrants than they
do to requests for arrest warrants, which are often signed by the judicial officer
without reading them or are signed by the judge's clerk. With rare exceptions,
magistrates do read and carefully consider the evidence presented by law enforce-
ment officers requesting a search warrant, and they frequently require the prose-
cuting attorney to endorse the affidavit and recommend the issuance of the search
warrant, a practice often used also in arrest warrant situations. But in the search
warrant case the magistrate often also reviews the evidence himself rather than
relying totally on the police and prosecutor as he does in the arrest warrant case.
[Footnote omitted.]
Similarly, LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Micir. L. REv. 987, 993 (1965), note:
"As a general proposition, there is greater judicial concern over the issuance of search
warrants than over the issuance of arrest warrants.. . .Although most judges view
the issuance of a search warrant as an important responsibility, this is not true in all
jurisdictions." (Emphasis added.)
'While the authors of Detection of Crime, supra, suggest that this "marked differ-
ence in judicial attitude toward search and arrest warrants seems to result from habit
rather than from any deliberate policy judgment," the explanation probably lies in
the difference in judicial function as explained in note 120 supra. The difference may
also be explained, in part, by the belief that officers are more familiar with the require-
ments for a valid arrest than for a valid search warrant. Both determinations require
an understanding of the nature of probable cause, but in the search situation the issue
may be more complicated because of the variable scope of the search (particularly where
a residence is involved) and the range of items that may be subject to seizure. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
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an "'after-the-event justification for the . . search ...subtly in-
fluenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.' "123
Some Committee members argued that, aside from protecting
constitutional rights, a code revision facilitating the use of warrants
is needed to permit the police to avoid potential constitutional diffi-
culties. They noted that whether decisions like Chimel v. Califor-
nia124 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire'2 were based on a correct or
incorrect assumption as to the value of the warrant process, those de-
cisions established the prevailing constitutional standard, and state
law should not place unnecessary obstacles in the path of officers seek-
ing to comply with that standard.
Several members also argued that the prosecution should be
given full opportunity to gain the legal and practical advantages
that attach to the use of warrants. Where a search has been con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant, the Supreme Court has indicated that
greater leeway may be given to the prosecution in determining
whether probable cause existed.126 Similarly, a hearing on a suppres-
sion motion ordinarily will be more narrowly confined, and hence
less time-consuming, when the challenge is to a search based upon
a warrant. 127 Where the search was pursuant to a warrant, the tra-
ditional view, which Michigan courts apparently follow, limits the
probable cause determination at the suppression hearing to con-
sideration of the facts alleged in the warrant application; the de-
fendant may not introduce evidence challenging the truthfulness of
123. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964).
124. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
125. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See note 96 supra.
126. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965), the Court stressed
the "preference accorded police action taken under a warrant as against searches and
seizures without one," and noted "that in a doubtful or marginal case, a search under
a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall." See also People v.
White, 392 Mich. 404, 420, 221 N.W.2d 357, 364 (1974): "The judicial preference for
searches conducted under the authority of a search warrant should be expressed not
only in terms of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement but also
in terms of a more stringent standard of review applied to all aspects of warrantless
searches."
127. In L. TiFFANY, D. Mc:INTnRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 122, at 159, the
authors note that the "police are likely to rely on the consent search to save the time
and avoid the difficulty involved in going through the rather elaborate procedure
required to obtain a search warrant." As developed in the text at notes 141-206 infra,
the Committee proposals seek to simplify that procedure, but even under current
procedures the short-cut of "consent" may often prove in the long run to be more
time-consuming than obtaining a warrant. A motion to suppress challenging alleged
consent typically will require extensive testimony by all officers present, the defendant,
and any bystanders, whereas the motion challenging a search warrant will rarely
require the testimony of persons other than the officer who submitted the affidavit.
[Vol. 73:221
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these facts.128 Moreover, even if the Michigan courts follow the
trend toward permitting a challenge as to the truthfulness of the
applicant's allegation that he obtained certain information from an
informant,129 the initial showing needed to gain an evidentiary hear-
ing on that issue is not likely to be met in many cases.180 Finally,
use of search warrants might present practical advantages in terms of
citizen response. Experience suggests that, at least with respect to
the search of a building, people often expect the police to have a
warrant and are more likely to cooperate when they see that the
police do have the authorization of a magistrate.18 1
A. Safeguards Versus Facilitation
Commentators have suggested that there is "an inherent and
basically insoluble inconsistency between improvement of the war-
rant as a safeguard against abuse, and encouragement of its use."'
32
They note that "[a]lmost every effort to 'tighten' the warrant pro-
cedure, and give meaning to the 'neutral magistrate's' scrutiny of the
application, is bound to make it more difficult and time-consuming
for the police officer to get a warrant, and stimulate his resort to a
warrantless basis for the search."' 8 3 While the revision of search
warrant procedures does pose somewhat of a dilemma in this regard,
many areas exist in which the use of search warrants could be en-
couraged without undermining the role of the magistrate. Similarly,
additional safeguards could be added while still providing a com-
paratively swift and simple procedure for obtaining warrants.
The Committee started from the premise that current procedure
provides fairly strong support for the exercise of independent judg-
ment by the magistrate. Nevertheless, several safeguards were either
added or clarified to strengthen the magistrate's position. 84 First,
some effort was made to inhibit "judge shopping."' '5 Under current
128. See People v. Kerwin, 234 Mich. 686, 209 N.W. 157 (1926).
129. See Nakell, supra note 112, at 295 nn.79, 80 (collecting cases).
130. See United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
181. See PLE W .RRA'i.ss SEARCms, supra note 82, at 29. The commentary to the
Model Rules offers as an additional advantage of a search warrant that it "decrease[s]"
the "possibility of civil liability in the event of a mistake... " Id.
132. ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 171.
138. Id.
134. As discussed in the Committee Report (to be published in 1975 by the State
Bar of Michigan), some of the provisions mentioned below clearly reflect current
practice and may be required by current law. Others reflect the practice in at least
some parts of the state, but are not required by statute.
135. The Committee's recommendations were not based upon any empirical data
suggesting that "judge shopping" is a significant problem in Michigan. The Committee
simply recognized that the potential for "judge shopping" generally is a primary point
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practice, a particular magistrate in each district is designated to
consider warrant applications. Police ordinarily will present to the
designated magistrate any applications made during normal "busi-
ness hours," but they usually have greater flexibility during evening
hours, when the designated magistrate can often be bypassed as not
readily available. Section 3 will ensure that more designated magis-
trates will remain available during evening hours.13 6 Section 2,
while not restricting warrant authority to designated magistrates,
does create a presumption in favor of those magistrates by emphasiz-
ing the discretion of other magistrates to refuse to consider appli-
cations unless the applicant shows that the designated magistrate is
not available. Persistent attempts by the police to bypass an avail-
able designated magistrate would be a matter of public record and
subject to the administrative authority of the Circuit Court.
"Judge shopping" is also restricted by the provision on repeat
applications (section 7[2]). When a magistrate denies an application,
subsequent applications on the same matter must be brought back
to him, and, if he is unavailable, his replacement must be informed
that the prior application was denied.
Section 7, governing consideration of warrant applications,
strengthens the magistrate's role by requiring that he examine the
applicant. While the examination admittedly can be perfunctory,
the requirement emphasizes that the magistrate need not automat-
ically accept the applicant's credibility. Section 7 also gives the mag-
istrate discretion to examine other persons believed to possess rele-
vant information, and the magistrate has the authority to insist upon
questioning the source of that information. Section 7 also seeks to
ensure that the ordinarily unrecorded examination is not used to
undermine effective review of the magistrate's issuance of the war-
of criticism of current procedures. See L. TFFANY, D. MCINTYRE S. D. ROTENDERO,
supra note 122, at 119-20; Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping:
The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 Mics. L. Ray. 455, 483 (1969). In light of such
criticism, there is value in restricting that potential (even if it is not currently used)
-provided, of course, that any restriction is administratively practicable. The Com-
mittee concluded that a provision limiting authority to issue warrants to a single
magistrate in each district would be far too inflexible, see text at notes 144-46 infra,
but that a presumption against bypassing designated magistrates could be established
without creating significant administrative problems or denying the flexibility needed
in emergencies.
136. Where the judicial district encompasses the entire county (and in Detroit's
Recorder's Court), a locally designated magistrate should always be available, since
section 3 requires that at least one judge in each county (and in Recorder's Court) be
available at all times. For reasons iliscussed in note 143 infra, the Committee concluded
that it could not justifiably require that a magistrate be continuously available in each
district, 2s opposed to each county.
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rant.137 The finding of probable cause must be supported solely by
information contained in the affidavits; the prosecution may not
support the magistrate's finding on the basis of information devel-
oped in the examination unless that information subsequently was
added to the affidavit.
The reporting provision (section 14) further implements the
magistrate's authority by giving him more complete information
about the use of the warrants he has issued. This provision requires
that a return of the warrant be made, not only when the search is
executed and property seized as is currently required,138 but also
when the search is executed without the seizure of property, and
when the search is never executed (with the reasons therefor noted
in the return). The Committee believed that compliance with the
reporting and examination requirements will not be overly burden-
some when viewed in light of other provisions designed to facilitate
the use of warrants. Moreover, the examination requirement was
viewed as essential to preserve the legal advantages8 9 that flow from
use of the warrant process' 40
B. Facilitating the Warrant Application
While the addition of the safeguards noted above is a significant
feature of the proposed search warrant provisions, the thrust of the
proposed changes is toward facilitating the use of search warrants.
The Committee sought to encourage the use of warrants through:
(1) providing for a more swift and simple application process by
137. Magistrates in many judicial districts lack facilities to make a verbatim
recording of an examination. The Committee considered permitting the magistrate to
make a written summary, but concluded that it would be equally convenient to amend
the affidavit to include any significant information developed in the examination.
On the constitutionality of using unrecorded oral testimony to supplement a deficient
affidavit, see the cases collected in W. RINGLE, SEARCaHES AND SE.zu ES, ARREs, AND
CONFESSxONS § 171.09 (Supp. 1974). While several lower courts have upheld that practice,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Christofferson
v. Washington, 393 U.S. 1090 (1969), expressed significant doubt as to its constitution-
ality.
138. See Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
139. See text at notes 127-30 supra.
140. This is not to suggest that the examination requirement is constitutionally
compelled. It might be constitutionally acceptable to follow a procedure similar to that
employed in some states for arrest warrants-the application is sworn to before a clerk,
the clerk then presents it to the magistrate without the applicant being present, and
the magistrate may either issue the warrant without examining the applicant or may
request that the applicant be presented. Cf. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345
(1972). It would be far more difficult, however, to justify restricting. the defefndant's
ability to challenge the affidavit allegations in a subsequent suppression hearing, see
text at notes 127-30 supra, when the magistrate has not examined the applicant prior
to issuing the warrant.
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requiring the prompt availability of a magistrate, permitting tele-
phonic search warrant applications, and clarifying the requisite con-
tents of the application; (2) expanding the types of searches that
may be authorized so as to permit warrant use in conjunction with
all types of constitutionally permissible searches; (3) largely equal-
izing search execution requirements so that officers executing a
search warrant do not bear substantial burdens that are not imposed
upon officers engaged in warrantless searches.
1. Availability of Magistrates
The most frequent police objection to the use of search warrants
is that the application process is too time-consuming. 141 A major
factor contributing to delay in obtaining a search warrant is the
unavailability of magistrates, particularly after normal courthouse
business hours. When an officer learns of criminal activity currently
in process within a building, he usually will go immediately to the
scene of the crime and arrest the persons involved. Similarly, when
an officer receives information that establishes probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime, he will often go di-
rectly to that person's residence to arrest him. Arrests in both in-
stances frequently occur during evening hours.142 After making an
evening arrest, the officer may find that he needs a warrant to
search the premises as a follow-up to the arrest. He may have had
no prior indication that a search would be needed, but matter found
in plain view or on the person of the arrestee may have provided
probable cause for a further search. In other situations the officer
may have anticipated the need for a search but decided that his first
obligation was to make an immediate arrest. (This is particularly
likely where the criminal activity-for example, distribution of nar-
cotics-is currently in progress.) In either situation there usually is
a need to obtain a search warrant promptly, and the first obstacle is
finding an available magistrate. Section 8 seeks to meet this problem
by requiring that at least one magistrate in each county be "on call"
at all times. With the use of paging devices, a magistrate should
ordinarily be available within a short period of time-particularly
where the telephonic search warrant application is utilized.1 43
141. See, e.g., L. TrFrANY, D. McINrian & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 122, at 105,
114-15, 159.
142. Even when the offense is committed during the day, certain sources of informa-
tion furnishing probable cause, such as informants, often are most readily available
after normal working hours.
143. Section 3 applies to each county rather than to each judicial district. Some
Committee members thought it would be desirable to have a magistrate in each
(Vol. 73:221256
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Section 2 supplements section 3 by permitting any magistrate
within the state to issue a warrant in any case. At the same time,
to inhibit judge-shopping, it grants the judge discretion to refuse
to consider an application for a search unrelated to his district un-
less the applicant has shown that all of the judges of the related
district are unavailable. The Committee rejected an alternative pro-
posal that would have permitted a judge to issue warrants only to
conduct searches within his district (and possibly neighboring dis-
tricts when it was shown that all of the judges of the neighboring
district were unavailable).14 That provision would have presented
several difficulties. Initially, the district in which the search is to
take place is not always the most appropriate district in which to
present the application. While a search in a particular district ordi-
narily will relate to a crime committed in that district, occasionally
local police investigating local offenses obtain probable cause to
search premises located outside of the district. The application to
search the out-district premises may, under some circumstances, be
more appropriately presented to the local magistrate than to the
magistrate of the district in which the premises are located. For
example, a single showing of probable cause may relate to the
search of different premises located both within and without the
home district. Also, it may be preferable promptly to obtain the
warrant in the district of investigation and request execution by
the police in the district in which the place is located.145
Even if a specific district could be designated as the most
appropriate in all cases, restricting the authority to issue warrants
to magistrates of that district could prove pernicious. A search might
be invalidated because the police were mistaken as to the district
in which the searched place was located and presented the appli-
cation to a judge of the wrong district. Similarly, if the unavailability
of a local judge were a jurisdictional prerequisite to the issuance
district "on call" at all times. Judicial districts, however, often cover a fairly small
geographical area (e.g., a single municipality). See section 1(c). There may often be two
or three judicial districts, each containing only a single judge, in a small county. It
would impose an unnecessary burden to make each of those judges remain on call.
While district court magistrates could be utilized, the Committee did not desire to
encourage the use of "part-time judges." With the telephonic application process avail-
able, a single judge in each county should be sufficient.
"144. Several states allow judges to issue warrants only for searches "within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court." Omio R. CPsm. PRAc. 41(a). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 933.01 (1974); LA. CODE Cams. P. art. 161 (1967).
145. Thus, the "ordinary district" for application under section 2 includes both the
district of the place to be searched and the district in which the underlying offense
allegedly was committed.
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of a warrant by a judge of another district, the legislation would
have to provide specific standards for "unavailability"; it would
have to settle such questions as whether a local judge is "unavail-
able" when it would take one or two hours longer to present a
petition to him than to a judge of another district. In light of these
difficulties the Committee concluded that restricting search warrant
authority to judges of certain districts (1) created a significant po-
tential for confusion and inconvenience and (2) did not provide
significant countervailing advantages, particularly in terms of pre-
venting "judge shopping," that could not almost as effectively be
provided by the discretionary authority granted in section 2[1].
140
2. Telephonic Search Warrant Applications
147
Under current practice, an applicant for a warrant must prepare
a written affidavit and appear personally before a magistrate. Section
5[4] permits an alternative procedure-an oral application presented
via telephone. This provision was not designed simply to avoid the
"inconvenience" involved in making a trip to the courthouse. Para-
graph (a) limits use of the telephonic application to situations in
which there is reasonable cause to believe that the delay involved
in bringing together the magistrate and the applicant "might result
in loss or destruction of matter subject to seizure . . . ." This stan-
dard permits telephonic applications where the evidence may be
lost or destroyed due to delay, but where that possibility is not so
great as to justify a search without a warrant under current con-
stitutional standards.
48
Vale v. Louisiana'49 illustrates the situation covered by section
5[4]. The officers in Vale lacked probable cause to search the de-
fendant's home until after they had arrested him on his front porch.
At that point, however, they could anticipate the possible return
146. See note 135 supra.
147. NATIONAL Anvisoay COMMISSION, note 48 supra, Recommendation 4.2 urges
"that every State enact legislation that provides for issuance of search warrants pur-
suant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police officers." At least two states
currently have such legislation. See Axuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1444(c), -1445(c)
(Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West Supp. 1974). COMMrrEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, Rule 41(c)(2) (Prelim. Draft 1973) [hereinafter PROPosED AMEND-
mENTs], would provide similar authority in federal courts.
148. The section 5[4](a) standard is stated in terms of the reasonable likelihood that
delay "might result," rather than "will result," in the possible loss of evidence. Compare
section 5[2](c). This phrasing should permit the officer to give more weight to the
potential for changed circumstances (e.g., the anticipated return of a resident). It
should also permit reliance upon factors that create a potential for loss generally,
without examining their particular application in a specific situation.
149. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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of other residents who might desire to assist the defendant. If the
officers left the premises to apply for a warrant, those residents might
destroy the evidence before the officers returned. The Court in Vale
held that these circumstances did not justify dispensing with the
warrant requirement. The majority only briefly commented upon
the potential destruction of evidence, noting that the "goods ulti-
mately seized were not in the process of destruction"'150 as in Schmer-
ber v. California.'5' The facts of Vale support the Court's ruling,
even if a warrantless search could be justified by a significant threat
of destruction less imminent than that presented in Schmerber.
52
First, when the officers initiated their search of the Vale home, they
apparently had no specific basis for assuming that persons likely to
destroy the evidence were about to.return to the premises. 53 Second,
more than one officer was available, so the premises did not have
to be left unprotected while an officer applied for a warrant. The
Committee concluded that even though the potential costs of delay
in cases such as Vale are insufficient to justify dispensing with the
warrant requirement, they are certainly significant enough to justify
a substantial effort to eliminate those costs through a provision like
section 5[4].
Possible destruction of evidence in a "Vale situation" might
be prevented by keeping the premises in "protective custody" while
the warrant is sought. But this raises serious problems if the custody
extends for any significant period. 54 Of course, the officers at the
scene might seek to reduce the period of "protective custody" by
calling headquarters, relaying the relevant information to another
150. 399 U.S. at 35.
151. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court noted:
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Par-
ticularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to
a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek
out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that
the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appro-
priate incident to petitioner's arrest."
384 U.S. at 770-71.
152. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
153. Compare United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
969 (1973).
154. See notes 97, 101 supra. See also Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535,
105 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973), in which police officers were refused admittance to the defen-
dant's apartment, but entered without invitation and placed considerable restraint on
the residents' freedom while another officer obtained a warrant. Noting that the police
had ample prior opportunity to obtain a warrant, the court held that the police action
violated the fourth amendment; it left open the issue of what action is permissible
when the police are faced with an emergency "not of their own making." 30 Cal. App.
3d at 541, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
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officer, and having that officer obtain the warrant on his own appli-
cation, using the "hearsay" from the officer at the scene. The second
officer, however, still might experience significant delay in getting
before the magistrate, particularly during evening hours. Moreover,
this procedure would deprive the magistrate of the opportunity to
examine the officer at the scene, who is in a much better position
to answer questions relating to probable cause and the requisite
scope of the search. 55 The Committee concluded that the telephonic
application process would provide a generally preferable procedure
for eliminating the possible loss of evidence while protecting the
legitimate interests of the owner and occupants of the place to be
searched.
Section 5[4] preserves the essential safeguards of the traditional
search warrant application procedure. The application is made un-
der oath, and the applicant is subject to examination by the magis-
trate. The statement of factual grounds supporting probable cause
is "frozen" at the time of the application since the officer's statement
is recorded by a machine subject to the control of the court'50 and
transcribed at the court's direction "without unnecessary delay."
The court approves and issues a specific warrant, and directs the
officer to fill out copies to be served and returned as provided in
section 12.1S
The Committee recognized that the telephonic application pro-
155. Prosecuting attorneys in San Diego noted in an interview that magistrates
there frequently asked questions during telephonic applications, and the questions often
related to information that would not likely have been conveyed to a second officer-
for example, "were you in uniform when they asked you these questions?"; "where
were you standing when he invited you in?" Also, the judge occasionally gave the
officer directions on conducting the search-for example, "all [you are] entitled to
take from those premises is those things which [you have] asked for. Should anything
else be found in there, [you] will need to get another search warrant." (In the par-
ticular case the judge later noted that this direction did not apply to contraband
found in plain view.) See Transcript of telephonic search warrant application, Jan. 26,
1972, before Judge Robert Cooney, San Diego Municipal Court, on file with the
Michigan Law Review. See also San Diego District Attorney, Manual on Telephonic
Search Warrants (1971).
156. See Miller, Telephonic Search Warrants: The San Diego Experience, 9 Tim
PRosEcUTroR 385 (1974), on the type of equipment and manner of operation that will
ensure judicial control. The required recording provides a safeguard viewed by several
courts as not constitutionally required, at least where the applicant testified in the
presence of the magistrate. See Comment, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard of
Warrant Availability, 21 UCLA L. REv. 691, 697 (1973); note 137 supra. See also
PRoPosED AaMNmaENirrs, note 147 supra, Rule 41(c)(2) (requiring recording "unless it
is impractical to do so').
157. The California courts have upheld the constitutionality of a similar procedure.
See People v. Aguirre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1972). See also Powelson v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 357, 88 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970); Nakell, supra note 112,
at 306-17; Comment, supra note 156.
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cedure may be challenged as providing less satisfactory safeguards
than the traditional procedure in two respects: (1) the magistrate
does not have before him the demeanor evidence of the applicant;
and (2) the oral presentation of information may make it more dif-
ficult for the magistrate to evaluate fully the factual basis for the
issuance of the warrant.158 The lack of demeanor evidence was not
viewed as a matter of great concernm-particularly in light of the
current acceptability of affidavits based upon hearsay.159 The section
5[4] procedure gives the magistrate an opportunity to examine the
source of the information, which would appear to be far more sig-
nificant than the opportunity to observe and examine an applicant
who has received all of his information from another. The oral
form of the presentation was also viewed as unlikely to cause diffi-
culty, although some note-taking (or playback of the tape) might be
necessary in complicated cases.' 60 Nevertheless, to ensure that the
information is properly presented, the Committee required that the
oral application first be approved by the prosecuting attorney. It is
anticipated that a conference call will be used in which prosecutor,
officer, and magistrate will participate. This is common practice in
California, where the officer usually presents the relevant informa-
tion through answers to questions asked by the prosecutor.' The
statement of probable cause is thus presented in an orderly fashion
and has not caused serious difficulty.162
158. See Comment, supra note 156, at 701-05. A few Committee members opposed
the telephonic application procedure because of what they described as the "clandestine
image" likely to attach to a procedure that permits a magistrate to issue an order from
his own home in response to a police officer's "midnight call." The majority, however,
viewed the transcription requirements, including judicial control of the recording
equipment, as an appropriate response to any public concern as to the "clandestine"
aspects of the procedure. It was noted also that the current procedure suggests an
equally clandestine atmosphere when an officer goes to a magistrate's home to obtain
a warrant in an emergency situation. See, e.g., People v. Eddington, 387 Mich. 551,
198 N.W.2d 297 (1972).
159. See Comment, supra note 156, at 701-03, suggesting that demeanor evidence is
not likely to be significant in the warrant application process because, inter alia, "there
is less pressure on the affiant in the ex parte warrant application than there is on a
witness in an adversary proceeding," and "the affiant-usually a police officer who has
testified on prior occasions-is accustomed to the warrant application process."
160. See Comment, supra note 156, at 703-05.
161. See, e.g., San Diego District Attorney, supra note 155; Los Angeles District
Attorney, Instructions for Preparing Sworn Statements for Search Warrants (1971);
Orange County District Attorney, Telephonic Search Warrant Guide (1973).
162. The prosecuting attorney's participation is also helpful in avoiding other pit-
falls of telephonic applications. He can assure that each participant properly identifies
himself before speaking and that crucial matters (e.g., names) are spelled out so as to
avoid errors in the warrant. The prosecutor can also verify that the person seeking the
warrant is an authorized peace officer. (In some California counties, verification is
provided by using the police radio, which is available only to officers.) Interviews with
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In approving the telephonic application procedure, the Com-
mittee was influenced considerably by the successful use of that
procedure in California. District Attorney Miller of San Diego has
noted:
One of the main features of the telephonic system is its flexibil-
ity. In San Diego the system has been used for everything from a
search for a stolen Van Gogh painting to a search for weapons used
in a multiple slaying. In one instance, two affiants working on the
same case were separated by some 60 miles from one another and
yet were able to get their search warrant without delay. The use of
multiple affiants is not uncommon; equipment is the only limita-
tion. There have also been cases of use of the system by untrained,
out-of-county officers who got their first look at the telephonic search
warrant form at the time they were phoning to the deputy district
attorney for a search warrant.
Speed and ease of operation is another great benefit of the tele-
phonic search warrant system. The saving of time has been remark-
able. In a recent survey, it was determined that 65% of all telephonic
search warrants take one hour or less from the time when the officer
in the field decides he wants a search warrant until the time of its
issuance. Most of the remaining 35% are completed in less than 2
hours. Frequently, the delay can be attributed to lack of the neces-
sary information to establish probable cause when the police officer
first calls a deputy district attorney.103
Some Committee members would have permitted telephonic
application in all cases. They viewed the personal appearance of the
applicant and the written application as needless formalities. The
Committee as a whole concluded, however, that it would be best to
initiate use of the procedure under limited circumstances. In August
1972, the reporter discussed the use of the telephonic application
procedure with members of the staff of the district attorney in San
Diego. That office probably has made more extensive use of the
procedure than has any other prosecuting agency in California. Al-
though the California statute contains no time limitation, the dis-
trict attorney's office generally does not permit police to use the
procedure during "normal working hours," when judges would be
readily available at the courthouse. Their approach emphasizes that
application by affidavit remains the "usual procedure."'" The Coin-
Edwin Miller, Jr., District Attorney of San Diego County; Tony Maino, Deputy District
Attorney, San Diego County, August 4, 1972.
163. Miller, supra note 156, at 886.
164. In a typical four-month period after the telephonic procedure was well estab-
lished (November 1971-February 1972), 86 telephonic warrants were issued in San
Diego. All were issued between 6 p.m. and 8 a.m., with over two thirds issued between
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mittee agreed to incorporate a similar approach by including the
potential-loss-of-evidence prerequisite in paragraph (a) of section 5[4].
This standard was thought preferable to leaving the restriction on
use to the prosecutor's discretion (as in California 6 5) or adopting
the very general standard suggested in Proposed Federal Rule 41(c),
which permits the use of oral testimony "when the circumstances
make it reasonable to do so.'1 6
3. Affidavit Contents
Notwithstanding the availability of forms and manuals,167 there
appears to be some confusion concerning the current requirements
governing the contents of the search warrant affidavit. 68 While the
current statutory provisions'6 9 provide some help, the Committee
concluded that a more detailed provision would be desirable. It
recognized that complete explanation of the applicable require-
ments requires reference to the case law. Nevertheless, by including
a general statement of each basic requirement, the statute could
provide some minimal but readily accessible assistance to the officer
and prosecutor in preparing the application, and to the magistrate
in ruling upon it. Hopefully the more complete statutory statement
would also suggest the complexity of certain requirements and the
need to consult materials beyond the statute in attempting to meet
those requirements.
6 p.m. and midnight. Reports from San Diego suggest that the telephonic application
process often was used in situations where warrants formerly were not obtained.
Interview with Edwin Miller, Jr., District Attorney, San Diego County, August 4, 1972.
165. Some California counties did adopt procedures to ensure that the telephonic
application procedure was used only in "emergency" situations. See Los Angeles Dis-
trict Attorney, supra note 161.
166. See PROPosED AMENDMENTs, supra note 147, Rule 41(c)(2).
167. See, e.g., G. Gn.Sr-sPIE, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 868-73
(Supp. 1974); NATIONAL Disrsucr ATTORNEYS AssocrATIoN, MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1973); D. REISIG & E. STAFFORD, THE LAw OF ARREsT, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE IN MicHIGAN (1968). At least a few prosecutors' offices also have prepared de-
tailed memoranda on special types of warrant applications, including checklists of
relevant factors in establishing probable cause. See, e.g., P. BOYLE, THE INFORMR AS
THE BAsis FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 4 (1974) (Wayne County Prosecutor's Office), listing,
for example, the following factors as potentially relevant in showing the reliability of
a first-time, unnamed, nonvictim informer: informer's statement constituted an ad-
mission against penal interest; officer's observations corroborating statement (as in a
"controlled buy" situation); significant detail furnished in statement; accused person's
reputation; and receipt of similar information from other first-time informers.
168. The experience of Committee members suggested that the confusion related
more to "pleading requirements" than to the nature of probable cause. In part the
confusion might be the product of the traditional use of conclnsory statements in
arrest warrant applications. See, e.g., People v. Burrill, 391 Mich. 124, 132, 214 N.W.2d
823, 827 (1974). See also note 120 supra.
169. MicH. Coa'. LAws ANN. §§ 780.651-.658 (1968).
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The Committee's primary concern in describing the contents of
the search warrant application related to the allegations necessary
to establish probable cause through hearsay. Prior to the 1966 stat-
utory revision, Michigan did not permit probable cause to be estab-
lished by hearsay.1 70 While section 780.653 now notes that probable
cause may be shown by reliable hearsay obtained from a credible
person, that provision does not adequately indicate how reliability
is established. Proposed section 5[2] describes the primary means of
establishing reliability as prescribed in various Supreme Court de-
cisions: 171 setting forth "facts bearing on the informant's credibility




To assist in establishing reliability, section 5[2] also permits submis-
sion of affidavits from other parties to support the allegations of the
applicant. Finally, the section specifically notes that the special re-
quirements relating to the presentation of hearsay apply to informa-
tion obtained from a fellow officer. 78
The Committee also made one substantive change in the pro-
visions governing the use of hearsay. The draftsmen of the 1966
revision, seeking to avoid any difficulty in establishing informant
reliability, required that the affidavit contain "affirmative allegations
that the person [who 'supplied' information to the 'complainant']
spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein."'174
This provision apparently prohibits reliance on the hearsay of one
170. See, e.g., People v. Moten, 233 Mich. 169, 205 N.W. 506 (1933); People v.
Perrin, 223 Mich. 132, 193 N.W. 888 (1923).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1971); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
172. Proposed section 5[2](d). To meet the basic standard set forth in section 5[2](d)
-providing "allegations of fact establishing reasonable cause"--the affidavit must also
set forth the "underlying circumstances upon which the informer concluded" that a
crime had been committed, not merely the informer's conclusion alone. See Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
The requirement that the affidavit state "facts bearing upon the informant's credi-
bility" does not refer solely to independent factors, such as past reliability, that have
frequently been noted in Supreme Court opinions. In some situations, the Informant's
status (e.g., victim or uninterested eyewitness) itself suggests credibility. See People v.
White, 392 Mich. 404, 419 n.8, 221 N.W.2d 357, 364 n.7 (1974); Y. KAmssAn, W. LAFAvE
&c J. ImsAm, supra note 50, at 250-51. Similarly, the requirement that the affidavit set
forth the "means by which the informant obtained the information" does not require
that the applicant include so complete a description (e.g., date and time of obser-
vation) as to reveal the informer's identity. Cf. ALl CODE, supra note 5, § SS 220.1(3)
(affiant "shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was
obtained").
173. Thus, such information may not be described as based upon the "personal
knowledge" of the second officer who submits the affidavit-a practice sometimes fol.
lowed in arrest warrant applications. See People v. Burrill, 391 Mich. 124, 214 N.W.2d
823 (1974); People v. Hill, 44 Mich. App. 308, 205 N.Y.2d 267 (1973).
174. Mia. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.653 (1968).
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informant who is repeating information he received from another
informant. Such a prohibition is neither required constitutionally7 5
nor necessary to ensure reliability. Assume, for example, that officer
A discusses a crime with informant C, who has personal knowledge,
and officer B discusses the same crime with D, who also has personal
knowledge. Officers A and B then compare their discussions. When
officer A decides to file the search warrant application, the current
code permits him to rely upon the statement of C, but not upon the
statement of D since it was relayed to him by officer B. In fact, the
officer may have as much knowledge concerning the reliability of D's
statement as of C's, although he did not personally speak to D. It
often will be crucial that someone "down the line" did have per-
sonal knowledge, but it does not serve the purpose of the search
warrant process to allow only the person who spoke with that in-
formant to file the application. Accordingly, section 5[2] eliminates
the requirement of personal knowledge of the informant.
Proposed section 5 also includes standards relating to the descrip-
tion of the place or person to be searched and the items to be seized.
Both standards admittedly are quite general, but they do provide
some idea of the basic objectives to be met. The standard for
description of the place or person-"sufficient particularity so as
to identify a definitely ascertainable place or person"176-emerges
from several Michigan opinions 7' Michigan cases, however, pro-
vide very little guidance concerning the description of the matter
to be seized. Accordingly, the proposed standard-" reasonable par-
ticularity" in light of the nature of the object and the offense al-
legedly committed' 78 -is derived from federal cases.179 The requisite
specificity will vary with the character of the item and its connec-
tion with the offense being investigated. With respect to certain
items (e.g., money), the description must of necessity be general.
With respect to other items, the description must relate to their use
in connection with a particular crime (e.g., "books and records
used in bookmaking," or "gambling paraphernalia"). 80
175. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 828 (1973); State v. Patterson, 83 Wash. 2d 49, 515 P.2d 496 (1973).
176. Proposed section 5[2](c).
177. See, e.g., People v. Ranes, 230 Mich. 384, 203 N.W. 77 (1925); People v. Lienarto-
wicz, 225 Mich. 803, 196 N.W. 326 (1923); People v. Musk, 221 Mich. 578, 192 N.W. 485
(1922).
178. See proposed section 5[2](c).
179. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); James v. United States,
416 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
180. See United States v. Honore, 450 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Sharfman, 448 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1971); James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
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4. Expanded Scope of Search and Seizures
The Michigan Code currently lists the "property or other
thing[s]" for which a search warrant may be issued.18 Although the
Code provision is sufficiently broad to cover most searches, it fails
to encourage full use of the search warrant because it does not
encompass all constitutionally permissible searches. This lack of
coverage is primarily of importance with respect to three special
types of searches.
First, since the 1966 Code revision, the Supreme Court has ex-
panded the concept of a "search" to encompass nontrespassory in-
vasions of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.18 2 Thus,
there are now situations in which surveillance of a suspect's activities
within a private area must meet fourth amendment standards--for
example, where the officer observes through an opening (such as
a vent) that is not a readily anticipated observation site.8 3 The
current search warrant provisions do not specifically exclude "sur-
veillance searches," but section 780.652 authorizes only searches for
and seizures of "property or other thing[s]," a phrase that seems to
limit warrants to searches for tangible objects. Surveillance searches,
on the other hand, are designed to discover and "seize" information.
While surveillance searches are not common, they are partic-
ularly useful when police have probable cause to believe that an
illegal activity (e.g., professional gambling) is occurring within a
-particular building, but would prefer to observe the participants
before entering the premises to make arrests. Very often these are
situations in which police have invested a fair amount of investi-
gative effort and in which the potential criminal liability extends
to several persons. The success of the entire venture may be risked,
however, if the police undertake a surveillance search without a
search warrant. Although the arrests may still be valid as based
upon previously obtained information, the police testimony as to
what they observed prior to entry is likely to be suppressed if they
had ample time to obtain a warrant before the surveillance search
was undertaken. 8 4 The proposed code enables police to obtain a
1969), cert. denied, 597 U.S. 907 (1970); Hastings v. Haug, 85 Mich. 87, 48 N.W. 294
(1891).
181. MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 780.652 (1968).
182. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
183. See, e.g., Texas v. Gonzales, 588 F.2d 145, 147 (5th Cir. 1968); Lorenzana v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); Cohen v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432
P.2d 64 (1967).
184. Cf. Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1968); Lorenzana v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
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warrant in such situations. 8 5 Section 6 authorizes the issuance of a
warrant to search for and seize any "matter" that constitutes evi-
dence of a crime, and the definition of "matter" in section l(f)
includes "the obtaining of incorporeal information by sensory per-
ception . .. ." While the proposed execution provisions would be
incompatible with authorization of lengthy surveillance searches, 88
a court could authorize observation for short periods to ensure that
the criminal activities were underway before officials entered the
premises to make an arrest. Revised section 6 also eliminates any
question of the availability of warrants where the police desire to
enter a building to take photographs or otherwise inspect the
premises but do not intend to seize any tangible item.
A second defect of the current statute is its failure to authorize
issuance of warrants to search for a person to be arrested. 87 Courts
generally have held that, even where ample time exists, an officer
need not obtaii a warrant before entering a building to make an
arrest; this rule applies even though the officer may have to under-
take a fairly thorough search of the premises to find the suspect s8
There are arrest situations, however, in which officers may desire
185. The Code does not, however, provide any standard for determining when a
search warrant is constitutionally required-that is, when surveillance constitutes a
"search." The Committee concluded that, as with the probable cause standard, see
text at notes 15-17 supra, an appropriate legislative definition of what constitutes a
"search" could only reiterate the standard established by judicial decisions such as
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
186. The Committee decided not to consider proposed electronic eavesdropping in
view of the legislature's recent rejection of legislation authorizing such surveillance.
Of course, nonconsensual electronic eavesdropping, even for a limited period, is barred
by federal statute unless the state adopts a provision meeting the requirements of
federal law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
187. McH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.652(f) (1968) permits a search only for "[t]he
bodies or persons of human beings ... who may be the victims of a criminal offense."
See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.54, .136 (1968) (authorizing warrants to search a
building for persons believed to be engaged in specified crimes).
188. See, e.g., People v. Sprovieri, 95 Ill. App. 2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1968), affd.,
43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969); People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178
N.W.2d 686 (1970), affd., 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972); People v. Herrera,
19 Mich. App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969). See also Note, The Neglected Fourth
Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L. R1v. 995 (1971). Note, however,
the suggestion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971), that the
Constitution may require that, where practicable, an officer obtain .an arrest warrant
before entering a household to make an arrest. See also Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958) (forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling to make an arrest
without a warrant may pose a "grave constitutional question!'); Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warrant required unless warrantless entry is
justified by exceptional circumstances). Although these opinions speak in terms of an
arrest warrant, it seems that a search warrant requirement would be more appropriate
because the courts' primary concern apparently relates to the invasion of privacy in-
volved in the entry into the house, rather than in the seizure of the person. See also
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Y. KAmISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 50, at 312. Compare ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 145.
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to obtain search warrants. In particular, a warrant may offer sig-
nificant advantages if the police believe that a suspect is being har-
bored in the residence of another person. An entry into a private
building for the purpose of making an arrest must be based upon
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is on the premises.18 9
While courts tend to assume almost automatically that a reasonable
basis exists when the suspect's own residence is involved,190 the
degree of probability needed for entry upon the premises of another
remains somewhat unclear.191 Advance judicial approval would be
189. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. McKinney, 379
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202-03 (4th Cir.
1966). See also Note, supra note 188, at 996-97.
190. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 28, 28 (1963); United States v. Dudley,
352 F. Supp. 1140 (ED. Mich. 1972); People v. Sprovieri, 95 Ill. App. 2d 10, 238 N.E.2d
115 (1968), affd., 43 Ill. 2d 219, 252 N.E2d 531 (1969). See also People v. Valot, 33
Mich. App. 49, 52, 189 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1971); People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App.
210, 221, 178 N.W.2d 686, 691-92 (1970), affd., 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972).
Lower court decisions have suggested that the officer must have "reasonable grounds
to believe that [the defendant] was in [his residence] when it was entered." United
States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Alexander, 346
F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966); People v. Valot, 33 Mich.
App. 49, 189 N.W.2d 873 (1971). Cf. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500
(1958). However, decisions frequently have found that regular residence in a dwelling,
without more (e.g., car in driveway), furnishes such reasonable belief. See, e.g., United
States v. Dudley, 352 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1972); People v. Sprovieri, 95 I11.
App. 2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1968), affd., 43 Ill. 2d 219, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969). See also
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (there "was no special
knowledge that [the defendant] was home, but concepts of probable cause and reason-
ableness prima fade justifi[ed] looking for a man at home" at 10:20 p.m.). It is de-
batable whether residence alone provides the same degree of probability of success as
is required for probable cause to enter a dwelling to make a search for evidence. See
Y. KAmISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 50, at 276 n.2(b), 312 n.2. Cf. People v.
Sprovieri, 95 Ill. App. 2d 10, 14, 238 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1968), affd., 43 Ill. 2d 219, 252
N.E.2d 531 (1969) (sustaining entry on the ground, inter alia, that "rudimentary police
procedure dictates that a suspect's residence be eliminated as a possible hiding place
before a search is conducted elsewhere").
191. Compare United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974), with United
States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Phillips two narcotics dealers, in the
presence of an undercover agent, called Phillips' office and placed an order for nar-
cotics. One of the dealers asked initially to speak to Phillips, and then said, "well,
all right, I'll talk to you," and placed an order. The dealers then drove to Phillips'
office, entered the building, remained inside for a short time, and returned to their
home. In the meantime, a group of officers entered Phillips' office (using a ruse) to
arrest him. A divided court of appeals held that the officers "did not have probable
cause to believe that Phillips was in the office building at the time of the raid," 497
F.2d at 1136, and therefore the entry and Phillips' subsequent arrest were invalid.
A dissenting judge noted that "the probabilities" would "preponderate in favor of
Phillips' being in his building where all the action was, rather than at home or some-
where else." 497 F.2d at 1136-37. The dissent relied heavily on Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (see note 190 supra). In Brown, police had estab-
lished a surveillance of the apartment building in which Brown's "number one girl
friend," Nadine Frazier, resided. 467 F.2d at 421. A security guard had "sometimes
observed [Brown] frequent the building in company with Miss Frazier." 467 F.2d at
421. At 11 p.m., the officers observed two men enter the apartment building by use
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desirable to meet any subsequent legal challenge either in the
form of a civil suit or a motion to suppress evidence obtained in the
course of the search for the person.192 Such searches may also present
difficult problems of community relations-particularly where the
suspect is not found on the premises-and the warrant may be help-
ful in gaining acceptance of the search.193 Here again we are dealing
with situations that are somewhat unusual, but the encouraged
use of the search warrant process in these situations may eventually
lead to its more frequent use in arrest situations generally.
A third difficulty presented by the current search warrant statute
relates to searches of a person. Most such searches are conducted
incident to an arrest, and warrants therefore are not needed. There
are situations, however, in which police may desire an advance
magisterial determination that probable cause exists for the search of
an arrested person.-' Notwithstanding United States v. Edwards,es
of a key. Shortly thereafter, "a light came on in the window in the vicinity of [Miss
Frazier's apartment]." 467 F.2d at 421. The officers acknowledged that they "had no
reason to believe" that either of the men was Brown, aside from the subsequent show-
ing of lights. The officers returned to headquarters, and at 5:20 a.m. officers demanded
entry (and were eventually admitted) to Miss Frazier's apartment, where they found
Brown. The court held that the officers had "probable cause . . . to enter [that]
apartment to search for Brown." 467 F.2d at 424. The court recognized that the wait
from 11 p.m. to 5 aan. "diminished to some indeterminate extent the likelihood that
Brown was still in the apartment," but not to the extent "as to condemn the police
action as lacking in probable cause-which is essentially a concept of reasonableness."
467 F.2d at 424. The opinion noted:
It is material that what the police were executing was a warrant to arrest a dan-
gerous, usually armed man who was involved in a narcotics operation and was
wanted for murder; and it was reasonable, in terms of prudent police action and
the avoidance of the dangers attendant an armed resistance, to wait for the quiet
hours to enter the apartment of his best girl friend, and to presume that he had
stayed on from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m.
467 F.2d at 424. See also United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1967);
England v. State, 488 P.2d 1347 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1967). Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1966).
193. Indeed, this may be true even when the individual is found on the premises.
Consider, for example, the problems faced by the FBI a few years ago when some
churches provided an "open refuge" to persons subject to arrest for draft evasion.
194. There also may be some situations in which a search of the person pursuant
to a warrant provides a better alternative than an arrest. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. Mc-
Ir'rrvE& & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 122, at 101 n.8:
In Chicago, occasionally, search warrants are obtained for a search of an individ-
ual when a raid is conducted against premises used for commercialized gambling.
The suspect may not be in the building when the raid takes place. He can be lo-
cated, perhaps on the street, and searched without the need to arrest and then
released if nothing is found. If he is arrested, the police feel compelled to take
him to the station even though incriminating evidence is not found.. . . (]t is
suggested a search warrant is appropriate when an officer wishes to search the
person of an apparently innocent suspect carrying contraband by mistake or as a
result of trickery or fraud by another; but this suggestion assumes there are no
grounds to arrest him. [Emphasis original.]
195. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). See text at notes 95-97 supra.
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there may be limits on the examination of clothing as part of an
"inventory search." Certainly if police make a scientific analysis of
the defendant's clothing, they should have probable cause (as the
police had in Edwards) to believe that the analysis will reveal in-
criminating evidence.196 Moreover, even when probable cause is
clear, the general rule authorizing a warrantless search incident to
an arrest may not apply if the search involves an invasion of the
privacy of the body (e.g., the removal of items from body cavities).
Thus, in Schmerber v. California97 the Court suggested that the
taking of a blood sample without awarrant could not be upheld
simply as a search incident to an arrest.198 The Court upheld the
196. The Edwards opinion noted that the lower court had found probable cause,
and the only issue before the Supreme Court- was whether "a warrant should have
been secured." 415 U.S. at 808 n.9. The Court also noted that even where the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment is "inapplicable," the police conduct must still be
"tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures." 415 U.S. at 808 n.9, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
While the Edwards opinion further noted that "[w]ith or without probable cause,
the authorities were entitled at this point not only to search Edwards' clothing, but
also to take it from him and keep it in official custody," 415 U.S. at 804, that reference
arguably was only to a search and retention of the clothing for custodial purposes.
Although scientific analysis does not entail'a substantially greater invasion of privacy,
it serves only an investigatory function, and searches for that purpose ordinarily re-
quire probable cause. Thus, while Michigan courts have frequently upheld traditional
inventory searches of arrested persons, see, e.g., People v. Robinson, 388 Mich. 630,
202 N.W.2d 288 (1972); People v. Dixon, 45 Mich. App. 64, 205 N.W.2d 852 (1973), in
People v. Trudeau, 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965
(1972), the seizure and scientific examination of a jail inmate's shoes for the purpose
of determining whether the inmate had committed a homicide was held invalid for
lack of probable cause.
197. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
198. The majority opinion noted:
Whatever the validity of these considerations [authorizing a search of the person
when legally arrested] in general, they have little applicability with respect to
searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface. The interests in human
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intru-
sions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence
of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may dis-
appear unless there is an immediate search. . . Search warrants are ordinarily
required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be re-
quired where intrusions into the human body are concerned .... The importance
of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not
to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.
.. The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that
he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence."
384 U.S. at 769-70. See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973), upholding the
taking of fingernail scrapings without a warrant as a "very limited search necessary
to preserve the highly evanescent evidence ... found under... [defendant's] finger-
nails .... "
In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the Court specifically noted that
it was "not conclud[ing] that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is never
applicable to the postarrest seizures of the effects of an arrestee." 415 U.S. at 808. It
also noted that it was not "express[ing] a view concerning those circumstances sur-
rounding custodial searches incident to incarceration which might 'violate the dictates
[Vol. 73:221
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search in Schmerber on the ground that delay in obtaining the war-
rant would result in the loss of the relevant evidence.199 There may,
however, be some searches of the body (e.g., removal of foreign
substances) that do not present such urgency. In such instances, a
warrant should be obtained, to ensure both that there is probable
cause and that the method of extraction is reasonable. 200
The current code arguably does not authorize warrants for the
search of a person. Section 780.651 provides that a warrant may be
obtained "to search the house, building or other location or place
where the property or thing which is to be searched for and seized
is situated." While the term "location or place" may be sufficiently
broad to cover the search of a person's clothing or body, that inter-
pretation is at least debatable. Proposed section 7[l] avoids such
ambiguity by specifically providing for warrants authorizing the
search of an "object" or a "person."
20 1
5. Ordinance Violations
After considerable discussion the Committee concluded that its
policy of encouraging use of search warrants did not require that
the warrant process be available for investigations related solely
to local ordinance violations. The vast majority of local ordinances
carrying a potential punishment of imprisonment merely duplicate
state misdemeanor provisions. Ordinances that create "new offenses"
of reason either because of their number or their manner of perpetration.' . . .
Cf. Shmerber v. California .... 415 U.S. at 808 n.9, quoting Charles v. United States,
278 F.2d 386, 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 881 (1960).
199. See note 151 supra.
200. In Schmerber the Court stressed both the strength of the probable cause, 884
U.S. at 768-70, and the "reasonable manner" in which the blood test was performed.
884 U.S. at 771-72. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 280.8(2), similarly requires consider-
ation of both of these factors in authorizing a warrantless "[s]earch of an arrested
individual's blood stream, body cavities, and subcutaneous tissues." Section SS 280.8(2)
allows such a search incidental to an arrest if
there is a strong probability that it will disclose things subject to seizure and re-
lated to the offense for which the individual was arrested, and if it reasonably
appears that the delay consequent upon procurement of a search warrant would
probably result in the disappearance or destruction of the objects of the search,
and that the search is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances of the case,
including the seriousness of the offense and the nature of the physical invasion
of the individual's person.
Proposed section 5 does not specify the types of intrusions upon the body that
may be authorized pursuant to a warrant. Certainly section 22 should not be viewed
as a suggested limitation. The procedures listed in section 22 are geared to a particu-
lar problem, establishing identity, and assume the lack of full-fledged probable cause,
Compare with respect to search warrant authorization Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511,
192 SX.2d 850 (1972), with Adams v. State, - Ind. -, 299 NXE2d 884 (1978), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974).
201. Section 7[l] refers to search of a "person" or "place." Under section l(i)
Oplace" includes any "object."
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apart from state law relate primarily to regulatory matters of local
concern.20 2 Conviction under these provisions rarely results in a
jail sentence. Indeed, the offenses tend to be treated in most respects
as more civil than criminal in nature. Any search warrant authority
required for the enforcement of such ordinances can be provided
by administrative search provisions. A small number of local ordi-
nances do create "new offenses" with respect to activities that tradi-
tionally fall within the "criminal sphere." Most of these ordinances
deal with matters quite similar to state offenses but depart from
state law in defining the prohibited offense. 203 The differences ordi-
narily are not so substantial that probable cause relating to the
ordinance violation will not also suffice for a state offense.2°4 More-
over, the Committee concluded that, should the differences in state
and local law be that significant, the investigation of the possible
ordinance violation certainly should not include a search beyond
that needed incident to an arrest. If enforcement of a legislative
prohibition requires extensive searches of the type undertaken
pursuant to a warrant, the state legislature, rather than the local
city council, should make the determination as to whether the pro-
hibition justifies that cost.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the proposed revision cre-
ates a distinction between state and local offenses that extends
throughout the revision. Provisions authorizing search warrants
refer only to searches for matter relating to a "state offense." 205 This
limitation appears to be consistent with current law.200
202. See, e.g., ANN ARBoR, MIci., Crry CODE § 1:13 (1974), authorizing imprison-
ment for not more than 90 days for most code violations, including construction in
a residential area between the hours of 8 p.m. and 7 a.m., ANN ARBOR, MIcH., CITY
CODE § 9:13(9) (1974), and selling pastries not in a "clean and sanitary container ...
sufficiently tight and compact to exclude all dust and dirt and other contamination."
ANN ARBOR, MICH., Crry CODE § 6:191 (1974). See also ANN AR3oR, Micar., CrrY CODE
§ 8:866 (1974) (providing separate criminal penalties for violation of refrigeration code).
203. See, e.g., ANN ARBOR, McH., CrrY CODE § 9:62 (1974) (describing various forms
of "disorderly conduct"). On local authority to depart from state law in dealing with
matters governed by the state Code of Criminal Procedure, see Note, The Concurrent
State and Local Regulation of Marijuana: The Validity of the Ann Arbor Marijuana
Ordinance, 71 MicH. L. REV. 400 (1972).
204. Compare, e.g., ANN ARBOR, MICH., CITY CODE § 9:62(11) (1974) with MICH.
Compn'. LAWS ANN. § 750.167 (Supp. 1974-1975) (both prohibiting prostitution); ANN
ARBOR, MicH., Crry CODE § 9:62(19) (1972) with Micu. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.856
(1968) (both prohibiting larceny). On the other hand, some ordinance offenses, such
as those directed at particular types of "obnoxious" or "harassing" public behavior,
may have no close counterpart in the state code. See, e.g., ANN ARBOR, MICH., CITY
CODE § 9:62(6) (1974) (prohibiting the following of an individual without lawful justi-
fication where the actor "should know that said individual is likely to be caused
alarm"). Most such offenses are unlikely to require searches beyond those incident to
an arrest.
205. See, e.g., proposed sections 5[2], 7[1]. The Committee also limited section 18[l]
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C. Executing Warrants
The Committee's basic approach in dealing with the execution
of warrants was to retain all provisions that significantly implement
the protective function of the warrant procedure while eliminating
those provisions that impose burdens without providing offsetting
protective benefits. In addition, the Committee sought to establish
clearly the legality of certain important and commonly utilized
procedures that are not treated in current provisions.
Perhaps the most troublesome problem relates to the timing of
service of the warrant. The Committee recognized that service may
be an important factor in gaining the occupant's acceptance of the
search. The served warrant may also assist the occupant in deter-
mining whether to challenge the search. For these reasons section 12
expands present law by requiring service of the warrant in all cases
-not merely when property is seized.20 7 Section 12, however, departs
from current law by permitting service of the warrant at the time of
the search or "as soon thereafter as is reasonably practicable." The
present Code provides that "[t]he officer taking property or other
things under the warrant shall forthwith give to the person from
whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the
Warrant .... ,"208 If that person is not present, the Code directs the
officer to leave a copy "at the place from which the property or
thing was taken."20 9
In order to comply with the current Code, the officer executing
the search must have a copy of the warrant in his possession. While it
is desirable that he have a copy, a requirement to that effect does
not permit sufficient flexibility in the execution of warrants. Situa-
tions may arise in which it is appropriate that an officer other than
the one who obtained the warrant execute it. Section 8 permits
service by another officer, since the magistrate may authorize "any
officer" within the state to execute the warrant. Thus, one officer
may obtain a warrant and then notify a second officer closer to the
scene who may conduct the search. The Committee did not view
to searches for matter relating to "state offenses." If extensive searches for evidence of
ordinance violations should not be authorized by warrant, neither should they be au-
thorized without a warrant under the "exigent circumstances" doctrine.
206. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 780.651 (1968) provides for issuance of a search
warrant in "criminal cases"--a phrase that has been interpreted in a related context
as limited to prosecutions under "state laws." See Mixer v. Board of Supervisors, 26
Mich. 422 (1873). See also Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.652 (1968).
207. Compare Mica. Comp,. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
208. Mica. CoMiw. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
209. Mica. Corn,. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
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this as a procedure to be commonly utilized. There may be situa-
tions, however, in which the officer having the best knowledge of
the grounds for probable cause is far removed from the premises to
be searched.210 If execution by another seems appropriate in light
of the other factors involved-such as the simple nature of the
search, the availability of other officers at the scene, and the likely
absence of any adverse response even if the executing officer is un-
able to show a warrant-the court should have the power to autho-
rize execution by other officers.
21
1
Similar flexibility should apply to the preparation and service
of the receipt. The current Code requires that an officer seizing
property prepare a "complete and accurate" tabulation of the
items seized, "in the presence of the person from whose . . .
premises the property or thing was taken, if present, or in the
presence of at least one other person .... .2 12 The officers must then
either present the tabulation to the person from whom the property
was taken or leave it at the premises. The receipt assures the occu-
pant that the seizure of the property is officially recognized (that is,
the police will not claim the property was never taken). It also may
assist defense counsel in determining whether to challenge the
search. Finally, it assists the police in providing for the correct dis-
position of the property, including its return where appropriate.
Only the first of these functions is substantially served by having
the inventory taken in the presence of the occupant. While it may
reduce the occupant's anxiety, preparation in his presence is not so
essential as to be required under all circumstances. Where the
search pursuant to a warrant is accompanied by an arrest, it may be
desirable to remove the arrestee from the premises before the search
is completed.213 It is not entirely clear whether the current pro-
210. Cf. text at notes 144-45 supra.
211. Under section 8[b] the court may designate the executing officer by name,
department, or classification. Indeed, the proposed section is sufficiently broad that
warrants could be obtained to search a vehicle when its current whereabouts are
unknown. The court could authorize execution of the warrant by any officer in the
state, and any officer who stopped the vehicle (after being informed of the warrant)
could conduct the search. The warrant execution procedure would thus be similar
to the procedure permitted under current law for the execution of arrest warrants.
MxcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 764.18 (1968) provides that the officer executing an arrest
warrant need not have the warrant in his possession, but shall inform the person that
there is a warrant and shall "show .. . [the] warrant if required, as soon as prac-
ticable" after the arrest.
212. Mici. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 708.655 (1968).
213. Although most searches can be conducted promptly, certain searches (e.g.,
the search of premises used for bookmaking) may take several hours, because the
inventory is likely to be quite extensive. Also, there are occasions when even a rela-
tively limited search may have to be conducted intermittently, so that the overall period
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vision permits this procedure.214 Assuming that the person can be
removed, the police must then find another person in whose pres-
ence the tabulation may be made. The same need would also exist
in cases in which the premises are empty when the police arrive.
The police may rely upon the assistance of neighbors in such situa-
tions, but neighbors may not be available. Thus, to be positive that
one other person will be present, the police must use a two-officer
search team (a desirable but not always feasible practice).
Even if an occupant is on the premises during the search, it may
be impracticable to make a complete tabulation in his presence.
Good police practice ordinarily suggests that any items seized im-
mediately be packaged and marked in the presence of the occupant,
so as to avoid subsequent claims that not all valuables taken were
tabulated.215 Where a large quantity of items of several types have
been seized, however, it may be quite difficult for the officers im-
mediately to prepare a "complete tabulation" that includes the
precise number of items of each type. 216 Indeed, in some situations,
it is impracticable to prepare even a fairly general receipt at the
time of the seizure. Where the property is subject to rapid disinte-
gration, it may be necessary to remove it immediately to a laboratory
for preservation. Similarly, where a closed container is obtained
from an arrested person, there is little reason to take an inventory
when the container and the person are to be removed promptly to the
station, where the contents of the container may be examined in his
presence. The Committee concluded that the only standard that
could accommodate all of these situations would be one geared to
"practicability." Accordingly, section 20 requires that the receipt
of the search encompasses several hours. In one recent case the search had to be
conducted over a two-day period because of tear gas. Statement of William Morris
during Committee proceedings, June 28, 1971. See proposed section 9[3].
Police have expressed concern that if they keep the arrestee on the premises dur-
ing an extended search, their action will be challenged by the defense on the ground
that it delayed the defendant's prompt presentment before a magistrate. Also, from
a defense counsel's viewpoint, removal will be preferred lest the defendant make an
incriminating statement in response to the discovery of evidence in his presence.
214. The current statute requires that the tabulation be prepared in the presence
of the person "from whose ...premises the property was taken, if Present .... "
MIcH. CoI ip. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968) (emphasis added). This provision does not
specifically restrict police authority to remove that person when he has been arrested.
It may be argued, however, that to permit removal is to undermine the tabulation-in-
the-presence requirement, at least where the person is not obstreperous.
215. See PRojEcT ON LAW ENFORcimiENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MoDESL RuLEs
FOR LAw ENFORCEMIENT-SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTION, Rules 803, 305 [hereinafter PLE
SFARCH WARRANT ExEcUTIoN]. Cf. Michigan State Police, General Procedures for Han-
dling Evidence, C.11502 (Nov. 1, 1972).
216. See, e.g., People v. McLott, 55 Mich. App. 198, 222 N.W.2d 178 (1974).
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be prepared, signed, and served as soon after the seizure as is "rea-
sonably practicable."
21'
Another aspect of warrant execution treated in the Committee's
proposal is the scope of the permissible seizure by an officer execut-
ing a warrant. The current Code refers only to the seizure of prop-
erty "under the warrant."218 This language, combined with a
prohibition era ruling stating that the officer may seize only items
specified in the warrant, 219 has caused some confusion concerning
the officer's authority to seize other evidence discovered in the rea-
sonable course of a search under a warrant. Recent cases establish
that the seizure of such items is constitutionally permissible under
the "plain view doctrine," provided that the officer has probable
cause to believe that items seized constitute evidence of a crime.
220
Section 15 restates this principle, and should thereby eliminate any
confusion on this score, although it admittedly provides little help
in determining precisely what constitutes the "reasonable course"
of a search under a warrant.
The Committee also sought to eliminate any uncertainty con-
cerning the public record status of warrants and warrant applications.
Although judges commonly view the search warrant determination
as a closed proceeding, no current provision excludes warrants and
warrant applications from the public record.221 As a matter of prac-
217. ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § SS 280.2 similarly requires that in "all cases of
seizure other than pursuant to a search warrant, the officer making the seizure shall,
as soon as is reasonably possible," file a report "with a list of things seized ... .
However, section SS 220.3(6), governing searches pursuant to a warrant, is similar to
MAcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968). That ALI section requires that the list be
prepared "[u]pon completion of the search" in the presence of the "person in appar-
ent control of the premises ...." Where the premises are unoccupied, the executing
officer is directed to secure the presence of one or more apparently credible persons
"if practicable." The ALl commentary does not offer any explanation as to why dif-
ferent standards are applied to searches with and without warrants. The Michigan
Committee found no justification for imposing a more rigid timing requirement where
the search was undertaken pursuant to a warrant, particularly in light of the Com-
mittee policy to encourage the use of search warrants.
218. icir. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
219. In People v. Preuss, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N.W. 684 (1923), the officer was di-
rected by the warrant to search for stolen beans. While searching for the beans he
came across seven gallons of moonshine whiskey, which he seized. The court ques-
tioned the validity of the affidavit supporting the warrant, but concluded that, even
if the warrant was viewed as "fair on its face and [therefore] protected the officer,"
the seizure of evidence other than that specified in the warrant made the officer a
trespasser and required suppression of the evidence. 225 Mich. at 118, 195 N.W. at 685.
220. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); United States
v. McDonnell, 315 F. Supp. 152 (D. Neb. 1970); People v. Imbrunone, 5 Mich. App.
42, 145 N.W.2d 844 (1966).
221. Mcmir. Comm. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968) provides that the tabulation of the
items seized "may be suppressed by order of the court until the final disposition of
the case ... . The Committee found no need for suppression of the receipt since
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tice, warrants are not filed with public records of judicial proceed-
ings prior to their return. Section 7[3] specifically approves this
policy of nondisclosure, which is necessary to ensure effective exe-
cution. In some instances, a warrant may be returned unexecuted
for reasons that suggest that a request will subsequently be made for
another warrant in connection with the same investigation. Accord-
ingly, section 7[3] also extends the disclosure prohibition to warrants
that are returned unexecuted, except that disclosure may be ordered
by the magistrate or by another judge in connection with a judicial
proceeding.
It should be emphasized that the Committee did not view itself
as necessarily bound by current procedures governing execution of
warrants. For example, it considered proposing a new provision re-
quiring that warrants be executed during the daytime unless the
court authorizes nighttime execution upon a showing of special
need.222 After weighing the interests involved, the Committee de-
cided to place no limitations upon nighttime execution. The effec-
tive utilization of the search warrant often requires an evening
search. Warrants are commonly used in the investigation of criminal
activity that occurs during the evening.223 Also, as noted above,- 24
information concerning illegal activity of all sorts is frequently
obtained from informants available primarily during evening hours.
Once reasonable cause is established, the search usually should be
made forthwith because the possibility always exists that the items
to be seized might otherwise be removed or destroyed. The Com-
mittee concluded that there would be little value in imposing a day-
time-execution requirement if an exception were permitted in every
case in which an evening search might be somewhat more effective.
A daytime-execution provision would only be justified if the inter-
ests of the individual in not being disturbed during the evening
the warrant has already been executed at that point. Of course, where pretrial pub-
licity threatens a fair trial, the court may take appropriate measures relating to
disclosure generally. See ABA PRoJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Approved Draft 1968).
222. A number of jurisdictions have such provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Cams. P. LAw
§ 690.30(2) (McKinney 1971); Omo R. Cums. P. 41(c). See also ALI CODE, supra note 5,
§ SS 220.2(3). Michigan formerly had such a provision but repealed it in 1929. See
Public Act of 1927, Mich. Session Laws No. 175, ch. 16, § 4 (May 14, 1927), repealed by
Public Act of 1929, Mich. Session Laws No. 24, ch. 16, § 2 (April 2, 1929).
223. Warrants are frequently sought in connection with "raids" of dwellings being
used for illegal enterprises. See ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 156-57. Raids in connection
with certain types of gambling and the narcotics trade are frequently made during
the evening, when the illegal activity is at its height.
224. See text at notes 141-43 supra.
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hours ordinarily would offset the risk to the effectiveness of the
search. The Committee concluded that they would not. First, eve-
ning searches are not necessarily more "alarming" or "danger-
provoking" than daytime searches. 225 Much depends upon the time
of the search and the habits of the occupants. An evening search
of a dwelling when both husband and wife are likely to be present
and awake may be less alarming than a late afternoon search when
only a teenager is present. Searches conducted during early morning
hours are, of course, quite different. But experience in Michigan
since it discarded the daytime limitation did not suggest, to the
Committee's knowledge, any pattern of abusive use of early morn-
ing searches. Moreover, searches conducted at that time usually
have followed an arrest of the occupants. The police might still
make an early morning entry for the purpose of making an arrest,
even if the nighttime search warrants could not be obtained. Pro-
hibiting nighttime searches might thus result only in encouraging
a search without a warrant, contrary to the Committee's basic
objective in drafting the search warrant provisions.
IV. EXECUTION PROVISIONS
Execution of searches was a primary Committee concern apart
from the amendments needed to facilitate the use of search warrants.
Current execution provisions are notably deficient in their failure
to deal with warrantless searches. The interests of privacy and effec-
tive law enforcement considered in fashioning appropriate execution
standards relate to all searches, and the same standards generally
should apply to searches with and without warrants. Admittedly, the
search warrant process requires certain special execution procedures
(e.g., warrant service), but most of the problems of execution relate
equally to both types of searches. Moreover, these problems appear to
be fairly susceptible to legislative solution.226 While the Constitution
does impose some limitations upon the manner of execution, those
225. Compare ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 175; Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S.
430, 464-65 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting possible constitutional require-
ment of "greater justification" for a nighttime search).
226. The Committee appreciated that, from the viewpoint of the occupant of the
premises, the manner of execution is often far more important than the strength of
the justification for the search. Cf. Strauss, Field Interrogation: Court Rule and Police
Response, 49 J. URBAN L. 767, 770 (1970). People may be far more upset by a lawful
search executed in a rude or threatening manner than by a search lacking probable
cause but conducted in a polite, low-key, and unobtrusive manner. Of course, some
of the most significant aspects of execution from the occupant's viewpoint relate to
matters of general demeanor that are not susceptible to legislative regulation. Yet,
matters of notification, distribution of receipts, and the return of property are also
important, and they have traditionally been regulated by legislation, at least with
respect to searches under a warrant.
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limits are fairly clear. The Committee foresaw far less difficulty in
dealing with constitutional standards in this area than in dealing
with the shifting standards that determine the permissible scope of
warrantless searches.
The proposed provisions relating to the execution of searches
concentrate upon four areas: notification of authority to search,
use of force, provision of receipts for seized property, and custody
and disposition of seized property. In each area the Committee
sought to achieve three goals: (1) to eliminate functional inconsis-
tencies in the current law; (2) to reduce confusion in the governing
standards by eliminating ambiguities and treating significant prob-
lems not mentioned in current provisions; and (3) to provide suffi-
cient flexibility in permissible procedures to meet emergency situa-
tions while retaining appropriate safeguards against abusive practices.
A. Notification of Authority
Section 780.656 of the current Code is a typical codification of
the English common law rule on notification. 227 The proposed sec-
tions on notification, sections 10, 11, and 18, vary from that pro-
vision in several respects.
First, sections 10, 11, and 18 concentrate upon the need for
notification of authority without regard to method of entry. Sec-
tion 780.656 presently requires notification only as a prerequisite
to forcible entry. Notification, however, serves interests other than
possible avoidance of breaking doors or windows. An unannounced
entry in any form constitutes an invasion of privacy. It tends to be
frightening and disruptive, and often increases the potential for
violent response. These qualities are present even though entry is
gained without use of force, as by climbing through an open win-
dow. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized this potential
in their interpretations of provisions almost identical to section
780.656, and have held, for example, that the statutory notice
requirement applies to any "unannounced intrusion into a dwelling
w .. hether officers break down a door, force open a chain lock
227, McH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968) provides: "The officer to whom a
warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door
or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the
warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or
when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the
warrant."
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968) is quite similar to the federal statute
on execution of warrants, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970). Similar provisions are found in
over one half of the states. See Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful
Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 508, 560-61
(1964). For a review of the English common law heritage of these provisions, see Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 47-52 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Blakey, supra, at 500-08.
December 1974]
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mich. L. Rev.  279 1974-1975
Michigan Law Review
on a partially open door, open a locked door by use of a passkey,
or . . . open a closed but unlocked door."228 The Committee's
proposal, like other recent revisions, approaches the problem di-
rectly rather than through an expansive interpretation of phrases
such as "break" or "force." 229 Sections 10, 11, and 18 apply to all
forms of entry and require prior notice of authority except under
specified circumstances.230
Second, the proposed sections vary from the current law with
respect to the structures included. Section 780.656 extends to entry
into all buildings, including those open to the public. Sections 10,
11, and 18, on the other hand, are limited to entry into "private
buildings," as defined in section 1(a). When the focus is shifted
from the use of force to the need for prior notification, there is no
reason to include the public building, which any person can enter
without announcement of identity or purpose.231 On the other
228. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 (1968). See also People v. Rosales,
68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); State v. Monteith, 4 Ore. App.
90, 477 P.2d 224 (1970); State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 499 P.2d 241 (1972).
229. See also N.Y. QumR. P. LAW § 690.50 (McKinney 1971); ALI CODE, supra note
5, § SS 220.3(2). But compare former D.C. CODa § 23-591 (repealed 1974). The former
D.C. Code required notice prior to "breaking and entry," but defined "breaking and
entry" as including "any use of physical force or violence or other unauthorized
entry," not including "entry obtained by trick or strategem." This standard appar-
ently permitted entry without notification when the officer gained entry by misrepre-
senting his identity (e.g., by stating that he was a telephone repairman). See United
States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing various federal "ruse
entry" cases). While entry obtained by trick does not carry with it all of the pernicious
qualities of unannounced intrusions obtained by force or stealth, it may often present
some of those qualities. Accordingly, entry by trick for the purpose of conducting a
search should be permitted only where there is some justification for failing to give
prior notice-that is, when the circumstances noted in proposed sections 10 or 18[8]
are present. Of course, entry for other purposes is not governed by this requirement.
See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (undercover agent used ruse to
enter premises to "set-up" unlawful transaction).
230. Decisions interpreting MrcH. Coat,. LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968), and a counter-
part provision relating to arrests, MgcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 764.21 (1968), have held
that the notice must be appropriate to the circumstances-for example, where the
officer announces "this is the police" and nobody responds, his subsequent entry is
not invalid because he failed to state also that his purpose was to conduct a search.
See People v. Doane, 33 Mich. App. 579, 190 N.W.2d 259 (1971), revd. on other grounds,
387 Mich. 608, 198 N.W.2d 292 (1972). See also People v. Harvey, 38 Mich. App. 39,
195 N.W.2d 773 (1972). This policy has been followed in the proposed provisions.
Sections 11 and 18 require that notice be given in an "appropriate manner." In light
of the flexibility provided by that phrase, the Committee concluded that there was
no need for additional provisions on the form of the notice, such as a provision
stating that a reasonable effort to give notice will be adequate when notice is inter-
rupted or that the announcement must be made in a voice sufficiently loud to be
heard within. Cf. N.Y. Cum. P. LAW § 690.50(1) (McKinney 1971).
231. This is not to suggest that an officer with a warrant authorizing the search
of a public area in a public building (e.g., a store) should not give notice to a person
in apparent control prior to undertaking the search. However, there is no need to
give notice prior to entry into the building. See, e.g., ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 120.6
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hand, there is a need to include all private structures in which the
occupant has an expectation of privacy. The New York provision
accordingly includes entry into vehicles as well as buildings.232 The
Committee, however, viewed notification of authority as unnecessary
in the typical vehicle search. When the officer stops or approaches
the automobile, his status ordinarily will be known immediately
to any occupants.
233
Third, sections 10, 11, and 18 depart from section 780.656 by ex-
tending the basic notification requirement to warrantless searches.
234
In most instances, exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless
search of a building would probably also justify entry without prior
notice under the standards specified in section 18[3].235 There may
be situations, however, in which a warrantless search is permissible,
but in which there is no such emergency as would justify an unan-
nounced entry. The ALI Code apparently assumes that such situa-
tions are very unlikely to occur since it does not extend its notifica-
tion provision to warrantless searches. 236 That assumption is tied
to an ALI provision that permits entry into a building to conduct
a warrantless search only if there is reasonable cause to believe that
the building contains individuals in "imminent danger," things
"imminently likely to burn, [or] explode," or things that will cause
or be used to cause serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed.237
The ALI rejected as constitutionally impermissible a broader pro-
(requiring demand to enter upon "private premises" to make an arrest). Compare id.
§ SS 220.3 (requiring notice prior to entering upon any "premises" specified in the
warrant).
232. N.Y. CRiin. P. LAw § 690.50 (McKinney 1971).
233. Even when the officer is not wearing a uniform, he will ordinarily announce
his status when stopping the automobile. Also, under the Committee proposal on
arrests, he must announce his identity in making the arrest, which will usually pre-
cede the search of the vehicle. With respect to those vehicles from which occupants
are not as likely to be looking outside (e.g., stationary mobile homes), see the dis-
cussion of the definition of "building" (proposed section l(a)) at text following note
240 infra.
234. The reference here is to entry to conduct a warrantiess search apart from any
search incident to an arrest. A separate provision in the Committee proposal on arrests
requires notification prior to entry into private premises to make an arrest. See text at
notes 267-68 infra.
235. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F2d 205, 212-13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 860 (1963) (search for mortally injured person); People v. Superior Court, 6
Cal. App. 3d 421, 85 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1970) (search for bomb). Cf. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967). But compare United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
236. See ALI CODE, supra note 5, §§ SS 220.3, 260.1-.6. Where the warrantiess search
is made incident to an arrest, see id. § SS 230.5 (quoted in note 100 supra), notifica-
tion would be required pursuant to id. § 120.6, governing entry of private premises
to make an arrest.
237. See id. § SS 260.5. See also note 270 infra.
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vision that would have permitted entry generally where officers have
probable cause to believe that the building contains seizable things
in imminent danger of being moved or destroyed. 288 On the other
hand, the Project on Law Enforcement includes such a provision.28 9
The Committee found no need to determine whether the ALI or
PLE proposal more accurately reflects the scope of the exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine. Even under the ALI provision, there may be in-
stances, for example, where the danger of explosion or fire is not so
"imminent" as to justify an unannounced entry, even though it does
jistify entry to conduct a warrantless search for incendiary items.
24 0
Furthermore, the Committee's draft, unlike the ALI Code, defines
"building" to include mobile homes and similar vehicles. While
these "buildings" may be sufficiently mobile to justify a warrantless
search under Chambers and Coolidge, that mobility ordinarily
would not be sufficient to justify dispensing with the notice require-
ment under section 18[3].
Finally, sections 10, 11, and 18 make their greatest departure
from current law in recognizing certain exceptions to the notice
requirement. Section 780.656 does not refer to any exceptional
circumstances under which an officer may make a forcible entry
without giving prior notice of his authority and purpose. Many
states with similar statutes have recognized certain common law
exceptions, however.241 Those exceptions, as they apply to entry for
the purpose of a search, are commonly described as: (1) the physical
peril exception-where the giving of notice is likely to result in
imminent peril of bodily harm to the persons executing the search
or other persons on the premises; (2) the useless gesture exception
-where the persons within already know of the officer's authority
and purpose; (3) the unoccupied premises exception-where the
officer reasonably believes that the premises are currently unoccu-
pied; and (4) the destruction of evidence exception-where provid-
238. See ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 210-11. Compare id. § SS 230.5, quoted in
note 100 supra, permitting extension of a search incident to an arrest to the premises
when there is a similar likelihood of losing evidence. See also id. § SS 260.3, authoriz-
ing certain vehicular searches without warrants.
239. PLE WARANTLESS SEARcHEs, supra note 82, Rule 502. See also United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
240. Cf. People v. White, 54 Mich. App. 342, 220 N.W.2d 789 (1974) (involving a
search for booby-trapped evidence).
241. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969); People v. Dumas,
9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973); State v. Gassner, 6 Ore. App.
452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971). Over one half of the states have recognized one or more of
these "common law" exceptions either by court decision or by specific "no-knock"
provisions in statutes prescribing notice requirements. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1970) [hereinafter House REPORT].
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ing notice is likely to result in the destruction of seizable property.242
In Ker v. California,243 the Supreme Court, although dealing with
entry to make an arrest, apparently accepted the constitutionality of
these exceptions if properly applied.244 Relying upon Ker, several
jurisdictions have adopted statutory provisions that specifically rec-
ognize one or more of the exceptions.245
The Committee's proposal recognizes only the physical peril
and destruction of evidence exceptions.246 The Committee con-
cluded that the exception for unoccupied premises was unnecessary.
The slight delay involved in giving notice and waiting a reasonable
time for a response is a worthwhile investment in avoiding a possible
unannounced entry based upon an erroneous belief that the prem-
ises are vacant. The same policy also led the Committee to reject the
"useless gesture" exception. Many useless gesture cases involve sit-
uations in which the subject sees the officer coming, races into the
house, and bolts the door. In such a case, prompt entry following
notice is permitted under proposed section 11[3](c)-reasonable be-
242. Although the first and fourth exceptions are commonly stated in terms of the
consequences of giving notice, cases applying these exceptions consider the conse-
quences of the delay occasioned both by giving notice and by waiting a reasonable
period to determine if entry will be denied. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Menduchi
v. Tracy, 350 F.2d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1965); Henson v. State, 286 Md. 518, 523, 204 A.2d
516, 519 (1964). See also Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139,
151 (1970). Cf. State v. Lindes, 291 Minn. 217, 190 N.W.2d 91 (1971). Since it is the
notice that creates the dangerous potential of the waiting period, section 10 follows
the traditional statutory form in referring only to the impact of giving notice.
243. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
244. The four exceptions appear to be consistent in principle with both Justice
Clark's plurality opinion and Justice Brennan's separate opinon, although the latter
opinion suggests a somewhat narrower standard as to the destruction of evidence.
See Note, supra note 242, at 148; note 270 infra. It should be noted that Justice
Brennan was referring throughout Ker to unannounced entry based on the officer's
own determination of need. More leeway might be granted when entry without prior
notice is authorized by a court order. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1965).
245. See, e.g., N.Y. CraM. P. LAw § 690.35-50 (McKinney 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-29-08 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-54-9 (Supp. 1973).
246. The Committee's decision to authorize no-knock entry under limited circum-
stances was made prior to the repeal of the federal no-knock provisions. See Act of
Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481. The Committee was aware, however, of the diffi-
culties experienced in federal no-knock "raids" in connection with narcotics investi-
gations. Although some question was raised as to the value of no-knock entry as an
enforcement tool, cf. Senate, House Vote To Repeal Federal No-Knock Authority, 15
CRtm. L. Rm. 2460 (August 28, 1974), a majority of the Committee was convinced that
experience in Michigan and other jurisdictions established a need for no-knock au-
thorization under appropriate circumstances. Several members emphasized that if no
exception to the notification requirement were recognized, executing officers would not
only be barred from making entry without prior notification, but also from giving
notice and entering immediately thereafter without waiting for a response (a more
common practice in some of the situations noted below). See note 242 supra and the
discussion of "entry without consent" in text at note 272 infra.
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lief exists that prompt admission will be denied-and the minimal
effort involved in giving appropriate notice immediately prior to
entry is unlikely to frustrate the officer in preventing the possible
destruction of evidence.247 On the other hand, there are so-called
"useless gesture" cases in which the officer only suspects that his
presence is known (e.g., someone appears to be looking out the win-
dow) or in which the officer believes that notice will not be heard
(e.g., the occupant appears to be sleeping).2' 8 In such cases, assuming
there is no ground for fearing physical peril, the officer should not
be allowed to rest simply upon his possibly erroneous assumption
that announcement of his authority and purpose would be a useless
gesture. Indeed, an announcement in those circumstances might be
required constitutionally in light of the suggestion in Miller v.
United States24 9 that the "useless gesture" exception applies only
when "the facts known to [the] officers would justify them in being
virtually certain that the petitioner already knows their purpose."
250
The Committee had comparatively little difficulty in accepting
a "physical peril" exception based upon a reasonable-cause standard.
While some Committee members generally opposed any no-knock
provision, they recognized that where an unannounced entry is rea-
sonably believed necessary to avoid physical peril to the executing
officer or to another, the officer simply cannot be expected to give
notice or to delay his entry to await possible admittance.2 1 The
Committee sought to prevent abuse of this authority by requiring
advance approval of a magistrate when the officer is operating pur-
suant to a warrant and the grounds justifying an unannounced entry
are known at the time of the warrant application.202 While decisions
247. Of course, if the individual's prior response to the appearance of the officer
suggests possible physical peril, then section 11[2](b) would permit the officer to enter
without giving notice.
248. See, e.g., Bosley v. United States, 426 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
249. 357 US. 301 (1958).
250. 357 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
251. Some support for this view was found in Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.656
(1968), which permits immediate use of force by the officer "when necessary to liberate
himself or any other person assisting him in the execution of the warrant" (emphasis
added). However, this provision apparently refers to persons within a place who seek
to escape, and therefore does not necessarily support a provision authorizing the use
of force where the danger could be avoided by simply not seeking entry in the first
place.
252. See proposed sections 10(b), 11[2](b). State statutes recognizing exceptions
to the notification requirement ordinarily include provisions permitting warrant
authorization of no-knock entry. See, e.g., statutes cited note 245 supra. Judicial
decisions have also recognized warrant authorization of no-knock entry in the absence
of a statutory provision. See State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 166 N.W.2d 347 (1969).
Compare ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 220.3, described in note 260 infra.
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indicate that reasonable cause to anticipate physical peril must exist
at the time of entry,2 3 there may be cases in which factors known
at the time of the warrant issuance clearly indicate that danger will
exist when entry is made.25 4 Of course, the requisite reasonable cause
must consist of more than the fact that the occupant possesses a
weapon; the officers also must show a reasonable basis for assuming
that the occupant is likely to use it.255 The Committee proposal en-
courages the officer to present such a case to the magistrate, because
otherwise the officer can rely only upon circumstances unknown at
the time of the warrant application in subsequently justifying his
unannounced entry.
250
While the potential source of danger may disappear subsequent
to a magisterial authorization of entry without notice, that possibil-
ity does not justify refusing to permit advance authorization of
entry without notice. A similar potential for changed circumstances
is present with respect to all aspects of warrant authority, including
the existence of probable cause.257 It is assumed that police will not
253. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Parsley v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d
934, 513 P.2d 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1973).
254. See, e.g., People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1973).
255. See People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 177, states that the crucial issue in the issuance of "no-knock
authority" is whether dispensing with notice will increase or decrease the risk "of
executing the warrant with 'all practicable safety....' This suggests that the court
must weigh the risk involved in entry without notice against the risk involved in entry
with notice. The Committee concluded, however, that once it is shown that reasonable
cause exists to believe that an occupant will respond to notice with physical force, the
court should not be placed in the position of determining whether entry without
notice will improve the officer's chances of avoiding injury. There may be some situa-
tions presenting a threat of resistance in which notice nevertheless might not increase
the risk (e.g., where an announced entry is likely to provoke a dangerous response
from only one of several persons who may be on the premises, while the others are
more likely to respond violently to an unannounced entry). That determination, how-
ever, should be left to the officer, who is in a better position to evaluate what mode of
entry will minimize the risk in a particular case. The court's role under section 10(b)
is only to ensure that the officer is reasonable in concluding that a real risk exists.
256. See section 11[2](b). Although a similar limitation is not imposed upon
warrantless searches, this distinction was not viewed as likely, in itself, to discourage
applications for warrants. See text at notes 238-40 supra on the fourth amendment
limitations upon warrantless searches of buildings.
257. While the proposed provisions do not state specifically that an officer should
decline to execute a warrant when aware of changed circumstances that eliminate
probable cause, proposed section 14[2] is premised, in part, on the existence of such an
obligation. Cf. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 120.9. A similar obligation would exist with
respect to use of no-knock authority granted in the warrant. In other settings the
existence of probable cause at the time the warrant was issued has not precluded a
challenge to the exercise of warrant authority after probable cause clearly has dissi-
pated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCants, 450 Pa. 245, 299 A.2d 283 (1973) (sub-
stantial delay in executing warrant renders it "lifeless"). Cf. People v. Siemienlec, 368
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use no-knock authorization when it becomes obvious at the scene
that the grounds for the authorization no longer exist. In any event,
the possibility that police may use such authority without regard to
changed circumstances is offset by the value of obtaining advance
judicial review in the vast majority of cases in which circumstances
will not have changed.258
The Committee had greater difficulty with the "destruction of
evidence" exception. Reports of abusive no-knock entries in other
jurisdictions have concerned entries based primarily on this
ground.2 9 The Committee concluded that the potential for misap-
plication of a destruction of evidence exception is so great that the
exception .hould be recognized only when approved in advance by
a magistrate. A similar approach has been adopted in New York,20
0
but the standard for authorization there arguably is so broad as to
encompass all cases in which the item to be seized is susceptible to
swift destruction.2 1 Section 10(a), on the other hand, assesses the
possible loss of evidence in the particular case. The nature of the
item to be seized is, of course, an important factor. But other factors
should also be considered, including the past behavior of the suspect,
the nature of the criminal activity,26 2 and the likely location of the
Mich. 405, 118 N.W.2d 430 (1962); People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 116 N.W.2d 786
(1962).
258. See also PLE SEARCH WARRANT Ex ECUToN, supra note 215, at 26:
The California Supreme Court recently .. . [held] that the "key to permissible
unannounced entry" is the search team's knowledge of exigent circumstances at the
time of entry, and that a "warrant authorizing such action adds nothing."
[Parsley v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 934, 513 P.2d 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1973)].
Nevertheless, the drafters feel that judicial authorization should be sought even
if it is legally meaningless. Seeking approval supports the conclusion that exigent
circumstances do exist and are not the product of a creative imagination. Seeking
approval demonstrates good faith, since the search team is asking a neutral,
detached magistrate to test its possibly hurried or unreasonable conclusion.
259. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1973, at 1, col. 5 (late city ed.); Percy, The No.Knoc
Law: An Indelicate Balance, 10 TRIAL, March-April 1974, at 29.
260. See N.Y. CRim. P. LAw § 690.50[2](b) (McKinney 1971). Compare State v.
Linder, 291 Minn. 217, 190 N.W.2d 91 (1971); former D.C. CODE § 23-591(c)(2)(A)
(repealed 1974) (permitting no-knock entry to prevent destruction of evidence when
authorized by warrant or upon facts unknown at the time warrant was obtained); ALI
CoDE, supra note 5, § SS 220.3(3) (no provision for warrant authorization of no-knock
entry, but executing officer may make such entry without authorization if he has
"reasonable cause to believe that the notice ... would endanger the successful execu-
tion of the warrant with all practicable safety').
261. N.Y. CIuM. P. LAw § 690.35 (McKinney 1971) applies whenever "the property
sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of."
262. See, e.g., HousE REPoRT, supra note 241, at 108-09:
Illegal gambling and bookmaking operations have taken special precautions so that
they will be able to destroy the work product of the gambling operations during
the time the officer has to wait before breaking into the premises. In 1962, for
example, it was reported that less than 30 seconds were necessary to destroy all
of the evidence of a wire service headquarters.
[Vol. 73:221
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mich. L. Rev.  286 1974-1975
Search and Seizure Legislation
evidence. Thus, a search for narcotics would not inevitably justify
an unannounced entry.268 The magistrate would also consider such
factors as the likely means of quickly disposing of the narcotics, the
police capacity to observe the activity of the occupants following
an announcement, and the nature of the narcotics activity involved.
The requirement of a case-by-case analysis, combined with prior
judicial authorization, should substantially restrict the potential
for abuse of no-knock authority based on likely destruction of
evidence.
214
Of course, a potential cost of the Committee's proposal is the
possible destruction of evidence when police are unable to utilize
no-knock authority because either (1) entry is made without a war-
rant, or (2) entry is made with a warrant that fails to authorize no-
knock entry because the police did not learn of circumstances
suggesting likely destruction of evidence until they arrived at the
scene to execute the warrant. The risk in either situation, however,
is not very great. As previously noted,265 entry of a private building
to conduct a warrantless search (apart from an arrest) will only rarely
be permissible. Moreover, those exigent circumstances that might
justify entry to conduct a warrantless search often would include po-
tential physical peril that justifies no-knock entry without regard to
the destruction of evidence.266 More significant will be cases in which
police enter a private building to make a warrantless arrest.26 7 The
officer may reasonably fear that the person to be arrested will re-
spond to a request to enter by destroying any evidence in his posses-
sion. While unannounced entry would not be permissible under sec-
tion 11, a separate provision in the Committee's proposal on arrests
would permit no-knock entry to make a warrantless arrest if the officer
has reasonable cause to believe that the person will flee.268 This provi-
Experience has shown that numbers bets are recorded on either "flash" paper
which ignites on contact with fire or "water soluble" paper which dissolves on
contact with water, and that the time spent by the executing officer in giving
notice and waiting to be refused admittance is used by the gambler to destroy
his work product. [Footnote omitted.]
263. Compare the decisions discussed in State v. Gassner, 6 Ore. App. 452, 488 P.2d
822, 826-28 (1971).
264. The requirement of warrant authorization will also facilitate police imposition
of a requirement of approval by superior officers and compliance with specific internal
regulations relating to no-knock entry (e.g., wearing of uniforms, double-checking
addresses). See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 13, col. 1 (late city ed.) (describing
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration policy statement).
265. See text at notes 235-40 supra.
266. See cases cited note 235 supra.
267. See text at note 188 supra.
268. Proposed section 118[2] (to be submitted to the State Bar Commission'ers in. a
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sion would cover many of the situations likely to involve destruction
of evidence. Also, in some cases the officer will have ample time to
obtain a search warrant authorizing no-knock entry before he makes
the arrest.269
The second situation noted above-in which a search warrant is
obtained but the possibility of destruction of evidence is subse-
quently discovered at the scene of the search-is more appropriately
treated by authorizing immediate entry after notification than by
expanding no-knock entry. In most such situations the information
suggesting likely destruction of evidence is obtained only after the
police make their presence known. Once the police knock, sounds
from within may suggest that the occupants are moving away from
the door.270 Immediate entry is then permitted pursuant to sec-
tion 11[3] if the response to the officer's announcement indicates
denial of a reasonably prompt entry or potential physical peril.
271
Section 11 [3] admittedly would not cover all situations in which the
response to the officer's announcement might suggest the possible
destruction of evidence. A sound of a flushing toilet, for example,
does not indicate a refusal to permit prompt entry or potential
physical peril, although it may signify the destruction of evidence.
But to permit immediate entry based upon such a sound would un-
dermine the basic premise of section 10: that such factors are too
readily misinterpreted in the process of execution, and therefore an
forthcoming publication). The New York arrest provisions provide similar authority.
However, they also permit the officer to enter without giving prior notice when there
is reasonable cause to believe that "the giving of such notice wil . .. [r]esult in the
destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence." See N.Y. CIm. P. LAW
§§ 120.80(4)(c), 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971). Compare the New York search warrant pro-
vision, N.Y. Canm. P. LAw § 690.50[2](b) (McKinney 1971), noted in text at note 260
supra.
269. Cf. United States v, Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972), discussed in note 191
supra; People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970), affd., 387 Mich.
551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972).
270. Thus, Justice Brennan, in Ker, described the destruction of evidence exception
to the announcement rule as follows: "Mhe Fourth Amendment is violated by an
unannounced police intrusion into a private home, with or without an arrest warrant,
except . . . where those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside
(because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers in the belief that ... the destruction of evidence is
being attempted." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (separate opinion). See also State
v. Linder, 291 Minn. 217, 190 N.W.2d 91 (1971).
271. This provision is limited to cases involving a response. Where there is no
response, the officer must wait a reasonable time. Immediate entry on the grounds
noted in section 11[3](c) probably would also be permitted under current interpreta-
tions of MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968). See People v. Brown, 43 Mich. App.
74, 202 N.W.2d 493 (1972) (forcible entry permitted after officer announced, "it's the
police" and heard a noise indicating that someone was running to the rear of the
apartment).
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exception based upon destruction of evidence should be recognized
only upon magisterial authorization.
B. Entry Without Consent
Section 11[3], governing entry into a building to conduct a
search, further reflects the policy of the notification provisions.
First, it requires that entry be delayed following notification of
authority until admittance is denied, either formally or through
action or inaction indicating that the officer will not be admitted
with reasonable promptness. 272 Unlike the current statutes, proposed
section 11[3] applies to all forms of entry without consent, and not
just to entry by breaking doors or windows. Second, section ll[3](a)
specifically permits immediate entry whenever section 11[2] applies,
that is, where no-knock entry is permitted because of danger of
physical peril or warrant authorization. Section 11[3] thus recog-
nizes that the authority to make a no-knock entry necessarily in-
cludes the authority to knock, give notice, and enter immediately
without waiting for a response (a practice that is often preferred to
a true no-knock entry).
C. Use of Force
Proposed section 19 prescribes the appropriate use of force
against both person and property in the execution of a search. In
its treatment of force against property, section 19 departs most funda-
mentally from present law by separating the use of force from notifi-
cation and entry requirements.27 3 As noted above, the need for prior
notification is not limited to cases of forcible entry.27 4 Similarly,
avoidance of unnecessary force is desirable not only in cases in
which the officer enters without prior notification. The disruptive
impact of a no-knock entry obviously increases with the use of force,
both in terms of, the damage to property and the threatening nature
of the entry. The same disruptive impact may also exist, albeit to a
lesser extent, when unnecessary force is used following a proper
request for admittance. For example, if the officer receives no re-
sponse to his request, and breaks through a window when entry
could have been made as quickly and safely by opening an unlocked
door, he unnecessarily damages property and excessively threatens
272. A similar requirement is imposed under MIcf. Comp. LAws AN. § 780.656
(1968). See also People v. Doane, 38 Mich. App. 579, 190 N.W.2d 259 (1971), revd. on
other grounds, 887 Mich. 608, 195 N.W.2d 773 (1972) (noting that "refusal of admit-
tance" under the current statute is "not limited to affirmative denials').
273. Compare Micir. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968).
274. See text at notes 227-80 supra.
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any occupants.275 The situation is roughly parallel to that presented
in the arrest area, where the use of excessive force is prohibited
without regard to whether the arrest is justified by probable cause.
Section 19 similarly prohibits the use of excessive force whether or
not the entry is otherwise lawful. In many cases, those circumstances
that allow entry without consent may also suggest that force is
needed to achieve a safe entry, but the statute should not auto-
matically authorize force whenever entry without consent is per-
missible under section 11 [3].
Section 19 permits that degree of force against property "reason-
ably necessary" successfully to execute the search. The same standard
has traditionally been employed to describe the degree of nondeadly
force that an officer may use against a person in making an arrest.
The standard has not caused serious administrative problems in the
arrest area and there is no reason to anticipate any difficulty in its
application under section 19, especially since courts are likely to give
officers more leeway in the use of force against property than against
the person. Several states employ a similar standard in provisions
governing forcible entry.2 76
In its treatment of force against the person, section 19 fills a
gap in the law. Neither the current procedural code nor the sub-
stantive criminal code deals with an officer's use of force against
a person who physically obstructs a search. Under section 19 the
275. Although the absence of a response suggests that the premises are vacant, the
officer still should make a reasonable effort to enter in a'manner that would not unduly
frighten an occupant who may have failed to hear the doorbell. Of course, where
the officer believes that an occupant is lying in wait, safety considerations might
require 'entry through a window even though an unlocked door is available. See
generally PLE SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTON, supra note 215, Rules 207(B) (suggesting
that officers entering vacant premises initially "should determine whether a key to the
premises is readily available'), 206 ("entry should be conducted in as courteous and
non-destructive a manner as is practicable," and "[f]irearms should not be exhibited
.unless-the lead investigator ... reasonably feels the team is endangered").
276. See, e.g., ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 398, § 108-8 (1974) ("all necessary and reasonable
force"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2508 (Supp. 1973) (same). Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 968.14
(1971) ('all necessary force"). Section 19, of course, is not limited to forcible entry into
buildings, but applies to other uses of force in conducting a search.
The ALI commentary, while supporting a "reasonable and necessary" standard,
urges that the provision also refer to "the factors against which 'reasonableness' and
'necessity' are to be weighed"--that is, "success in finding and seizing what is sought
and maximum safety for all concerned." See ALI CODE, supra note 5, at 178. The
Committee accepted the significance of these factors but concluded that a general
reference to them, such as is found in id. § SS 220.3(7), was not necessary. Indeed, such
reference could cause difficulty if the term "success" were viewed narrowly as relating
only to the possible loss or destruction of the particular matter to be seized. For
example, a forcible entry may be needed, even though the matter could be seized later
when entry might be possible without force, because prompt seizure is necessary to
locate a key suspect who is likely to flee the jurisdiction. Cf. PLE SEARCH WARRANT
ExEcUTnoN, supra note 215, Rule 207(A)(2).
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officer may use nondeadly force if reasonably believed necessary to
execute the search, but he may not use deadly force unless he "rea-
sonably believes such force to be necessary to defend ... [against]
the use or imminent use of deadly physical force." Although sec-
tion 19 apparently states the prevailing rule in this country,277
Michigan has no opinions on point.278 If the force that can be used
to execute a search is analogous to that permissible in arresting a
person for obstructing the search, section 19 would probably reflect
the current Michigan law. Since the obstruction would most likely
be a misdemeanor,27 9 the arresting officer could use only nondeadly
force in the absence of a threat justifying the use'of deadly force in
self-defense. 2 0 If, however, the permissible degree of force in exe-
cuting a search is analogous to that permissible in making an arrest
for the offense being investigated through the search, then section 19
might provide less leeway in the use of deadly force where the
search relates to a felony. At least in some circumstances, deadly
force may be used to secure the arrest of a suspected felon even
though the felon is not threatening the imminent use of deadly
force.28' Current authorization for the use of deadly force in arrest
situations, however, emerges largely from the premise that the felon
presents a potential future threat and therefore must immediately
be taken into custody.2 2 The evidence of a felony that an obstructive
person is preventing from being seized presumably would not have
this quality.28
3
277. See, e.g., N.Y. Cpnx. P. LAw, § 690.50(1) (McKinney 1971); ALI CoDE, supra note
5, § SS 220.3(7).
278. It was the consensus of the Committee that the section 19 standard should
.not be left to extrapolation from arrest decisions, but should be set forth clearly in
the proposed revision. Some Committee members were opposed, however, to including
either this standard or the standard as to the use of force against property. They
argued that these provisions related primarily to the imposition of tort liability for
damage to the property or person, and that such damage may be distinguished from
the privacy interest protected by the general limitations upon searches.
279. See Micmr. Coupt. LAws ANN. § 750.479 (1968).
280. See Comment, Justifiable Force in Property Defense and Arrest Under the
Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 847, 853-60 (1968).
281. See Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 772, 828 (1968).
282. Id.
283. ALl CODE, supra note 5, § SS 220.3(7) provides: "The use of deadly force in
the execution of a search warrant, other than in self-defense or defense of others, is
justifiable only if the executing officer reasonably believes that there is a substantial
risk that the individuals or things to be seized will... cause or be used to cause death
or serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed ...."
The Committee concluded that such a provision was unnecessary because the dr-
cumstances permitting use of deadly force under section SS 220.3(7) are adequately
encompassed by section 19, and the law governing the use of deadly force in making
an arrest. Where the search is directed to finding and arresting a dangerous person,
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Conceivably, a situation could arise in which police would be
unable to prosecute a dangerous felon because they lacked the au-
thority to use deadly force to prevent the destruction of crucial evi-
dence. Thus, deadly force might be the only available means of
stopping a person who has not engaged in dangerous criminal activ-
ity, but who is fleeing with evidence necessary to arrest and prose-
cute another person who has committed a dangerous felony. Such
circumstances, however, are too rare and difficult to determine to
justify creating a special exception. Moreover, in terms of the
danger presented, such a situation would not differ substantially
from the flight of a material witness who possesses information
needed to arrest and prosecute a dangerous felon; there certainly is
no suggestion in current law that deadly force could be used to
restrain such a person.
D. Receipt
Section 780.655 of the Michigan Code requires the issuance of
a receipt upon the seizure of items "under [a] . . . warrant." Pro-
posed section 20 follows the lead of several states in requiring a
receipt for items seized both with and without warrants. 84 The
receipt requirement serves several functions, 2 5 none of which can
appropriately be limited only to seizures made pursuant to war-
rants. While the receipt requirement strengthens the warrant process
by assisting the recipient in determining whether to challenge the
validity of the seizure, a receipt may equally assist a recipient in
determining whether to challenge a seizure pursuant to a warrantless
the officer's use of deadly force against that person may appropriately be governed by
the principles applicable to arrests. Similarly, even where the search is directed at
finding dangerous materials, ordinarily the danger stems only from the possible use
of the materials by a person at the scene whom the police are seeking to arrest. In the
occasional situations in which that is not the case (e.g., where the search is directed
at finding explosives that could be detonated accidently), section 19 provides appro-
priate authority for the use of deadly force because there then is a need to protect
a "third person"--the victim of any such accident. Police training has traditionally
conditioned the use of deadly force on self-defense, the protection of others, and the
arrest of dangerous felons. So long as these grounds are sufficient in practice, it would
be wise to avoid the potential confusion, and possible lessening of restraint, that might
result from adoption of an additional ground as stated in section SS 220.3(7).
284. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2512 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.18
(1971). But see ALl CODE, supra note 5, § SS 280.2, requiring a list to be filed with the
court "[qn all cases of seizure other than pursuant to a search warrant," with a copy
given to the defendant or his counsel. In searches conducted pursuant to a warrant or
consent, however, a receipt must be given to the occupant at the time of the search.
Id. § SS 220.3(6). Proposed section 20 applies to items seized in connection with searches
authorized by consent, as well as to warrantless searches under sections 16 and 18.
285. See text at notes 212-13 supra.
[V:ol. 73:221292
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search. The receipt requirement also assists the recipient in reclaim-
ing the property seized, but that function too is suited to all searches.
Admittedly, the search pursuant to a warrant is more likely to in-
volve situations in which the occupant will find it difficult to deter-
mine what has been taken if not given a receipt. Thus, searches
likely to result in the seizure of a large number of items (e.g., searches
of premises allegedly used for bookmaking activities) usually are made
pursuant to a warrant. On the other hand, at least one common
type of warrantless search is likely to produce a similar difficulty.
Post-arrest automobile searches authorized under Chambers often
will occur when the driver is not present and when he no longer
has ready access to the vehicle to determine what was taken.2 6 Thus,
in terms of the functional value of the receipt, the distinction be-
tween searches with and without warrants is difficult to justify. Nor
is the distinction readily sulported by substantial differences in
ease of administration, given the flexibility provided by proposed
section 20.287
Section 20 applies solely to items subject to seizure under sec-
tion 6. That section does not encompass matter seized and retained
only for custodial purposes under section 17[l]. The Committee
treated the custodial search in section 17 only in so far as it repre-
sents a potential method of obtaining evidentiary matter, and there-
fore avoided proposing extensive regulation of the custodial pro-
cess. 288 Where the item initially seized for custodial purposes is
subsequently identified and kept as evidentiary matter, however,
section 17[2] requires issuance of a receipt. Similarly, under sec-
tion 16[4] a receipt must be issued for items seized by private persons
and subsequently turned over to the police.
Section 20 requires that the receipt list all tangible things seized.
286. See text at notes 92-94 supra.
287. Proposed section 20, unlike current section 780.655, does not require immediate
issuance of the receipt when that is impracticable. While it often may not be feasible to
issue a receipt immediately after making a warrantless seizure incident to an arrest,
officers can comply with section 20 by preparing and delivering the receipt following
the arrestee's arrival at the station. That practice should not impose an undue burden
on the officer. Indeed, a similar practice is currently followed when the officer deter-
mines that the seized item need be kept only for custodial purposes and surrenders it
to the jailor. Although a requirement that receipts be issued when-evidentiary items
are seized incident to warrantless searches adds to the paperwork currently required
of the police, the increase is not substantial because the police generally keep records
of these items in one form or another.
288. The Committee anticipated, however, that receipts would continue to be pro-
vided for inventory items, as is currently the practice. Such receipts do not serve all
of the same functions as the receipt for evidentiary items, and therefore might not be
as extensive in coverage. Thus, inventory receipts might not list such individual items
of clothing as are regularly taken.
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Most state provisions require receipts only for "property" seized.280
If the term "property" is limited to its usual meaning, the receipt
requirement would not apply when the officer seizes items in which
a lawful possessory interest could not be obtained.210 That limita-
tion would substantially undermine the effectiveness of the receipt
requirement in assisting the defendant in determining whether to
challenge the search and seizure. 291 Section 20 accordingly follows
the current provision governing receipts, 2 2 which applies to the
seizure of "property or other things."
Arguably, section 20 should have been expanded to require the
listing of all evidence seized pursuant to a search. As previously
noted, both the Constitution and proposed section 6 treat incorpo-
real information obtained through a search as "seized matter."213
The Committee decided, however, that a peace officer could not
reasonably be expected to list all of the relevant incorporeal infor-
mation seized in connection with a search. Very frequently the
officer may not be aware of the significance of the information ob-
tained until he reviews the case in preparation for trial. Moreover,
limiting the receipt requirement to the seizure of tangible things
should not substantially detract from its usefulness in assisting the
defendant. Where both tangible things and incorporeal information
are seized, a receipt listing only the tangible things ordinarily should
provide the defendant with sufficient information to consider a
possible challenge to the search. Where a search results only in the
seizure of incorporeal information, it will usually have been con-
ducted via surreptitious observation that required warrant authori-
zation,294 and the served copy of the warrant would provide the
defendant with adequate notice of the search.
Presently, section 780.655 requires that the receipt be given
to the person "from whose premises the property or thing was
taken." This phrase might be read as referring only to a person
289. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1535 (West 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2512 (Supp.
1973).
290. See, e.g., State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3 N.W.2d 176 (1942) (gambling devices
prohibited by law not property); Deeg v. Detroit, 345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W.2d 16 (1956)
(no property right in corpse).
291. The Committee recognized that this function could, perhaps, be served more
effectively by other means. Thus, a few jurisdictions have discovery provisions requiring
that the prosecutor inform the defendant of, for example, any "relevant material and
information regarding... [s]pecified searches and seizures ...." ALAS. R. Camro P.
16(b)(6). The Committee viewed such provisions as more appropriate for its considera-
tion in connection with the area of discovery.
292. MIcH. Coiis. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
293. See text at notes 182-86 supra.
294. See text at notes 182-86 supra.
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with some property interest in the premises, such as an owner or
a tenant, but it is viewed in practice as including any person who
appears to have current possession of the premises, such as a baby-
sitter, employee, or overnight guest. Section 20 restates this standard
by requiring that the receipt be given to any person present who is
in "apparent control" of the premises. If no such person appears to
be present, the receipt is to be posted at the place or forwarded to
the owner as appropriate under the circumstances. The "apparent
control" standard, borrowed from the ALI Code,29 5 permits the
officer to rely upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear to
him. The Committee was concerned that the receipt provision not
be viewed as ordinarily requiring interrogation in order to serve
the receipt properly. In many instances, it may be highly incrimi-
nating to acknowledge that one is a regular occupant of the prem-
ises. The officer should not be encouraged to bypass limitations
otherwise imposed upon interrogation on the ground that the
information must be obtained to serve the receipt properly. The
"apparent control" standard ordinarily should eliminate the need
for any information beyond that observed by the officer, although
there may be unusual cases in which the 'officer might need more
information because all persons present appear to be casual visitors.
The Committee rejected the alternative of permitting the officer
to give the receipt to "anyone present"; that standard appeared less
likely than posting to assure that a person with some interest in
the premises would eventually receive the receipt, particularly where
the person on the premises is arrested at the time of the search.296
E. Disposition of Seized Property
Section 21 governs the disposition of seized items. This section
typifies many of the statutory revisions proposed by the Committee.
In large part, it seeks simply to provide guidelines that reflect cur-
rent policy and practice more accurately and appropriately than the
present provisions.297 Perhaps the most significant illustration of
this approach in section 21 is the establishment of a single distri-
bution pattern governing items seized with and without a warrant.
Currently, section 780.655 applies only to items seized pursuant to
a warrant, but the distribution pattern established therein com-
monly is followed with respect to all seized property.
295. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 220.3.
296. The same concern led the Committee to propose a new requirement in section
20 that the receipt be forwarded, rather than posted on the premises, where the premises
appear regularly unoccupied.
297. See MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968).
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Subsection [1] deals with the initial duty to retain seized items
for use in a subsequent prosecution. Like many of the Committee's
proposals, it restates current standards in terms sufficiently broad
to permit various practices that are consistent with the basic ob-
jective of, but arguably are inconsistent with the language of the
present provision. Thus, section 780.655 states that an item seized
under a warrant "shall be safely kept by the officer" who seized the
property. Unless the term "kept" is interpreted very liberally, this
standard is incompatible with current practice in many counties.
Seized matter usually is "kept" in the physical custody of another
officer of the same department or of some other responsible per-
son.298 Section 21 permits greater flexibility by requiring only that
the officer seizing the item "cause" it to be kept safely.29  Similarly,
the current provision unduly restricts the prosecution in permitting
the item seized to be kept only "so long as necessary for the purpose
of being produced or used as evidence in any trial." The term
"trial" may not be sufficiently broad to include all stages of a
criminal proceeding at which there may be a need to produce seized
matter (e.g., a sentencing hearing). Furthermore, seized matter oc-
casionally may be needed for prosecution purposes other than
"being produced or used as evidence" (e.g., to refresh a witness'
memory prior to testifying). Section 21 accordingly directs that the
material be kept "so long as necessary for use in a criminal prose-
cution."
Subsection [2] of section 21 also reflects current practice, but
seeks to provide more satisfactory guidelines by placing that practice
in a more appropriate administrative setting. Subsection [2] autho-
rizes, under limited circumstances, the temporary release of a seized
item pending its use in a forthcoming prosecution. Read literally,
current section 780.655 would seem to bar any such release by
requiring that the evidence be "kept" by the officer. Yet, items sub-
ject to that statute have been released to others under special cir-
cumstances (e.g., when needed for use in connection with a prose-
298. In some instances, depending upon the nature of the evidence involved and
the size of the police force, the evidence may be placed in the custody of the prosecutor
or even stored on private property. See also the discussion in the text at the paragraph
following note 299 infra of section 21[2], on temporary return of seized property to its
owner.
299. The Committee found no reason to shift the responsibility for determining the
appropriate means of custody from the police to the court. The court may, of course,
exercise supervisory control where there has been an abuse by police. The ALl pro.
posal, ALl CODE, supra note 5, § SS 280.2, requiring the issuance of a judicial "custody
order" in almost all cases, was viewed as imposing an unproductive and wasteful
requirement.
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cution in another district).300 Precise standards identifying those
circumstances are difficult to formulate. Factors relating to admin-
istrative convenience, effective law enforcement, and the interests
of third parties must be considered. The police and the prosecutor
face a difficult situation, however, when the release determination
is entirely their responsibility. Loss or alteration of the evidence
may adversely affect the defendant's case, yet there is no ready
means for determining in advance whether the defendant objects
to the temporary release. Where the request comes from the owner-
crime victim who claims an "urgent" need for his property, the
police and prosecutor find themselves in a particularly awkward
position because that person frequently is also the complaining
witness. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that final authority
to authorize temporary release should reside in the courts. The
police may still permit release on their own decision if they are
certain that the release would be consistent with their obligation
to cause the item to be kept safely, but if they have any doubts,
they can insist upon a judicial determination (as can a person whose
claim is denied by the police).
Subsection [3] of proposed section 21 seeks more satisfactory
guidelines primarily by indicating the relationship of the many
current provisions that bear upon the disposition of seized matter
no longer needed for prosecution purposes. Section 780.655 provides
that "stolen or embezzled property" should be "restored to the
owner," other "moneys" or "useful property" turned over to the
political subdivision of the police department seizing the property,
and any remaining "things" be disposed of as ordered by the court.
Other provisions, however, modify these directives. Various pro-
visions require that specified items be forfeited and disposed of in
accordance with forfeiture provisions.301 In some cases, the forfeited
property must be given to a specified agency or may be obtained by
such agency upon request.30 2 Other provisions deal with the dispo-
sition of stolen property that is not claimed by the rightful owner.
0 3
These provisions apparently further limit police authority to dis-
pose of seized property. Section 21[3] seeks to bring the various
provisions together in an orderly fashion so as to indicate the pos-
300. Discussion at Committee meeting of September 13, 1971.
301. See, e.g., Micin. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 205.509 (illegally possessed cigarettes);
286.18 (illegal apiary appliances); 300.12-.14 (illegally used hunting and fishing equip-
ment).
302. See, e.g., MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.434 (1968) (illegally possessed weapons);
335.334(3) (Supp. 1974-1975) (controlled substances).
303. See, e.g., MIcH. Cohis. LAws ANN. §§ 28AO1-A06, 434.171-.174 (1967).
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sible dispositions of all seized tangible items.304 Finally, it provides
a procedure, again largely following current practice, for deter-
mining who shall receive seized property when more than one per-
son claims a right to it.
V. EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
The Committee considered various proposals relating to the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the proposed search
and seizure statute, but decided against advancing a legislative
proposal. The Committee was concerned only with the possible
application of an exclusionary remedy to evidence obtained through
violation of those proposed requirements that are not constitution-
ally mandated. Where police activities violate the Constitution as
well as a statutory provision, Mapp v. Ohio ° 5 already requires ex-
clusion of all of the fruits of that violation.308
Some Committee members opposed any extension of the exclu-
sionary rule to nonconstitutional violations. They argued that even
if the exclusionary "remedy" is accepted as an appropriate deterrent
to unlawful police conduct, all of the necessary deterrent impact
is provided by the Mapp decision. Police officer training does not
distinguish between those statutory requirements that are consti-
tutionally mandated and those that are not, and officers are not
likely to draw distinctions of that type in practice. These Committee
members also rejected the contention that admission of illegally
seized evidence would undermine the "imperative of judicial integ-
rity."307 They noted that a court cannot properly be viewed as ap-
804. Here again the Committee eliminated what appeared to be an anomalous pro-
cedural distinction in the treatment of searches with and without warrants. Micir.
CoMp. LAws ANN. § 780.655 (1968) includes no special provision for the automatic
return of property (other than stolen property) seized pursuant to a warrant. Accord-
ingly, such property may be returned to the person from whom it was seized only upon
court order. On the other hand, property seized without a warrant is regularly returned
without a court order, unless another person claims ownership or there is some other
basis for doubting the person's right to the property, in which case a court order is
obtained. Section 21[3] follows the latter procedure in permitting the police to return
without a court order any tangible item (other than contraband or forfeited property)
without regard to whether the seizure was made pursuant to a warrant. Where there
is some question as to whether the property should be returned to the person from
whom it was seized, the police may await a court order.
305. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
306. Although Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), suggests that a state might be able to provide a
constitutionally acceptable alternative remedy for fourth amendment violations, any
such remedy would require legislation extending beyond a revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Accordingly, the Committee viewed adoption of such a proposal as
a matter beyond the scope of its assigned task.
307. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 669 (1961).
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proving illegality simply because it refuses to interrupt a proceeding
to determine how particular evidence was obtained; the availability
of civil remedies for violation of substantial statutory rights clearly
indicates that illegal police action is not condoned.
Other members contended that the exclusionary remedy was
the only feasible means of deterring police illegality and was neces-
sary to avoid the appearance of judicial condonation of such illegal-
ity. They favored application of the exclusionary rule at least to
bar evidence obtained through intentional violations of all sub-
stantial safeguards provided in the proposed statute, without regard
to whether those safeguards are constitutionally mandated.318
A majority of the Committee members on both sides of the issue
agreed, however, that legislation was unnecessary and perhaps inap-
propriate at this time. Committee members opposing the application
of the exclusionary remedy noted that Michigan courts had applied
the exclusionary remedy only to evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional limitations on search and seizure. They found no
indication in search and seizure decisions, or in decisions involving
related areas of criminal procedure, that evidence obtained from
violation of statutory provisions would be excluded on that ground
alone.30 9 When the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a state rule
similar to the federal McNabb-Mallory rule,310 its decision was
based on constitutional grounds as well as on the exercise of its
supervisory authority to implement the prompt arraignment stat-
308. Cf. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 290.2.
309. In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 121, 194 N.W.2d 878, 890 (1972) (Swainson,
J.), a concurring justice favored application of an exclusionary rule, based on the
"general supervisory powers of the court," to bar evidence obtained through police
entrapment that might not violate the federal or state constitutions. The majority,
however, did not reach that issue.
Subsequent to the Committee's determination, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that the results of a breathalyzer test administered to a person arrested illegally would
not be suppressed where the arrest met fourth amendment standards but violated a
state law permitting officers to make warrantless arrests only for misdemeanors com-
mitted in their presence. People v. Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974).
The court noted:
Defendant's arrest not being invalid in the constitutional sense and therefore not
subject to the constitutionally mandated per se exclusionary rule, the question thus
becomes whether this State, as a matter of its own public policy, should fashion a
similar exclusionary rule with respect to statutorily illegal arrests. We have not
found any Michigan precedent which would mandate such a rule, nor do we find
that such a rule is necessary to protect the basic rights of one illegally arrested as
was defendant herein.
56 Mich. App. at 52, 223 N.W.2d at 860-61.
310. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb-Mallory rule excluded from evidence incriminating
statements made by a defendant during the time he was detained in violation of the
federal prompt presentment requirement. See Y. KAmmstm, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL,
supra note 50, at 513-14.
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ute.811 In light of this precedent, members opposing an exclusionary
rule found no need for a specific prohibition against exclusion. In-
deed, some expressed concern that including such a provision in
only this one chapter of the Criminal Procedure Code would raise
doubts about the absence of similar provisions in other chapters.
Those favoring application of the exclusionary rule to violations
of all substantial statutory safeguards also believed that a specific
provision to that effect was not necessary in the setting of this chap-
ter.812 They noted that statutory violations most likely to lead to
the discovery of evidence almost always would infringe upon con-
stitutional safeguards protected by the Mapp decision.8 18 The one
possible exception is the restriction upon entry without notice
under section 11. The Supreme Court has held that the exclusion-
ary rule will be applied to violations of a federal statute that
provides less leeway than would the Constitution under Ker v.
California."4 Members favoring the extension of the exclusionary
811. See People v. McCager, 867 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962); People v.
Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
312. ALI CODE, supra note 5, § SS 290.2 would apply the exclusionary remedy to
evidence obtained through nonconstitutional violations under specified circumstances.
However, almost all of the nonconstitutional grounds listed in that section relate to
limitations that are not included in the Committee's proposals.
313. Moreover, violation of certain nonconstitutional provisions relating to the
validity of the search warrant may result in constitutional violations. Thus, where a
search is conducted pursuant to a warrant that is invalid under state law (e.g., because
the issuing official was not authorized to issue warrants), the Constitution may require
that the search be justified as a warrantless search even though the violated state
limitation is not constitutionally required. Support for this position is found in cases
holding unconstitutional searches conducted incident to arrests that meet fourth amend-
ment requirements (that is, arrests that are based on probable cause) but fail to comply
with state limitations on arrest authority. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948); United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Robinson,
388 Mich. 630, 633, 202 N.W.2d 288, 289-90 (1972) (T.G. Kavanagh, J., dissenting). But
compare People v. Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974), discussed in note
809 supra. On the other hand, some cases indicate that failure to comply with various
warrant execution requirements does not "amount to deprivation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights necessitating suppression." United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). See United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 569
(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972) (failure to include an item in the in.
ventory attached to the return); United States v. McKenzie, 446 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1971) (failure to deliver a warrant at time of search as required by FEn. R. CRIA. P.
41(d); warrant delivered next day); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.
N.Y. 1969) (twenty-eight month delay in filing warrant return and inventory). But
compare State v. Montoya, 86 N.M. 119, 520 P.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1974).
314. 374 U.S. 23, 39 (19683). In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), the
Supreme Court excluded evidence obtained after police had entered a dwelling in
violation of a District of Columbia law based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970). In Ker
the Court indicated that Miller rested on the view that the illegal entry rendered the
arrest unlawful; the subsequent search then fell because its only constitutional justifi.
cation was a search incident to an arrest. Cf. note 313 supra. However, the Court in
Ker also suggested that the exclusion of evidence in Miller rested on the exercise of
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rule were willing to leave possible adoption of a similar position
in Michigan to the determination of the Michigan Supreme Court. 15
They recognized that any general provision requiring application
of an exclusionary remedy to nonconstitutional violations would
be highly controversial, and did not consider it appropriate to ad-
vance such a proposal where its likely significance would be limited
to section 11.
APPENDIX: PROPOSED PROVISIONS ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE
[Definition of terms]
Section 1. The following defini-
tions apply to this Chapter unless
the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Building", in addition to its
ordinary meaning, includes a struc-
ture of any type that is used for
the lodging of persons therein or for
carrying on any business therein;
if a building consists of two or more
units separately secured or occu-
pied, each unit shall constitute a
separate building.
(b) "Executing officer" includes a
peace officer charged by the search
warrant with its execution and such
other persons as assist him in its
execution pursuant to section 13.
(c) "Judicial district". The "ju-
dicial district" of a magistrate who
is a district court judge, municipal
judge, or Recorder's Court judge
encompasses any geographical loca-
tion in which, if a state offense
were there committed, prosecution
thereon could be initiated in the
court on which the magistrate sits
pursuant to state law defining the
jurisdiction or criminal venue of
that court. The judicial district of
a magistrate who is a district court
magistrate is the same as that of
the district court which appointed
the magistrate.
(d) "Local offense" includes any
violation of an ordinance that is
punishable by imprisonment.
(e) "Magistrate" includes each of
the following: (i) a district court
magistrate authorized to issue war-
rants by a district court judge under
Section 8511 of Act No. 154 of the
Public Acts of 1968, being Section
600.8511 of the Compiled Laws of
1970; (ii) a district court judge;
(iii) a municipal court judge; (iv) a
judge of Recorder's Court of De-
troit who is designated, in accor-
dance with the rules of that court,
to consider applications for search
warrants.
(f) "Matter" includes persons,
tangible items, and incorporeal in-
formation.
(g) "Offense" includes any state
offense or local offense.
(h) "Peace officer" includes any
member of a police force or other
organization of a city, county, town-
ship, village or of the state, who is
regularly employed as such and is
responsible for the prevention and
the court's supervisory power. See 374 U.S. at 31, 39. See also State v. Linder, 291 Minn.
217, 219-21, 190 N.W.2d 91, 93-94 (1971).
315. In People v. Doane, 3 Mich. App. 579, 584, 190 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1971), the
court found no need to deide "whether technical noncompliance with MIcH. Comp.
LAws ANN. § 780.656 (1968) would render the evidence inadmissible "even though
defendant's 4th amendment rights were not violated thereby."
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detection of crime and the enforce-
ment of the general criminal laws
of the state, but shall not include
any person serving as such solely
by virtue of his occupying any other
office or position. Peace officer also
includes any public employee vested
by law with the duty to enforce a
specific criminal law when engaged
in a search designed to investigate
the possible violation of that law.
(i) "Place" includes any vehicle,
object, building or premises.
(j) "Private building" includes
any building or enclosed portion
thereof that reasonably should be
recognized as not open to the pub-
lic at the time of entry.
(k) "Prosecuting attorney" in-
cludes a prosecuting attorney for a
county, an assistant prosecuting at-
torney for a county, the Attorney
General, the deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, an assistant Attorney General,
a special prosecutor appointed pur-
suant to section -, and, in connec-
tion with a prosecution for a local
offense, an attorney for the political
subdivision that enacted the ordi-
nance.
(1) "Seizure" includes the obtain-
ing of incorporeal information by
sensory perception through a search.
(m) "State offense" includes any
crime proscribed by state law.
(n) "Stolen" property includes
any property obtained from an-
other in violation of any criminal
law of this state.
[Search warrants; authority to issue
a warrant]
Section 2[l]. A search warrant
may be issued by any magistrate. A
magistrate may refuse, however, to
consider an application for a search
warrant, or to issue a search war-
rant, on either of the following
grounds:
(a)(i) The warrant is sought to
seize matter relating to a state
offense not alleged to have been
committed within the judicial
district of the magistrate, and to
search a place or person not al-
leged to be located within the
judicial district of the magistrate;
and (ii) no showing has been
made that all magistrates of the
judicial district in which the of-
fense allegedly was committed,
or the place or person allegedly
is located, are unavailable.
(b) Another magistrate from
the same judicial district has
been designated to consider war-
rant applications and no showing
has been made that that magis-
trate is unavailable,
[2] Any judge of a court of rec-
ord, in addition to those designated
in section 1(e), may exercise the
authority of a magistrate provided
for in this Chapter, but rulings of
a judge acting in that capacity
shall be subject to review in the
same manner as the rulings of a
magistrate of the judicial district
within which the place or person
to be searched is located.
[Search warrants; availability of
magistrates]
Section 3. The presiding judge
of each circuit court shall designate
at least one magistrate in each
county of the circuit who shall be
available at all times to consider
applications for search warrants.
The presiding judge of Recorder's
Court shall designate at least one
judge of that court who shall be
available at all times to consider
applications for search warrants.
[Search warrants; who may apply]
Section 4. Application for a
search warrant may be made only
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by a prosecuting attorney or peace
officer.
[Search warrants; contents of ap-
plication]
Section 5[l]. Except as provided
in subsection [4], an application
for a search warrant shall be in the
form of an affidavit sworn to before
the magistrate.
[2] The affidavit shall contain
each of the following:
(a) The name of the court re-
quested to issue the warrant.
(b) The name and title of the
applicant.
(c) A statement that there is
reasonable cause to believe that
matter subject to seizure under
section 6[l] will be found in or
upon a described place or person,
or both. The matter to be seized
shall be described with reason-
able particularity in light of its
nature and the nature of the
state offense allegedly committed.
The place or person to be
searched shall be described with
sufficient particularity so as to
identify a definitely ascertainable
place or person.
(d) Allegations of fact estab-
lishing reasonable cause. The
basis for the allegations must be
stated, but the basis may be ei-
ther personal knowledge of the
applicant or reliable information
obtained from a credible person,
named or unnamed. If the al-
legations are based in whole or
in part upon information ob-
tained from others, including
peace officers, the affidavit must
set forth facts evidencing the re-
liability of such information, in-
cluding facts bearing on the
informant's credibility and the
means by which the informant
obtained the information. The
applicant also may submit affi-
davits of other persons contain-
ing allegations of fact supporting
those contained in the appli-
cant's affidavit.
(e) A request that the magis-
trate issue a search warrant di-
recting a search of the described
place or person for the purpose
of finding and seizing the de-
scribed matter.
[3] The affidavit may also con-
tain any or all of the following:
(a) A request that an extended
period for execution of the war-
rant be granted pursuant to sec-
tion 9[2]. The request must be
supported by allegations of fact,
of a kind prescribed in subsection
[2](d), establishing the conditions
specified in section 9[2].
(b) A request that the execut-
ing peace officer be authorized
under section 10 to enter a pri-
vate building without giving
prior notice of his authority and
purpose. The request must be
supported by allegations of fact,
of a kind prescribed in subsec-
tion [2](d), establishing the con-
ditions specified in section 10.
[4] In lieu of the affidavit re-
quired under subsection [1], an oral
statement, made under oath by an
applicant not in the physical pres-
ence of the magistrate, shall con-
stitute an acceptable application
for a search warrant if each of the
following conditions are met:
(a) The magistrate finds, based
upon the statement of the ap-
plicant, that there is reasonable
cause to believe that (i) the pre-
sentation of the applicant's affi-
davit to a magistrate would re-
sult in delay in obtaining a
search warrant and in executing
Dccember 1974]
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mich. L. Rev.  303 1974-1975
Michigan Law Review
a search pursuant thereto, and
(ii) such delay might result in loss
or destruction of matter subject
to seizure under section 6[1].
(b) The application by oral
statement has been approved by
a prosecuting attorney.
(c) The oral statement is com-
municated directly to the magis-
trate by radio, telephone, or
other appropriate means, and a
verbatim record of the oral state-
ment is made by a recording
process subject to the exclusive
control of the magistrate or his
staff, though the recording equip-
ment need not be located within
the offices of the magistrate or his
staff.
(d) Without unnecessary delay
the verbatim record is tran-
scribed at the direction of the
magistrate, certified by the mag-
istrate and the applicant, and
both the transcription and orig-
inal recording are filed in the
same manner as an affidavit.
An application presented in the
form of a sworn oral statement shall
be subject to all of the require-
ments of subsections [2] and [3] as
to the contents of an application.
[Search warrants; matter subject to
seizure]
Section 6[l]. A warrant may be
issued to search for and seize any
of the following matter.
(a) Stolen property.
(b) Tangible items designed
and intended for use as, or pres-
ently or previously used as, in-
strumentalities in the commis-
sion of a state offense.
(c) Tangible items possessed,
controlled, or used wholly or
partially in violation of any
criminal law of this state.
(d) Contraband.
(e) The bodies of human be-
ings or of animals, who may be
the victims of a state offense.
(f) Matter that may constitute
evidence tending to demonstrate
that a state offense was com-
mitted or that a particular per-
son participated in the commis-
sion of a state offense.
(g) A person unlawfully held
in confinement or other restraint.
(h) A person for whom an ar-
rest warrant has been issued.
[2] An officer executing a war-
rant may also seize pursuant to
section 15 any matter that may
constitufe evidence tending to dem-
onstrate that a local offense was
committed or that a particular
person participated in the com-
mission of a local offense.
[Search warrants; determination of
application]
Section 7[l]. If the magistrate is
satisfied that the application meets
the requirements of section 5, and
there is reasonable cause to believe
that matter described in the appli-
cation will be found in or upon a
place or person described in the
application, the magistrate shall
grant the application and issue a
search warrant directing the search
of said place or person and seizure
of such matter by a peace officer.
In ruling on an application for a
search warrant, the magistrate shall
examine the applicant and may ex-
amine any other person believed
to possess relevant information. A
finding that reasonable cause ex-
ists, however, may be based only on
information contained in the appli-
cation and any supporting affi-
davits.
[2] If the magistrate denies the
application, any subsequent appli-
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cation to search for the same or
similar matter in or upon the same
place or person shall be presented
to the same magistrate, if he is
available. If that magistrate is un-
available, the application shall note
that a previous application was de-
nied and shall contain a copy of
that previous application.
[3] A search warrant shall be
issued with all practicable secrecy,
and, prior to the execution of the
warrant, neither the warrant, the
application, nor any supporting affi-
davit shall be made public except
(i) as is reasonable to secure execu-
tion of the warrant, (ii) upon order
of the magistrate or, (iii) upon
order of any other court prelim-
inary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding pending before
that court.
[4] If the application for a war-
rant was by oral statement pur-
suant to section 5[4], and the
magistrate issues the warrant, he
shall orally authorize a peace
officer to sign the magistrate's name
on a duplicate of the original war-
rant. The authorization shall be
recorded verbatim, and transcribed,
certified, and filed as provided in
section 5[4]. The duplicate search
warrant shall be dearly designated
as a true copy and state that the
signing of the magistrate's name
thereon was authorized by order
of the magistrate. A duplicate war-
rant is a search warrant for the
purposes of this Chapter and shall
be served and returned as provided
in sections 12 and 13. Upon return
of the duplicate warrant, it shall be
filed by the court along with the
original warrant.
[Search warrants; contents of war-
rant]
Section 8. A search warrant shall
contain each- of the following:
(a) The name of the issuing
court, the subscription of the
issuing magistrate, and the date
of issuance.
(b) The name, department, or
classification of any peace officer
directed to execute the warrant.
The magistrate may direct that
the warrant be executed by any
peace officer within the state.
(c) A description of the matter
to be seized that is reasonably
particular in light of the nature
of the matter and the nature of
the state offense allegedly com-
mitted.
(d) A description of a place or
person, or both, to be searched.
The description shall be suffi-
ciently particular to identify a
definitely ascertainable place or
person.
(e) The name of the person
upon whose application the war-
rant is issued and the name of
any person whose affidavit was
filed in support of that applica-
tion.
(f) A statement of the facts es-
tablishing the reasonable cause
on which the warrant is issued,
or in lieu of such statement, a
copy of the application and any
supporting affidavits may be at-
tached to the warrant.
(g) A direction that the war-
rant be executed on or before a
date specified in accordance with
section 9.
(h) A direction that the war-
rant be executed consistent with
the notice and entry require-
ments of section 11, or, if the
court has so determined pursuant
to section 10, a direction that the
executing officer may enter a
private building without giving
prior notice of his authority and
purpose.
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(i) A direction that a copy of
the warrant and a receipt for any
tangible item seized be served as
provided in sections 12 and 20.
(j) A direction that the warrant
be returned as provided in sec-
tion 14.
[Search warrants; time of execu-
tion]
Section 9[l]. The warrant may be
executed at any time of day or
night. Except as provided in sub-
section [2], the warrant shall be
executed on or before a date spec-
ified in the warrant, but no later
than five days after the date of is-
suance.
[2] If the magistrate finds rea-
sonable cause to believe that a
place or person to be searched is
difficult of speedy access, he may
make the warrant executable on or
before a date no later than ten days
after the date of issuance.
[3] A search initiated during the
time period prescribed under sub-
sections [1] or [2] need not be com-
pleted within that time period, pro-
vided the search is not extended
beyond a period reasonably neces-
sary for its completion. A search
may be conducted intermittently if
a continuous search is not reason-
ably practicable under the circum-
stances.
[Search warrants; authorization of
entry without notice]
Section 10. The magistrate may
authorize the executing officer to
enter a private building without
giving the prior notice of his au-
thority and purpose otherwise re-
quired under section 11[1] if the
magistrate finds reasonable cause
to believe that any of the follow-
ing conditions exist:
(a) Giving prior notice is likely
to result in the destruction or
disposal of the matter subject to
seizure.
(b) Giving prior notice is likely
to endanger the safety of the
officer or another person.
(c) The officer also desires to
enter the building for the pur-
pose of making an arrest pur-
suant to a warrant, and the
arrest warrant authorizes entry
without giving prior notice pur-
suant to section 110.
[Search warrants; notice and entry
in execution]
Section 11[1]. Except as provided
in subsection [2], the executing offi-
cer, before entry into a private
building for the purpose of con-
ducting a search, shall give notice
of his authority and purpose in an
appropriate manner.
[2] The executing officer may en-
ter a private building without giv-
ing prior notice of his authority
and purpose under any of the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) The warrant expressly au-
thorizes entry without prior no.
tice pursuant to section 10.
(b) Circumstances known to
the officer at the time of entry,
but unknown at the time of ap-
plication for the warrant, give
the officer reasonable cause to
believe that giving prior notice
is likely to endanger the safety
of the officer or another person.
(c) The officer also enters the
building for the purpose of mak-
ing an arrest, and section 118
permits entry for that purpose
without giving prior notice.
[3] An executing officer may not
enter a private building without
consent unless one of the following
conditions exists:
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(a) The officer may enter with-
out giving prior notice pursuant
to subsection [2].
(b) After giving notice of his
authority and purpose, the offi-
cer is not admitted within a
reasonable time.
(c) After giving notice of his
authority and purpose, the offi-
cer has reasonable grounds to
believe, based upon the response
of an occupant, that reasonably
prompt admission will be denied
or that to further delay entry is
likely to endanger the safety of
the officer or another person.
[4] Before executing a search
warrant directing a search of a
person, the executing officer shall
give notice of his authority and
purpose to that person unless
encountering physical resistance,
flight, or other circumstances ren-
dering notification impracticable.
[Search warrants; service of warrant
copy]
Section 12. A copy of the warrant
shall be served by the executing
officer at the time of the search or
as soon thereafter as is reasonably
practicable. If the search is of a
place, the executing officer shall
give a copy of the warrant to any
person present who is in apparent
control of the place. If no such
person appears to be present, the
officer shall post a copy of the war-
rant at the place. If the search is of
a person, the officer shall give a
copy of the warrant to the person.
[Search warrants; assistance of oth-
ers in execution]
Section 13. A peace officer di-
rected to execute a warrant may be
accompanied and assisted by such
other persons as may be reasonably
necessary for the successful execu-
tion of the warrant.
[Search warrants; return of war-
rant]
Section 14[l]. If the warrant is
executed, the executing officer,
without unnecessary delay, shall
return to the magistrate the follow-
ing:
(a) The warrant, with date and
time of execution noted thereon.
(b) If a receipt was issued, a
copy thereof.
[2] If the warrant was not exe-
cuted within the time specified
therein, the officer shall return the
warrant within two days thereafter
and note thereon the lack of exe-
cution and the reason therefor.
[Search warrants; incidental
searches and seizures]
Section 15. In addition to the
matter specified in the warrant, an
executing officer may seize any
other matter, discovered in the rea-
sonable course of a search pursuant
to the warrant, that he has reason-
able cause to believe to be subject
to seizure under section 6. Tangible
items seized pursuant to this section
shall be included in the receipt
filed pursuant to section 14, but no
additional warrant shall be re-
quired to authorize such seizure.
[Searches without a warrant; search
incident to an arrest]
Section 16[l]. A peace officer
making a lawful arrest, or an officer
assisting him, may conduct a rea-
sonable search of the person ar-
rested and the area within that
person's immediate control.
[2] A peace officer conducting a
search pursuant to subsection [1]
may seize the following matter dis-
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covered in the reasonable course of
the search:
(a) Matter that the officer has
reasonable cause to believe to be
subject to seizure under section 6.
(b) Any weapon or similar item
that the officer reasonably be-
lieves to be capable of use in
attacking a person or attempting
an escape.
[3] A private person making a
lawful arrest may search the person
arrested and the area within that
person's immediate control, to the
extent reasonably necessary to ful-
fill the following purposes:
(a) Protecting the private per-
son or any other person present
from attack.
(b) Preventing the arrested
person from escaping.
(c) Discovering and seizing the
fruits of, or instrumentalities
used in the commission of, the
offense for which the arrest was
made.
[4] A private person conducting
a search pursuant to subsection [2]
may seize the following matters
discovered in the reasonable course
of the search:
(a) Any weapon or similar item
that the private person reason-
ably believes to be capable of
use in attacking a person or
attempting an escape.
(b) Matter reasonably believed
to constitute the fruits of, or in-
strumentalities used in the com-
mission of, the offense for which
the arrest was made.
Any matter seized by a private per-
son shall be delivered to a peace
officer, along with the arrested per-
son, as provided in section 120[3].
As soon thereafter as is reasonably
practicable, the peace officer shall
sign and deliver to the arrested
person a receipt itemizing the tan-
gible things received.
[Searches without a warrant; cus-
todial search]
Section 17[l]. A lawfully arrested
person confined in a jail or a sim-
ilar detention facility may be
searched to the extent reasonably
necessary for custodial purposes.
A vehicle or object lawfully taken
into custody may be searched to
the extent reasonably necessary for
custodial purposes.
[2] A person conducting a search
pursuant to subsection [1] may
seize, in addition to matter that
may be taken for custodial pur-
poses, any other matter discovered
in the reasonable course of the cus-
todial search that he has reasonable
cause to believe to be subject to
seizure under section 6. If such
matter is seized by a custodial
official other than a peace officer,
it shall promptly be delivered to a
peace officer for safekeeping as pro-
vided in section 21. As soon there-
after as is reasonably practicable,
the peace officer shall sign and
deliver to the arrested person a
receipt itemizing the tangible things
received.
[Searches without a warrant; other
grounds]
Section 18[l]. A peace officer hav-
ing reasonable cause to believe that
matter subject to seizure under sec-
tion 6[l] may be found in or upon
any designated place or person may
search that person or place without
a warrant if justified by exigent cir-
cumstances.
[2] A peace officer conducting a
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search pursuant to subsection [1]
may seize any matter discovered in
the reasonable course of the search
that he has reasonable cause to be-
lieve to be subject to seizure under
section 6.
[3] Before entry into a private
building for the purpose of con-
ducting a search pursuant to sub-
section [1], a peace officer shall give
notice of his authority and purpose
in an appropriate manner, unless
any of the following circumstances
exist:
(a) The officer has reasonable
cause to believe that giving prior
notice is likely to endanger the
safety of the officer or another
person.
(b) The officer also desires to
enter the building for the pur-
pose of making an arrest and
sections 110 or 118 permit entry
for that purpose without giving
prior notice.
Before conducting a search of a
person pursuant to subsection [1], a
peace officer shall give notice of his
authority and purpose to that per-
son unless encountering physical
resistance, flight, or other circum-
stances rendering notification im-
practicable.
[4] An officer may not enter a pri-
vate building without consent for
the purpose of conducting a search
pursuant to subsection [1] unless
one of the conditions specified in
section 11[3] exists.
[Use of force]
Section 19. A person lawfully
conducting a search pursuant to
any provision of this Chapter may
use such physical force against a
person or property as is reasonably
necessary successfully to execute
the search; but deadly physical
force may be used only if the person
reasonably believes such force to
be necessary to defend himself or a
third person from the use or im-
minent use of deadly physical force.
[Receipt for seized items]
Section 20. A peace officer seizing
a tangible item as subject to seizure
under section 6 shall, as soon there-
after as is reasonably practicable,
prepare, sign, and serve a receipt
specifying the item seized and indi-
cating the time and date of the
seizure. If the tangible item is taken
from a person, the receipt shall be
given to that person. If the tangible
item is taken from a place, the re-
ceipt shall be given to any person
present who is in apparent control
of the place. If no such person ap-
pears to be present and the place
appears to be regularly unoccu-
pied, the receipt shall be forwarded
to the owner. If the owner's address
is unknown or the place appears
to be regularly occupied, the re-
ceipt shall be posted at the place.
[Custody and disposition of seized
matter]
Section 21[l]. Except as provided
in subsection [2], a peace officer
seizing or receiving a tangible item
subject to seizure under section 6
shall cause such item to be kept
safely so long as necessary for its
use in a criminal prosecution.
[2] After notice to the prosecut-
ing attorney and defendant, any
court before which a criminal
prosecution is currently pending
may issue an order directing the
release of a tangible item retained
pursuant to subsection [1]. An
order issued pursuant to this sub-
section shall be consistent with the
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possible use of the item in the crim-
inal prosecution and may include
the following:
(a) A direction to temporarily
transfer the item to another court
where the item is required as
evidence in a prosecution before
that court.
(b) A direction to return the
item to its owner on condition
that he will retain it and return
it for use in the criminal prose-
cution.
[3] When a tangible item re-
tained pursuant to subsection [1]
is no longer required for use in a
criminal prosecution, it shall be
disposed of as follows:
(a) Items subject by statute to
forfeiture shall be disposed of as
provided by such statute.
(b) Items constituting contra-
band shall be destroyed, except
that any items capable of inno-
cent use may be sold or retained
for use when sale is inappro-
priate. The receipts from any
sale shall be distributed in the
same manner as the receipts from
unclaimed property distributed
pursuant to part (d) of this sub-
section.
(c) Stolen property shall be re-
stored to the rightful owner. If
ownership of the property is dis-
puted, the court having jurisdic-
tion to try the offense involved
shall determine who is the right-
ful owner. Any person claiming
to be the owner, and knowing
that another also claims owner-
ship, shall file a motion before
the court requesting receipt of
the property, and give notice
of the motion to all other known
claimants.
(d) Stolen property which is
unclaimed shall be disposed of
as provided by the law applicable
to the governmental department
employing the peace officer who
seized or originally received the
property.
(e) All other property shall be
returned to the person from
whose person or premises the
property was seized unless other-
wise directed by the court having
jurisdiction to try the offense
involved. If the right to receive
the property is disputed, the
court shall determine the proper
disposition of the property. Any
person claiming a right to receive
the property, and knowing that
another person also claims that
right, shall file a motion before
the court requesting receipt of
the property, and give notice
of the motion to all other known
claimants.
Evidence introduced in a judicial
proceeding shall not be subject to
disposition under this subsection
except as directed by the court be-
fore which the evidence was intro-
duced.
[Order for nontestimonial identi-
fication]
Section 22[l]. As used in this sec-
tion, an "identification order" is
an order directing a person to par-
ticipate in a nontestimonial identi-
fication procedure in any of the
following ways:
(a) Trying on clothing or other
articles.
(b) Submitting to the taking
of photographs.
(c) Submitting to the taking
of fingerprints, footprints, palm
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prints, and other body impres-
sions.
(d) Submitting to the taking
of specimens of blood, urine,
saliva, breath, hair, and nails, if
the taking does not involve an
unreasonable intrusion upon the
body.
(e) Providing handwriting and
voice exemplars.
(f) Submitting to body mea-
surements and other reasonable
body surface examinations.
[2] An identification order may
be issued only by a Circuit Court
or Recorder's Court judge. A Cir-
cuit Court judge may issue an iden-
tification order only in connection
with the alleged commission of a
state offense that would be triable
within the Circuit. A Recorder's
Court judge may issue an identifi-
cation order only in connection
with the alleged commission of a
state offense that would be triable
in Recorder's Court.
[3] Application for an identifica-
tion order may be made only by a
prosecuting attorney or peace offi-
cer. The application shall be in the
form of an affidavit sworn to or
affirmed before the court. The affi-
davit shall contain each of the fol-
lowing:
(a) The name of the court re-
quested to issue the order.
(b) The name and title of the
applicant.
(c) The name of the designated
person whose participation in an
identification procedure is re-
quested.
(d) The particular identifica-
tion procedure in which his par-
ticipation is requested and the
scope of that participation.
(e) A statement that there is
reasonable cause to believe each
of the following:
(i) That a state offense has
been committed.
(ii) Either that the desig-
nated person committed such
offense, or that one of a group-
ing of not more than several
persons committed the offense
and the designated person falls
within that grouping.
(iii) That the information to
be obtained from the requested
identification procedure will
be of material aid in determin-
ing whether the designated
person committed the offense.
(iv) That the information to
be obtained from the desig-
nated person's participation in
the identification procedure
cannot be obtained practicably
from a law enforcement agency
or other public official or
agency.
(f) Allegations of fact, of a
kind prescribed in section 5[2](d),
establishing the reasonable cause
alleged in paragraph (e) of this
subsection. The applicant also
may submit affidavits of other
persons containing allegations of
fact supporting those contained
in the applicant's affidavit.
[4] The affidavit also may contain
a request that the order direct the
designated person to be taken into
custody and brought forthwith be-
fore the court for the purpose of
requiring immediate participation
in the identification procedure.
Such request must be supported by
allegations of fact, of a kind pre-
scribed in section 5[2](d), estab-
lishing reasonable cause to believe
either that:
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(i) The designated person will,
upon service of the order, either
flee or alter or destroy a physical
characteristic to be examined.
(ii) The evidence sought will
be lost if the procedure is not
conducted forthwith.
[5] In ruling on the application,
the court shall examine the appli-
cant and may examine any other
person believed to possess relevant
information. A finding that reason-
able cause exists, however, may be
based only on information con-
tained in the application and any
supporting affidavits.
[6] If the court is satisfied that
the application meets the require-
ments of subsection [3], and that
reasonable cause exists with respect
to each of the elements specified
in paragraph (e) of subsection [3],
the court shall issue an order di-
recting the designated person to
participate in the requested identi-
fication procedure. If the court also
finds that reasonable cause exists
with respect to the issuance of an
order requiring immediate partic-
ipation, as specified in subsection
[4], it shall direct that a peace
officer take custody of the desig-
nated person and bring him forth-
with before the court. Upon
presentation of the designated
person, the court shall read the
order to him and give him a rea-
sonable time to consult with a
lawyer. The court also shall inform
the designated person that any
challenge or request for modifica-
tion must be presented promptly,
and that if the order is not vacated
or modified, the designated person
will be directed to participate forth-
with in the authorized procedure.
[7] The order of the court shall
contain each of the following:
(a) The name of the issuing
court, the subscription of the is-
suing judge, and the date of
issuance.
(b) The name of the person
upon whose application the order
was issued and the name of any
person whose affidavit was filed
in support of that application.
(c) A statement of the facts es-
tablishing the reasonable cause
on which the order was issued,
or, in lieu of such a statement, a
copy of the application and any
supporting affidavits may be at-
tached.
(d) A direction that the desig-
nated person be at a particular
place at a specified time and
submit to a specified identifica-
tion procedure. Unless the court
issues an order requiring forth-
with participation pursuant to
subsection [4], the time specified
for participation shall be at least
three days after the service of the
order.
(e) A direction that a person
identified by name or classifi-
cation conduct the specified
identification procedure. The
procedure may be conducted by
a peace officer or other person
designated by the court, except
that the taking of a blood spec-
imen shall always be conducted
under medical supervision. Med-
ical supervision may also be re-
quired for any other procedure
as appropriate. The court may
also require that specific methods
be employed in administering
the identification procedure, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the
requirement that the administra-
tion of the procedure be filmed,
photographed, or otherwise re-
corded.
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(f) A direction that the desig-
nated person be detained no
longer than a specified period
which is reasonably necessary to
conduct the procedure.
(g) A direction that the desig-
nated person not be subjected to
investigative interrogation in the
absence of counsel during the
period of his appearance.
(h) A direction that the order
be served within five days of its
issuance, or, if the court has
found reasonable cause to believe
that it may be difficult to
promptly locate the designated
person, a direction that the order
be served within ten days of its
issuance.
(i) A direction that the order
be returned as provided in sub-
section [8].
(j) A statement informing the
designated person that he will be
under no legal obligation to sub-
mit to interrogation or make any
statement during the period of
his appearance, except for such
statement as may be required for
voice identification.
(k) A statement informing the
designated person that he may be
accompanied by counsel and, if
the designated person cannot
afford to obtain counsel and re-
quests the assistance of counsel,
the court will appoint counsel to
assist him.
(1) A statement informing the
designated person that any at-
tempt to alter substantially the
physical characteristics to be ex-
amined in the identification pro-
cedure constitutes a violation of
the order.
(m) A statement informing the
designated person of his rights
under subsection [10].
(n) A statement informing the
designated person that he may
request that the court make a
reasonable modification of the
order with respect to time, place,
or manner of conducting the
procedure, including a modifica-
tion to have the identification
procedure conducted at the des-
ignated person's place of resi-
dence where practicable.
(o) A statement informing the
designated person that he may
challenge the order on the ground
that it was improperly issued.
(p) A statement informing the
designated person of the proce-
dure to be followed if he desires
to request the assistance of a
lawyer provided by the court,
request modification of order, or
challenge the order.
(q) A statement informing the
designated person that if he fails
to comply with the order, he may
be held in contempt.
[8] The identification order shall
be served by a peace officer by per-
sonally delivering a copy to the
designated person. If the order is
not served within the time speci-
fied, it shall be returned to the
court within two days thereafter.
The return shall note the lack of
service and the reason therefor. If
the order is served, but the desig-
nated person does not participate
in the identification procedure as
directed, the order shall be returned
thereafter, without unnecessary de-
lay. The return shall note the ser-
vice of the order, the lack of
implementation, and the reason
therefor, if known. If the order is
served and the designated person
participates in the identification
procedure, the order shall be re-
turned thereafter, without unneces-
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sary delay. The return shall note
the service of the order, its im-
plementation, and shall contain a
summary of the evidence obtained
from the procedure.
[9] An identification order shall
be issued with all practicable se-
crecy, and prior to the service of
the order, neither the order, the
application, nor any supporting affi-
davit shall be made public except
(i) as is reasonable to serve the
order, (ii) as directed by the court
that issued the order, or (iii) as di-
rected by any other court prelim-
inary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding pending before
that court.
[10] The designated person shall
be given a copy of the results of
any scientific testing procedure as
soon as those results are available.
If, within 30 days following his
participation in the procedure, the
designated person has not been
charged with the offense specified
in the application or a related
offense, all evidence and records
obtained from the identification
procedure shall be destroyed
promptly. The court may, however,
on a showing of good cause, extend
the period during which the rec-
ords and evidence may be retained
as is reasonably necessary to facili-
tate a continuing investigation or
prosecution. Notification of the
destruction of the records and ev-
idence shall be filed with the court
by the applicant. A copy of the no-
tification shall be sent to the desig-
nated person.
[Order directing prosecutor partici-
pation in a nontestimonial identi-
fication procedure]
Section 23[1]. Upon application
of an accused person, a Circuit
Court judge or Recorder's Court
judge may issue an order directing
a prosecuting attorney to provide a
specified identification procedure
for participation therein by the
applicant. The order may require
that the prosecutor provide any
identification procedure that could
be ordered pursuant to section 22[l].
A Circuit Court judge may issue an
order upon application of an ac-
cused person only in connection
with an alleged state offense that
would be triable within the Cir-
cuit. A Recorder's Court judge may
issue such an order only in connec-
tion with an alleged state offense
that would be triable in Recorder's
Court.
[2] An application for issuance
of an order pursuant to this section
shall be in the form of an affidavit,
sworn to before the court. The
affidavit must contain each of the
following:
.(a) The name of the court re-
quested to issue the order.
(b) The name of the applicant
and the particular identification
procedure in which he desires to
participate.
(c) A statement that the appli-
cant either (i) has been charged
with commission of a state offense
through issuance of a complaint,
information or indictment, or (ii)
is the subject of an investigation
by a peace officer or prosecuting
attorney relating to the commis-
sion of a state offense.
(d) A statement that there is
reasonable cause to believe that
the results of the requested iden-
tification procedure will be of
material aid in determining
whether the applicant committed
the offense specified in para-
graph (c).
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(e) Allegation of fact, of a kind
prescribed in section 5[2](d), es-
tablishing the applicant's status
under paragraph (c) and the rea-
sonable cause alleged in para-
graph (d).
[3] If the court is satisfied that
the application meets the require-
ments of subsection [2], that the
applicant meets the requirements
of paragraph (c) of subsection [2],
and that reasonable cause exists as
alleged in paragraph (d) of subsec-
tion [2], it shall issue an order di-
recting the prosecuting attorney to
provide the requested identification
procedure for participation therein
by the applicant. In ruling on the
application, the court may request
that a prosecuting attorney file a
sworn response thereto, which the
court may consider in making its
ruling.
[4] The order of the court shall
contain each of the following:
(a) The name of the issuing
court, the subscription of the is-
suing judge, and the date of
issuance.
(b) The name of the person
upon whose application the
order was issued.
(c) A statement of the facts
upon which the order was issued,
or, in lieu of such a statement, a
copy of the application may be
attached.
(d) A direction that the prose-
cuting attorney provide a speci-
fied identification procedure for
participation therein by the ap-
plicant.
(e) The particular place and
time at which the procedure shall
be conducted. The specified time
shall be at least three days after
service of the court's order on
the prosecuting attorney.
(f) A direction that the proce-
dure be conducted in accordance
with such methods as are sped-
fled by the court. The court shall
require that any blood test be
conducted under medical super-
vision, and may impose such
further requirements as may be
imposed under section 22[7](d).
(g) A direction that the iden-
tification procedure be conducted
with reasonable promptness.
(h) A direction that the ap-
plicant not be subjected to in-
vestigative interrogation in the
absence of counsel during the
period of his appearance.
(i) A direction that the order
be served and returned as re-
quired under subsections [5] and
[6].
(j) A direction that the appli-
cant be permitted to be accompa-
nied by counsel.
[5] The court's order shall be
served by personal delivery to the
prosecuting attorney or by mailing
a copy to the prosecuting attorney.
[6] If the identification procedure
is not provided as required by the
court order, the applicant shall
promptly return the order to the
court, together with a statement of
the reason why it was not imple-
mented, if known. If the identifica-
tion procedure is provided, the
prosecuting attorney shall there-
after return the order to the court,
without unnecessary delay. The re-
turn shall note the implementation
of the order and shall contain a
summary of the evidence obtained
from the procedure.
[7] The applicant shall be given
a copy of the results of any scien-
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tific testing as soon as the results are
available. If the applicant is a per-
son specified in paragraph (c)(ii) of
subsection [2] and is not charged
with the commission of a state
offense relating to the identification
procedure within 30 days following
his participation therein, all evi-
dence and records obtained from
the identification procedure shall
be destroyed promptly. The court
may, upon a showing of cause, ex-
tend the period during which the
records and evidence may be re-
tained as is reasonably necessary to
facilitate a continuing investigation
or prosecution. Notification of the
destruction of the records and ev-
idence shall be filed with the court
by the prosecuting attorney. A copy
of the notification shall be sent to
the applicant.
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